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SENIOR OFFICERS DEBRIEFING PROGRAM

CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH

and

COLONEL JOHN R. MEESE
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOUSTON P. Houser III

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. 17013
Interview with Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough

by

Colonel John R. Meese
and
Lieutenant Colonel H. P. Houser III

This is the first session of the oral history interview of Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, conducted by Colonel John R. Meese, on the mike at this time, and Lieutenant Colonel Parks Houser. Location: Southern Pines, NC; date: 28 March 1975.

Interviewer: General Yarborough, we'd like to ask you initially if you would like any restrictions at all placed upon the use of these tapes in connection with this program and the Army War College?

LTG Yarborough: No, these tapes become your property and the property of the War College to do whatever you want to with them after we are finished. I don't think we'll get in to any areas that are so sensitive that they ought to be looked at from that point of view; but, I guess if we do, we can identify them at the time and make the decision thereafter. But, they're your tapes.

Interviewer: Okay, sir, fine. Thank you very much. Well, sir, then generally starting off this first session, we thought we'd talk about Airborne operations in North Africa, maybe Sicily, Italy, and Southern France in that time frame from about November 1942 to September 1944. We were very interested in reading in your biographical sketch, the part that you had in those operations. I think it would be of significant interest to military historians and students of a
more general nature of military history of the World War period to know something about the planning and the strategic concept that went into those operations as well as any equipment problems or coordination problems or anything that came up that we could think about from a lessons learned point of view. Just start it off with any ideas you have about North Africa, sir, that first one. Would you care to make any comments on that?

LTG Yarborough: I...I was picked by General Mark Clark to become part of the London Planning Group to address Airborne operations. Partially, I suppose because I was extremely enthusiastic about Airborne operations and maybe having been one of the early...early officers in the activity, he felt that perhaps I was qualified to do this. I don't know really why I was picked other than I was available and had had a certain amount of experience. I went to... I went to England in, I guess it was July 1942. (Incidentally there are probably going to be a lot of inaccuracies as far as dates and amounts and this, that and the other, which we can sort out.) I went with more enthusiasm than real background, knowledge, intelligence about strategy and didn't really know what the Airborne goal or objective that Mark Clark had in mind was until I arrived in England. Clark pointed out to me the area that he thought Airborne operations
ought to take place in North Africa and I, of course, was very enthusiastic about it and went to work immediately to try to implement or to outline a concept that would be adequate and appropriate for the level of Airborne forces that we had at that time. Incidentally, we didn't call them airborne; airborne was something you came upon a lot later and a lot of us resented it from a point of view that we felt a parachutist was a different kind of a guy than a "glider-rider." These are little differences, of course, in light of the great spread of history and all, don't mean that much, but at the time I can assure you it was quite a feeling between the guy who rode in an airplane or a glider and the guy who jumped out of one. So, we were talking about parachute operations into North Africa. General Clark had the view on this strategic impact of an airborne or a parachute landing in North Africa. I learned from him. I was a young fellow without too much sophistication on the strategic scene. But as events developed and as the concept developed, the strategic part of this thing became extremely clear that the whole North African affair was a surprise. Astounding, in view of the fact that the preparations for it were so extensive and the enemy intelligence was so active, but to the thought of landing behind
enemy lines to seize a couple of strategic airfields out of a clear sky when parachute operations were not all that common, put this thing in a strategic category, let's put it that way. I don't know... I could go on and on on this but you want to sort of direct this into...into channels that will answer some questions, I presume. You don't want just a lot of impressions and a lot of feelings about it.

Interviewer: Well, sir, the impression that you gave on the difference in terms in the use of the parachutist versus airborne is something that I hadn't run into in any of our reading and that was very, very interesting.

What we initially were concerned with was the planning aspect of the actual operations. Given the setting that you have presented, that it was so different and with the limited capabilities we had. Could you discuss for us some of the planning problems you had in either material, equipment of troops, assembly, if you could go into that now, sir?

LTG Yarborough: Yeah,...

Interviewer: What was your grade at this time, sir?

LTG Yarborough: I was a Major, a newly made Major. I had been out on a glider site survey board that went to the panhandle of Texas and Oklahoma and various
places looking for areas to mount or to work on glider operations, a training for glider operations. My traveling companion was Lew Barringer, who was one of the few people who was a, I guess a what do they call that, silver ... silver C or whatever. In any case, he was one of the few glider experts in the country. He was later killed. And I was made a Major while I was out on that operation.

Incidentally, also I ... I was ... I was assigned as the assistant military attache to Moscow and I went to Washington to take the attache course and to get briefed and this that and the other. My job was to look into Russian parachute operations because they were way ahead of us in many ways. And under cover of being an assistant attache, I was supposed to go and see what they were doing and how they were doing it. But the Russians wouldn't give me a visa and working with Russians later on, I understood why and how. I went to the Russian Embassy myself after the State Department was unable to get a visa for me and was told that the government had moved from Moscow back to Kuibyshev and would take a little time and so on. So it was then I came back to Fort Bragg and Mark Clark picked me to go to England on the planning group. I voluntarily abandoned the mission to Moscow and told them, "The hell with it, I didn't want it and wouldn't take it under any circumstances thereafter." And, incidentally,
after I was in England, I guess we were on the verge of going into North Africa. I got word "it's okay now, you can go to Moscow." Well, you know what you can do with Moscow." So, I should say here in that connection that some of the best training material we had in the early days on the techniques of parachuting, were Russian. And, curiously enough translated by my father who was a Russian linguist. He was in the 31st Infantry in Siberia during World War I, and he was an intelligence officer with the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. Came back to the Philippines with the 31st Infantry and kept up his Russian capability and these documents that I used as test officer in the provisional parachute group were ... came from that source. I remember seeing pictures of Russians lying along the upper wing of a huge Russian airplane and holding on with their fingertips and at the command "turn loose," they would fall off the wing and I remember thinking of all the stupid ways to make a living that a guy could do or the most tenuous way to go into combat, this is number one; and if anybody ever accuses me of wanting to do that, why you know they are nuts too. Well, in any case, the problems connected with the equipment: with assembly on the ground; with air loading; were not by any manner or means, licked, when we went to England to get ready for the African invasion. We had begun by kicking the bundles out the door of a C-33 and C-39. This was obviously
unsatisfactory for anything except an infiltration of a small number of people.

The technical problems and the danger problems were germane. Also, you couldn't fly long distances with a cargo door off an airplane. The "daisy-chain" method was an ingenious kind of thing, where one bundle was attached to another of the first one so that one, the parachute would open and then in succession each one would trip the one above it. There were all kinds of ingenious things like that.

We progressed from that system to the para-pack system, where bundles were faired underneath the fuselage of a C-47 and could be released in salvos like a bomb. However, the ... even though they were faired and streamlined, they slowed the airplandown considerably and were not really satisfactory. The problem of identifying one's own bundle on the ground: we borrowed much from the Germans in technology in that score with colored parachutes. And at night we had plastic flashlight looking devices that attached to the various bundles, red and green, amber. But, I won't go into all of the permutations and combinations of things that we tried to do to improve our logistic capability which was, of course, the life's blood of an airborne outfit. But the problems were not solved when we went into Africa. The problems of communication... yes...
Interviewer: Before you get into that, you had mentioned in your article that
have
we both read, that when you got to England, it was the first time when the
troops, Colonel Raff's people, were able to really get involved in good
training and that the rapport with the British was very good and that your
people adopted some of the items of equipment from the British. Could you
elaborate a little bit on the training in England, the equipment that the
British might have had during this period of time?

LTG Yarborough: Well, we were ... we were attached to the British First Airborne
Division. I say we--the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry-- which later
Parachute
was redesignated as the 2nd Battalion, 509th Infantry and was then redesignated
as the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. In the typical way that the guys that want
to guard the traditions and heritage of the Army units do, you know, changing
names and numbers around. But that unit was in England when I arrived. It had
preceded me by, oh, I guess three or four months, and let me illustrate the
difference in training methods by...yeah, that's a lot better... by pointing
out this business of realism. We...I don't know whether I had it in my little
article there or not, about the operation in North Ireland?

Interviewer: Yes sir, you did, just briefly mentioned.
LTG Yarborough: Well, this was a real eye opener to us because we had always been simulating in the U. S.; simulating tanks and simulating equipment that we didn't have and pulling our punches on maneuvers in ways that made things more unrealistic than they should have been. Well, this jump we made in north Ireland was for the purpose of knocking out a pontoon bridge and interrupting the withdrawal of the enemy. And we jumped alright; we moved cross country in a proper way and came to the bridge and we said "bang-bang, the bridge is destroyed." And a British officer there who was the umpire said, "Okay old boy, how are you going to do it?" So we said, "Well, we'll blow it up."

"Well, go ahead and blow it up." "Well, we haven't got the stuff." "Well, why haven't you got the stuff?" In other words, we were supposed to really be prepared to operate and we learned a lot from the British along this line. The other thing that impressed me most, was the way the British marched on the road. They could outmarch us 2-1 because they used a different kind of a stride and they could keep this stride up for along periods of time. Whereas our people were physically as fit, they didn't know how to use their muscles in the same way.

The commando-type training that our people underwent also was rough and tough and I think we learned a great deal from the British along these lines. The
equipment, however, we felt that our parachute was superior to the British because it looked better on the outside. Ours was the T-3 then, I believe, which was laced around the edge and presented a nice neat package, whereas the British 'chute looked like it was stuffed into a laundry bag. However, you know today, we have something comparable to the British 'chute, that is the lines come out first and then the canopy comes out of the bag. Ours was just reversed and we had a lot of problems with it in the early days. Many more malfunctions than one has today. So, little by little, we moved over to the British system on that, but come to think about it, one of the major things that the British taught us was the production of models, scale models for airborne operations. I don't think we've still learned how to produce the kind of models that we need for detailed consideration of a target that requires every man to know what he's going to do personally. The models that the British built for us on the North African scene were absolutely marvelous. I don't know where they are now. I don't know whether they got into somebody's private possession or whether they are in museums somewhere or whatever. But they were so good that when we finally went into that activity, every man knew exactly
where he was by his familiarity with the model. And I think I mentioned in
the . . . in my notes on that action, that if I had had any mystification at all
about where we were, after marching the night on the desert, when dawn came and I
saw the characteristic line of trees that I remembered so well on the model, I
knew exactly where I was. Well, the British had a system for turning those
things out. Intelligence was translated into military characteristics of a
model which were produced without backing and filling and requisitioning and
whatever. The British First Airborne Division had a means of doing that and
we relied very heavily on them for those things. Another thing was the dummy--
the explosive parachute dummy--which was used as a decoy. The British developed
those, had them in stock and one could requisition them. Later, when we went
into the south of France, we dropped, I guess four, five, maybe eight hundred
of those in a diversionary operation which drew German attention away from where
the main thrust was going to be. British rations we used. They were lighter
than ours, they might not have been as palatable to the Yank, but they kept body
and soul together. I'm trying to think, well, of course we got the "Fairbairn"
knife from the British. (Note: Fairbairn-Sykes Fighting Knife.) In World War II,
all paratroopers carried the Fairbairn knife until we began to arrive on the scene
in too large numbers as to be able to procure them. I can't . . . there are
probably other items of equipment and
other techniques that I may remember as we go along. Bill Ryder and I, you

know Ryder who commanded the test platoon, he and I went to the British Parachute

school at Ringway to check on their methods and training actions and philosophy.

And I guess the things we learned or the thing that was most outstanding there

was the kind of discipline that the British exerted over their parachute units

and people. But we weren't too far behind in our own discipline in those days,

it was damn good. I think we had the philosophy that these being highly

selective units and volunteer units, that a man who couldn't tow the mark

in a disciplinary way, was not needed and was not wanted and we could fire him

out. . . there was no sweat whatever. We could terminate his membership in an

Airborne outfit by saying he was unfit. This covered a lot of ground. Well, let's

see, where the heck were we, here?

Interviewer: Your a...it's amazing to me just hearing you talk about the

number of things that you must have cranked into special forces later. I can just

see any number of those ideas which you must have gotten that re-appeared in

our training, in Special Forces. . .

LTG Yarborough: Well, let me say a word about that. When we first began the

parachute units, when we had the 501st Parachute Battalion, we considered that

more in the line of combination of Ranger-Special Forces than we did of straight
leg infantry arriving by air. I turned out a book on hand to hand fighting in that period, consisting of a lot of photographs showing what a man could do to disable his enemy with his steel helmet; with his elbows; with whatever.

We made a big point out of demolition. We worked on railroads, water supply and whatever might be vulnerable in the enemy's rear. And a paratrooper was supposed to be able to do these things as a sort of a prime objective, not just as a side issue. And the philosophy we built into those outfits was that wherever you land, you are liable to land in the wrong place. It's a coin flip. You are to do the kind of damage to the enemy that you are trained to do and don't let it worry you that you may end up in two's or three's or a half a dozen. That's part of the racket, you see. And I think later on when we talked about the philosophy of modern airborne or modern parachute units, that my feeling that highly skilled fighters, demolition types, disruptive types who can be introduced deep into the enemy's rear have more validity today than perhaps the concept of dropping a division on silk in the era of red-eye type, strella missile offense and so on.

Interviewer: We'll pick back up in flying into Algeria. It's amazing to me reading about your comments about the lack of navigational aids and how the pilot seemed to be darn near dead reckoning as dawn came up and
they were trying to figure out where they were on the coast and then coming...

LTG Yarborough: Well, this...this...there was a real reason for that and it revolved around the lack of desire on the part of the Air Force, the Air Corps, to haul parachute troops. They were a logistic force for the Army and for the air elements. They resented being taken off the kinds of jobs that were providing support to both air units and army units to fly tactical missions or strategic, if you will. Consequently, that force that went into North Africa, some of them only arrived at the take-off airdrome the night before they were supposed to take off. The installation of the navigational gear even to keep in formation had been delayed by all kinds of problems that reflected the lack of posture on the part of our flying arm to haul parachute troops. The troops themselves were superbly trained, along side the air element. The air guys were gallant, fine young, tremendous people but they certainly had not had the kinds of training that the Germans had going into Crete or someplace like that, you see. So, the lack of navigational aids were chargeable directly to delay in engineering and lack of emphasis on the part of the Air Force on that particular thing, not because we weren't technically capable of doing it. The Rebecca-Eureka which was on the...supposedly on our target area, was put out of action because of the
complexity of the strategic plan. There is another thing soldiers will never learn, that if a plan is simple, it's liable to work; if it's complex, it's chances of working are ... they just go down astronomically, you see, so we had the complicated set of circumstances revolving around whether the French would fight or whether they wouldn't fight; and if they didn't fight, what we would do; if they did fight what we would do; and the Rebecca-Eureka was a casualty of that situation, not mechanically.

Interviewer: Why don't you explain a little bit what you mean by that term, sir?

LTG Yarborough: Rebecca-Eureka?

Interviewer: Right. I read it in your book but...

LTG Yarborough: Well, this was, I guess the first radar that responded to another signal. The Rebecca was on the ground and the Eureka was in the airplane and Rebecca put out a signal and it was responded to by the airplane which then got a fix on it and homed in on it. This thing, like radar, was developed in England and I think what I said was in the early days we guided some air-planes over our position in London, just to make sure that the thing would work. And it... it had... it had a lot of capabilities that didn't get a ... have a chance to
be exercised because of the complexity of that planning problem.

**Interviewer:** You had mentioned that a Signal Corps Lieutenant who was placed out of the service and his job was to get the Eureka on the ground in Algeria to be on the ground, but you didn't elaborate in your paper. Would you care to discuss any more—you said you saw him later, that you, in England, said goodbye to him and the next you were to see him in Algiers. Then you indicated that it really didn't work or...

**LTG Yarborough:** Well, Hapgood, this Lieutenant Hapgood who had been schooled by the British in the operation of Rebecca—Eureka, had the job of smuggling it in North Africa through diplomatic channels. And in order to do this of course he had to get another identity. He had to be taken out of the... released from the Army and sent through in civilian status to Algiers. And he made it there all right. But, since the time that the airplanes were supposed to arrive was delayed a considerable amount of time when he was supposed to be out there at Tafaraoui Airdrome working the radar, working the Rebecca-Eureka, he wisely blew the thing up and vanished because had he been sitting there for several hours operating this device, his chances of survival would have been pretty low, I think.

**Interviewer:** So, he exercised good lieutenant-type initiative and...
LTG Yarborough: Absolutely, he saw something was snafu or he had every reason to believe that it would be and he took off. Now, in addition to that device, of course, we had a British ship orbiting in the Mediterranean off the coast of North Africa, sending out a signal which was supposed to ... supposed to simulate an Italian signal and this thing was off frequency, see, so the airplanes didn't catch that either. Well, there were a lot of reasons, it was a miracle that we hit North Africa at all. But the fact that we did was a tribute to the guts of the young pilots and the co-pilots, navigators. The formation at night over Spain had a great difficulty in staying together, mainly because they couldn't show proper running lights for obvious reasons, flying over neutral country. And the inter-cockpit or the communications system that was supposed to link the airplanes in flight had not been installed completely nor had everybody checked it out. So, we were operating on faith to a great degree.

Interviewer: Well, that's good. As we came in and made that first drop, I know you had that problem with the, you know the aircraft that intercepted and a lot of the people didn't get into the right place and because of that had to land. For what you got on the ground everybody was able to get assembled and get into the correct position all right?
LTG Yarborough: Well, no. To try to recreate this is a...is a real difficult thing. To paint a word picture of what happened there. Because, as a matter of fact, it was months and months and months before all the details began to leak out and things were pieced together and one knew who had done what to whom and what had happened. But, let's start first with the flight in darkness over Spain and the formation breaking up little by little because of lack of capability of even to see or communicate. When dawn came, the airplane I was in had Tom Schofield who was the Commander of the, you know the structure of this force, I'm sure. It was called Paratroop Task Force and a fellow named William C. Bently, an Air Corps Colonel, commanded the airplanes and the parachutists while in flight. The minute the parachutists hit the ground, they were out of the command, away from the command of William C. Bently and became a part of 2nd Corps when they connected up with 2nd Corps, 2nd Army Corps, I guess they called it then. Now, Schofield commanded the airplanes, Bently commanded the whole business. I was Bently's executive officer but I was also Mark Clark's G-3 planner for parachute operations. I went on the trip as the Executive Officer of the Paratroop Task Force. And when we hit the ground, I was supposed to then report back to Mark Clark and tell him who struck John, which was a pretty big deal to talk about. Well, when dawn came and the airplane I was in saw
one airplane on its flank and no others on the horizon and the commander of

the transport group was deeply concerned about it; I stood in back of Schofield

and tried from my knowledge of the terrain models we had and the maps we had
to figure out where we were. We saw land, lots of it and mountains,

but it wasn't until we saw a particular section of the coast of North Africa

that we realized that we were well to the south of where we should...well to

the west of where we should have been. We saw Melilla, the islands of Melilla

and then we decided to turn toward our objective and we knew where we were then.

But then the concern was about where the other force was, what had happened to
it? And I think I mentioned our real fright at seeing a couple of other air-
planes begin to approach us, thinking perhaps they were Vichy fighters and we

found that they were our own and little by little we got some airplanes together.

We then flew over a section of Spanish Morocco where we saw two of our airplanes
down...one airplane down on the ground with what appeared to be "SPAHIS" or

troops on horses rounding up the guys that were...who had gotten out of the

airplanes, so we knew that that was not the place. My next...my next memory

is of the Sebkra of Oran, this long oval desert stretching to the east of...

or to the west of Oran and seeing on the ground a half a dozen airplanes and

parachutes all over the place and some parachutes on the Sebkra of Oran and
some on the high ground to the north of the Sebkra. And I knew that this was not Tafaraoui or La Senia. I knew where those were, very clearly, but since the bulk of the force seemed to have gone down here, it seemed to me that was the place the rest of us should come because then we would provide at least a battalion kind of strength. So, I ordered...I ordered Schofield to land there. By this time we took off our 'chutes because we thought maybe we were going to have to fight when we got out of the airplane, and we landed there. When I got out, I could hear shooting, firing going on and action was going on in the high ground where we had seen the 'chutes spread out but one couldn't see who was shooting at whom. Well, I don't want to go through a completely unclear kind of a thing here, there's nothing to be gained by doing that other than to say that in due course, I found Ed Raff. Ed Raff the Battalion Commander had initiated the jump in that area. Seeing some tanks he thought they were the enemy and they weren't, they were our own.) He was... he was in no shape to take command of the battalion at that period because of his injury and so I took command of the battalion. My purpose was then to get the people that were together there and go and complete our mission, which was to seize La Senia and move to Tafaraoui, I believe.

Now, we'll have to straighten that out. Seize La Senia, move to Tafaraoui, destroy the airplanes at Tafaraoui and then move back in a perimeter around
La Senia. So, polling the airplane drivers, I found that almost all the airplanes were completely out of gas. I mean they didn't have none. Another reason why they had gone down on the Sebkra and were not fiddling around trying to find a better place. Well, I eventually found three airplanes that had enough gas we thought to get into La Senia and we jammed about, I guess, seventy or eighty people into those three airplanes, leaving all the chutes and everything to one side. Then it was that we were attacked on the way in, well, incidentally, this took all day. Walking through the mud of that Sebkra was just unbelievable. You couldn't move, you couldn't drive, you couldn't... your feet were like walking on fly paper and getting troops together and get them briefed and get them in the airplanes and getting the show on the road was an unconscionable kind of a chore. Furthermore, we'd been up, I guess for a couple of days, you know, full of adrenalin and ready to go and no sleep the night before flying over Spain and so we were tired among other things. And I guess when you are tired, your decisions aren't as good as they would be otherwise. Well, we flew very low for a lot of reasons and consequently when we were attacked by the three Dewoitine fighters, we didn't have far to go to hit the ground but it was enough to wash out the landing gear on the airplane I was in. We were hit broadside by the first pass of the Vichy fighters. And they made two passes, I guess.
while we were in the air and they hit something every time they came over and
then when we hit the ground, they flew over us one final time and peppered us
as we lay on the ground there. The airplanes were complete loss for a lot
of reasons. I guess salvage capability wasn't as good then as it is now. Then
we started to march into Tafaraoui or La Senia and arrived at dawn with a small
group of paratroopers, the ones that weren't too badly wounded. And we left the
dead on the Sebkra. But, these, these are all little things that don't... are
not really germane to the whole picture. The thing that made me happy that
we had done that operation and confounds the criticism of some of the experts
is that we were in Africa then with thirty-six, thirty-seven airplanes and
almost a whole parachute battalion. There weren't all that many casualties!!
And we got out of all that confusion, mind you, and history shows how much
confusion there was if you want to go into it in detail, but we got our parachutes
together, got them packed and five or six days later made another drop way the
hell to the east of Youks Les Bains in an occupied area. So, these forces
were invaluable and they got there the hard way but they learned an awful lot
and they weren't really all that chewed up.
Now, one airplane, I think went down in Gibraltar, a couple went down in Spanish Morocco. The rest of them were there for duty, see. As things developed in the North African theater, had we had a couple or three parachute battalions we could have cut off Rommel. Our move to the east would have been fantastically easier. We could have seized terrain features, oh, crystallized the feelings of the French about fighting and all sorts of things. But there were many, many faint hearts about parachute operations. Mark Clark was not one of them, but I'll tell you one that was and that was Hoyt Vandenburg who didn't want this thing to happen. And if it hadn't been for Jimmie Doolittle who said, "God Damn it, this is something that you really, you know, we really ought to do this."

But, Vandenburg and the guy that had NATO later, the Air Force officer... well known chap...

Interviewer: Lemnitzer, you mean?

LTG Yarborough: No, Air Force officer. He haunted young Air officers on the London planning group there, and they both opposed this. They said it's a profligate use of forces, we'd probably lose the airplanes. Our idea for what should happen to the airplanes after we got to Africa was that they should go inland and if... if Tafaraoui and La Senia didn't fold and we couldn't use them, go inland. We picked
three or four landing places where they could come down and we'd later move in with the logistic support and whatever and retrieve them, you see. Well, I...

I think it was a damn good venture for the reasons that I indicated earlier.

In the operation into Youks Les Bains, the French forces for the first time since the fall of France, got together with our people and presented a united front; and the Allied forces were so slow moving up there that the great advantage of seizing Faid Pass and Kasserine and that whole area; the advantage was lost. And so they had to do it over again, you see.

Interviewer: I guess in any new concept like that it wasn't really ready to take advantage of the whole implication of it.

LTG Yarborough: No, they were not.

Interviewer: What about once you were on the ground, once you had been in the airfield when... how far did you move toward Algeria, I mean towards Algiers? Did the battalion keep moving once it got in those?

LTG Yarborough: The battalion ...the battalion was airlifted out of La Senia to Maison Blanch which was the air field serving Algiers, over the period of the next five or six, five days after it hit there in the Sebkra. Now, a problem that we continued to have in the parachute operations was related to
maps. And there is never, never an adequate supply of maps. When we get later to Sicily, you know we went into that operation, I think with maybe one or two maps per battalion. We just weren't geared for that sort of thing and I remember looking at the map that Ed Raff had of Youks Les Bains. There was a little pencil circle around it, you know, Youks Les Bains. Where the hell is that? Well, it's up here around the border of Tunisia. Practically no intelligence about the area. We knew that there was a French garrison there. We didn't know whether it would fight or not. The Germans were in the airfields at Kairouan and around that area and they were real mean with their airplanes in those days.

So, I can't just tell how flimsy the intelligence was for that action. And I think today, you'd probably get a big argument out of the 82nd as to whether they'd do it on that short notice and with that amount of intelligence, you see. But, we had the feeling that "who dares, wins." This is the motto of the British SAS.

Interviewer: Back in London, how far had you all planned ahead. How many operations had you foreseen?

LTG Yarborough: Ah, we hadn't foreseen any ... any beyond the ... the capture
of the two airdromes there. We hadn't foreseen any in detail, let's put it that way. Clark wanted the forces, I believe for leapfrogging; for picking objectives out ahead of the troops but we hadn't seen an orderly precession of developing airborne actions in terms of terrain and actual location.

Interviewer: Then in summary, in Algeria you could say that, I think you summed it up pretty well when you said that it could have been even more successful if we had been prepared to take advantage of these leapfrogging actions you are getting.

LTG Yarborough: But you see, we were so naive, not just in an airborne way, but the United States Army could thank God that it had an easy theater to begin in, because the mistakes in planning and the lack of real training and equipping for that area could have meant disaster for us. The move to the east to ... to take Tunis, we found that our logisticians didn't know the capacity of the railroads for one thing. It came as a big surprise to find that they could only take so much tonnage. The road nets, the kinds of vehicles we had to operate.

If it were, in fact, essential to move out to the east and cut off the retreating Germans, very few of the ... the really essential factors that we needed to do that with had been... had been addressed adequately. The kinds
of troops and the kinds of equipment and the philosophy of the movements, the whole thing, you see. So, it was a training theater and it really, I guess, it saved our bacon later on in so many ways that I just can't tell you. I saw our troops coming ashore there with the oranges and the New York Times in their hip pockets, you know. I had one classmate that came in there, opened his little suitcase and I found his boot trees and all kinds of stuff—our idea about war was a little screwy.

Interviewer: Well, that was really interesting, sir. As you got ready to go into Sicily then, how much warning... how much time did you have to put together a planning operation?

LTG Yarborough: Well, I'll tell you. I... after the... after the Tunisian affair, in which I was up there with Raff, I fought with Raff in the... in the Faid Pass battle and so on and... but I had no official status thereafter because the Parachute Task Force had been dissolved, the Paratroop Task Force, and so I was there as a staff officer representing Mark Clark. In due course, Raff took a dim view of this. He said, "Either you, you know, tie you down here or else get off my back." And so I went back to Clark and said, "Obviously, my services are no longer needed up there, Raff is supremely adequate to handle his operation." So, Clark said, "I'll tell you what I'm going to do, I'm going
to send you back to 101st Airborne and get you a command. There is only
one battalion here and obviously you want one." So, I came back to the 2I and
I had intended to join the 101st Airborne because Bill Lee was my friend and
mentor, William C. Lee, who commanded the 101st and he said General Ridgeway
had requisitioned me and there wasn't anything he (Lee) could do about it. So I, in
a sort of a young man's prima donna way, felt very dumped on and went over and
reported into the 82nd, hoping for some kind of recognition as to having already
been in a parachute operation and, as is the character of a big outfit, I got
none. And, therefore, my feelings were hurt and I became a sort of a spoiled kind
of a brat who wanted out of that outfit and someplace where people would come
up and say, "Hey, you've been in parachute operations; tell us how it was." Well,
I didn't get that in the 82nd, you see. I was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 504th
which I commanded, and went back overseas with the 504th. Ruben Tucker was
the regimental commander and he had been an old friend of mine, but I was so
intractable and so impossible that even Ruben Tucker felt that he had a burr
under his saddle. We went ... we landed in Casablanca, took a train across to
North Africa, I got off in ... I got off in Algiers because I had some personal
business to handle there. This has nothing to do with strategy tactics or any-
thing else, but I had a driver in Algiers that I had inherited in Tunisia, a
fellow named Salah Kaiah who was an Arab and a Peugeot car that Jack Thompson of the Chicago Tribune had willed to me when he left. And I had taken this car from Tunisia all the way back to Algiers and in the process this Salah Kaiah had relieved me of my wallet somehow or another. It was full of franc's, French franc's, my pay. And I had reported it to the gendarmerie when I had left to go back to get the command and so I wanted to get off in Algiers to find out what the gendarmerie had found, you know. So I went into the prefect of police and they said, "oh Monsieur, we have found the character who stole your money and I said, "Sure enough, it was Salah Kaiah." And so they returned all the money to me and in the meantime the rate of exchange had gone up and I had made about fifty percent on it. Well, I then joined my battalion at Kairouan where we had our parachutes on the ground under the olive trees laid out there under the blazing sun and .... Sicily was in the making, I had no part of that planning. This planning was done by the staff of the 82nd Airborne, a part of which were not Airborne officers, they were straight legs. And my distress was ever greater when the debacle occurred as it had because I felt that I had something to say...if I had something to say about a lot of things, about
recognition signals, about maps, about even equipment then maybe we could have avoided that...that thing, you see. This is ... this is personal feeling that probably has no real basis in fact. It's ... I'm now interpreting the ... the feelings of a younger fellow who was highly spoiled in many ways by having worked on high staffs at a young age, and sort of emotionally envolved in the parachute business and in the light of what happened to me later, if I'd been in General Ridgeway's position, I'd have done the same thing, you see. And I'll tell you later what it was. We... we had to both go to the surgeon to have his boot cut out of my rear end, and not only that, a lot of damage was done. But, I had no part of the planning of Sicily. I went into the Sicilian operation on the second lift that went in, and from a personal point of view, it was a traumatic experience, I can assure you, from every ... I didn't have a map as the battalion commander. Ruben Tucker had one, he had the only one in the outfit so far as I know. The briefings consisted of drawing on the ground with a stick—We're here; they're there. You're going to do this and they're going to do this, you see. When we took off to go into Sicily, you want to talk about that now?

**Interviewer:** Yeah.
LTG Yarborough: We took off to go into Sicily. It was late afternoon and we flew past the Island of Malta as the search lights were beginning to come up for the evening's pasting that they always got. And I remember standing in the door there, the door was off; thinking about what a gallant bunch of guys there were down there, you know, and all of a sudden we got a burst ... a burst of what appeared to be flak. And we couldn't understand it, I thought maybe a German aircraft has gotten to the ... into the formation. And then we passed over some Navy ships and we got some more of it. And these airplanes of ours had the broad white stripes painted on the underside, there was no way to ... not to recognize them for what they were ... whose they were. But darkness came really quickly and the flak became worse and worse and worse and we were flying through a solid wall of this stuff. When we got land-fall at Sicily, you could see fires burning all over the place and ... and the stuff was just coming up in sheaves. The airplane that I was in was piloted by a young fellow who was obviously as scared as everybody else was and I went up to tell him that we were going to hook up then and if it got any worse, we were going to get out wherever we were as long as it was over land. So, I fought my way up through two rows of
guys hanging there and found this young fellow scared to death, and I told him what I was going to do and he agreed because he wanted to get out of there and get back to North Africa if he could. So, I fought my way back to the door again and in the meantime the airplane on my left was shot down and hit the ground in flames and it had my S-2 in it, part of my communication section. Other airplanes were being hit. We could see around them and ours was hit several times with small stuff. And as I stood in the door ready to get out of there, the crew chief lying on his belly, said, "Colonel, it's a hell of a lot safer out there then it is in here." And I said, "Your damn right and that's why we are going out, see." Well, the reason, the reason that we got out is because the formation was being broken up and to have ... I think the pilot had lost his orientation by that time, anyhow, on the ... on the DZ. So, it... I think it still was a proper decision to bail out, so we did. Ah, the... we hit the ground back of the city of Niscari, the walled city of Biscari, I learned later. And we could hear the anti-parachute signals going, you know, "gong, gong gong." Out of my airplane, I think I hit the ground with about eight people. The rest of them, I didn't know where they were, and we couldn't raise too much fuss either with a Very pistol or signals or whatever to try to get them together because we didn't want the guys with the cold-scuttle helmets coming
in to get us. Well, we got the eight people together and put out a little point and began to march in the direction we thought was the coast (of Sicily).

We marched ... moved during most of the night. We slept under the leaves and then cautiously moved in the daylight. We didn't find any more of our people. I believe it was the second day we hit the coast and were able to identify where we were on the...

that on the lateral road. By this time, we were tired of walking and we decided the next vehicle that came along was going to be ours. Whether it was American, German Italian, whatever, Sicilian. So, we heard a... we heard a noise down the road and here came a jeep moving along and who should it be but my friend Billingsly, Chuck Billingsly. And that son of a bitch, you know, instead of saying, "Gee, you must of had a hard time," he said, "Hey, Yarborough, what are you doing out here?"

Well, to make a long story short, driblets of our outfit began to come in from all over the place, as always. And we got to, I guess most of the battalion together. Tucker was unreported for quite some time and I thought I was going to temporarily get the regiment which would have pleased me, but not at the expense of Rube Tucker. In due course, he showed up. And then the job was to move on foot around the western edge of the Island of Sicily, kicking
out the Italian rear guards or whoever wanted to fight and marching to the north coast. No plans for supply that we could see. Our food was what we had on us. No way to carry wounded or whatever, we were just on foot, see. So the ... with the battalion in pretty good shape, we began this march and ah, the first action that we ran into was at a place called Tumarilla Pass.

Tumarilla was high ground with a very distinct military terrain feature surrounding it, but in front of it was nothing but flat, billiard tables kind of terrain. We approached this thing shortly after daybreak in advance guard formation with our security well out, and were taken under fire by artillery from the pass. Whereupon, we deployed to both sides of the road, moved up a mortar, a couple of mortars and began to fire back and did what I thought was an excellent job of maneuvering under the overhanging terrain so that the artillery couldn't get to us. Finally stormed the pass and collared an Italian battery of artillery and I guess a company of infantry, whatever it was. We then brought the battalion up and they were inside the city, or in ... not ... not the city, inside the Tumarilla Pass area, and I'd sent security out on the roads coming into it; General Ridgway arrived. And he said, "What's going on here?"
I said, "Sir, we've just taken Tumarilla Pass." "Well," he said, "If you stay in
the area here, you are going to be shelled. Why aren't you out on the road?"

And I said, "Well, we just got a three quarter ton truck full of rations here
and we're going to distribute some and the guys are going to have something
to eat." "Well," he said, "This is no way to do it. Keep moving, get going."

So, we started moving again. And again, my feelings were hurt, you see and this
is a lesson for young officers. You shouldn't ... you shouldn't get your feelings
on your sleeves so much because war is time of stress and the more emotional
a guy is the more energy you use in things that are not productive. Well, I
felt that he should have patted me on the shoulder and said, "Say, you guys did a good
job here, you took this place, see you captured a battery of artillery." He didn't
anything of the kind. He said, "Get your butts out of here and get on the road
and let's get going." He said, "You are vulnerable here, you see." So, we got
moving. Now, the three quarter ton that had brought the ... brought the rations
was the only transportation we had then and I ... I decided that at one... at one
time to go ahead with this thing, just sort of find out what was up ahead, and

I put, I guess, an Italian ... an Italian interpreter, my S-3 and myself on this
thing in addition to the driver and we started ahead. We ran into a road block which was ... which was garrisoned by Italians who came out of the road block with their hands up, but their weapons were still in place and through the interpreter we had, they said, 'What are you guys doing here?' you know, like this. We said, 'Well, there's a ... there's an airborne division coming up the road and the best thing for you to do, would be to surrender now and save the trouble, you see. Otherwise they are liable to come in here shooting.' So a great dialogue took place; and hand waving and this that and the other and talking to each other, you know; should we do it, should we not do it and after all there are only these guys here, what's their word against what we can see. Well, fear predominated in their hearts and they said, 'All right. We'll do what you say.' I said, 'Well, take those guns now and take them apart and lay them alongside the road and get the ammunition out here, where we can see it. Take your sidearms off and put them here.' And they did all that. And I said, "Where is the main position?" They said, 'Well, it's just down the road here a little way.' 'Well, you come with me.' So they got in the three quarter ton and we went down the road and the officer comes out, you know with his barettas
on and "what the hell is going on here." So, we explained again, you see.

"You better, you know, lay it alongside the road here because an airborne division is coming up the road and it is going to be tough for you if you show any fight." Well, we went through the same process and I had them wreck that position and pile everything up and get everything so that it was in no shape to resist. Then some of the young Italian officers began to cry, see. Not cowardly, but saying, "Oh, mama mia, when am I going to see my kids again?"

And we'd say, "fellows, don't take it so hard, it's all right, you know, we treat PW's all right. Just take your pistol off and put it in the truck here and don't worry too much about it." Well, after ... after doing this damage to that area, then we waited for our people to come. Hours went by and hours went by and then these guys began to look at you and who are these son of a bitches, they came in here with a story like that, eh...eh, que falto, eh.

And by george, it was not until just before dusk in the evening that the first elements of the 82nd began to arrive up there. And by this time we had gone out of the defensive position and gotten one for ourselves alongside the road with our ammunition around us, you know, in case these squirts changed their minds. Well, that was an incident along the way to the north of Sicily. We
arrived up at a city called Alcamo and there I found that I was in fact the

mayor of the town because the whole civil structure had been wrecked, thrown

out. Patton, as you recall, did not allow any civil affairs officers in.

They were f a t as far as he was concerned. He wanted somebody who could

shoot, kill, cut 'em apart. But, here we were faced with problems that you

wouldn't believe. They came and said, "We've got a lot of political prisoners

in the jail. Shall we let them out?" I said, "Sure let them out." "There's been

a big argument over the price of bread. The Fascists have fixed the price

of bread. Can we ... what'll we do about this?" "Well, change it."

I sat at the mayor's desk in Alcamo for about three days, passing on things

like that, using the best judgement that I could ... that I could muster but

feeling completely inadequate, in the light of the human problems that surround

uncovering of an enemy city by an Army, you see. All kinds of things like that.

And I really ... really understand from that experience what civil affairs and

military government really do for an Army. It's what it's all about. You can

make people stop shooting by shooting at them, And once they get into a position

to listen to you, unless you have something to say that has to do with the fabric

of life around you, well, what have you done? You are wasting your time, you see.

Well, I got the order to move out of Alcamo and move north, I guess to , yeah,
I went up to Palermo and then I got orders to, I guess, come back and see Ruben Tucker and also go and see Ridgway, who said, "Your services are no longer required. You're a pain in our ass, excuse me, but you go back to Mark Clark and tell him that he should find another job for you." So, I went back to Mark Clark and Mark Clark said to me, he said, "You know, knowing your personality and that of General Ridgway," he said, "I never should have assigned you or allowed you to be assigned to that outfit in the first place." He said, "Now you ... you come back here with me and in due course, I'll see that you get a ... you get another command." But in the meantime, I wanted to die. I felt like a ... I felt that if I could only get into combat someplace and get an honorable slug or whatever, that I would have paid the price for my high spirited stupidity, you see. Challenging ... challenging authority in a way that ... no outfit can just work on that basis. You can't have that kind of thing and I recognized where the deficiency lay. It was with me and not with Ridgway or with Tucker. So, this was how I then got back in the parachute planning business for the invasion of ... into ... of ... of Italy. And went with the command ship "Ancon"/ the Salerno operation. And when ... when the going was really tough, when the whole 5th Army headquarters was in the weeds no higher than your waist and crawling around on their hands and
knees, the four stars and the three stars and everybody else all together, that
Clark asked me to see what could be done about bringing some parachute re-inforce-
ments in and I picked out that section of the beach there at Salerno and developed
this ... this great cross with a half of five gallon containers filled
with sand and gasoline and people to light them. But, having been through that
terrible experience in Sicily where our airplanes were being shot down right and
left by our own gunners, both Naval and Army, I recognized that something really
had to be done about that business at Salerno. Because we had been bombarded
day and night by the Kraut airplanes and they were over us all the time. You
all never lived under enemy air bombardment. I can tell you it's a real nerve-
wracking kind of thing. You could hear the JU-88's which had a motor synchronization
characteristic that you couldn't mistake what they were. Hearing them in the
dark above you and going around and around and knowing that pretty soon there
was going to be a big one blossom somewhere around you. But, they would circle
and drop a flare, a string of flares and one would think that by where the flares
came, you would see the airplane, but the flares actuated after the airplane
was long gone from that area. The flares were as light as day and you felt
naked as though somebody was saying, there's that Yarborough boy, let's get him.
So, General Gruenther put out instructions at my urging that no anti-aircraft battery on that beachhead would fire at anything under any circumstances during the period when the airlift was coming in from Sicily. And it didn't matter whether we were being attacked or whatever. And so this was the umbrella that they had coming there. Real dramatic business waiting for them to arrive under those circumstances. Everything quiet on the beachhead. The krauts wondering why the hell, I mean, are these guys all dead down there or what is... what's going to develop here? Finally, hearing the hum of the motors in the distance, because we had no mechanical means of picking them up from that distance, and wondering whether it was a bunch of German bombers or whether they were our planes.

Finally the sound of the C-47 and we lit the cross and the first guy that I say was Jim Gavin, my old friend. He... I picked him up in a jeep and he wanted to see Mark Clark so we went and found Mark in the underbrush.* Well, I guess it was... it was Ruben Tucker's regiment that came in there and then he went up to... he was assigned up to Altavilla, where some real tough fighting took place.

**Interviewer:** What was General Gavin's position then?

**LTG Yarborough:** He had just been... he had just been appointed assistant division

*Not correct. Tuckers Regt. (504) had been landed across the beach previously.*
Commander, I believe and just been made a Brigadier, I think.

Interviewer: Excuse me sir. This will be the end of side one of the tape for Lieutenant General Yarborough's remembrances and we'll return to side two in just a few minutes.

NOTES:
1. During a later interview LTG Yarborough stated that Ruben Tucker's regiment had *not* parachuted into Salerno as may be interpreted by reading the transcription. Tucker's regiment was positioned on the LCIs of the amphibious fleet and was introduced over water to the beachhead and moved by truck to Altavilla.
Interviewer: Well, sir, picking back up then in Sicily with the...

LTG Yarborough: Well, we were able to get a few trucks together to get Tucker's outfit up to Altavilla which was a flank that was really under attack. As a matter of fact, you know the story of the beachhead and history points out that we almost lost it and it was closer than a lot of people think. Because we were right on ... our one foot was in the water, Well, Tucker's outfit gained some respite for the beachhead and I went up to see him the morning after he had gotten in there and the results of the combat were all over the place. There were a lot of dead lying around, they didn't even have a chance to bury them. They were fighting too hard and it was ... it was a tribute, I think, to the parachute soldier the way the guy stuck up there without really adequate support.

He didn't know what was adequate or what was inadequate, he was just there to fight and did. Again, I was working for Clark as his eyes coming in from the command ship and from his headquarters to contact various units and report back to him personally as to what their situation was. This is the first contact I'd had with the 36th Division which later ... because of the news accounts and all
gave Clark a rather hard time. He asked me the first day of the landing to go
ashore and find out where the 36th was. Now, I went where I thought it was
supposed to be and I followed ... followed some communications wire which had
been laid out and finally came to the end of the communications wire and there
wasn't any 36th Division there. There was just the twisted pairs and I finally
found way off on a flank up on a hill top, some of the staff that were a little
confused. All gallant guys and courageous but non-professional soldiers, you
see and there was a ... there was a great deal of experience that had to be
soaked up there before they could really tangle with the Wehrmacht and do it
in a credible way. It seems we never learn our lesson on that. You go up
against a professional enemy and your own people have to be professional and it's
kind of hard to get that way on weekends. One of the first things that surprised
me about that outfit and the others that were called to the colors because, again
I was a fairly young fellow, was the highly informal relationship that existed
between the commanders and everybody all the way down the line. Not unusual to
come into a command tent and find them all with their feet up on a table, the
lieutenants and the captains and the commanders because they had been colleagues
in whatever town; one was a druggist, one was a mail carrier; it's characteristic of the U. S. forces to be that way, but as a professional soldier, I always felt that especially in combat or in times of stress, the little lines of formality had to be drawn so that the commander could indeed take the responsibility for what was going to happen and there wasn't any argument about it. I don't mean to say that this would preclude discussion and all of that, but sort of sitting around in a forum to decide who was going to do what didn't seem to me as ... to be the proper way to go about it. Well, ....

Interviewer: I believe to start off with ... you were going up to find them and report back to General Clark, I wonder if ....

LTG Yarborough: Yeah, well, I reported that they were indeed there, but the configuration was something to marvel at. They were ... they were certainly not ... they were not disposed as a combat force, as a fighting force and maybe ... maybe the Germans were just as surprised as they were to run into them in that shape. And I want to make it quite clear that ... I in no way cast off on the ... on the courage of the 36th Division but certainly they showed lots of evidence of not having been trained adequately to go into a situation that involved that kind of ... that kind of stress. Consequently, later on when they ..., they got into this problem of crossing the Rapido, one of the most difficult
kinds of jobs in ... in the ... in the old military art is crossing against a defended area and it was to be expected that the kind of professionality they needed to do that was not there. However, I'm not ... I'm not ... I'm not qualified, really, to talk in that depth about the 36th Division, but I am qualified to uphold Mark Clark's professional reputation because I saw him at close range under innumerable situations and I know him very well and knew him then and what I'm saying is that the castigation that he received was not deserved.

Interviewer: I've a blank in my knowledge on this castigation. What was the problem?

LTC Yarborough: The 36th Division, upon being ordered to cross the Rapido River, ran into a hornets nest of German defense and took great casualties as a result of it. Whereupon, Mark Clark was held up as having given them the wrong order; ordered them to do something that was not possible or within their resources, and this being a Texas National Guard outfit cause great concern in Congress and everywhere else about it, you see. And the fact was, it was a tough job, there is no question about it. But the 36th was not quite up to that kind of thing and any ... even a good outfit would have taken a little mudding on it, but it
was not an incorrect decision on the part of Mark Clark.

Interviewer: Okay.

LTG Yarborough: Well, it was ... was on the beachhead there, that ... that I recommended to General Clark that the drops be made at Avelino by the 509th Parachute Battalion, which by this time had been moved from North Africa to Sicily. It hadn't ... it hadn't engaged in the action there, but it had been moved there to Sicily. And when the ... when the great Air Armada bringing the 82nd headquarters dropped along the beach, the 509th echelon peeled off and went inland to drop it at ... at Avelino. Now, Avelino was a road junction, I guess three or four or five way road junction through which the German supplies were streaming to support the beachhead. There was precipitous ground around it, defensible terrain, and it seemed to me that since we were fighting for our lives on the beachhead, that anything that would stop that jugular, even temporarily, would react to our advantage. And consequently Clark said, "Yes, go ahead with it." The ... the action was a success in that the flow was stopped temporarily. The Germans were, I think, taken aback in the shock action of the thing. It didn't appear logical that a parachute force would drop there, but it did. Now, again to justify this, I've justified it
of these people
I think, from a tactical point of view; ninety-five percent came back through
the lines. Unfortunately their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Doyle Yardley
was wounded and captured. And as these troops came back to Naples, after the
beachhead was relieved . . . wait a minute, am I getting out of whack here? They
reformed . . . they reformed at Naples when the beachhead was pushed up to Naples.
Then Mark Clark called me in and gave me command of that . . . of that organization.
Thus, getting me off his conscience and out of his hair and back where I belonged
with the troops. So, ninety-five percent of them came back, and I had resolved
then and there, having been . . . gotten all the prima donna business out of my
system that whatever mission the 509th was assigned, it would undertake it
with joy in it's heart. It didn't matter whether it was parachute or whether
it was amphibious or whether it was commando; we felt that we were capable, I felt
that that outfit was capable, I had known it now for a long time, of handling
it. And, incidentally, I want to give you a little flashback on the African
bit, relating to the 509th. In the planning period, not having any yard
stick to determine what casualties level we were probably going to experience,
I figured they'd probably be high on going into North Africa, so I requisitioned

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about 33 1/3 percent replacements, which surprisingly arrived while we were...

while we were still in North Africa, and we...organized a provisional

compny with these people in it. These became really valuable adjuncts to the

battalion, and we...they were responsible for a lot of the continuity of

the outfit. There weren't the...there wasn't the turnover that one normally

gets in a battalion. We had enough of our own people to keep the outfit up to

strength. And later on, when we got to Anzio, and we really took a shellacking

and had to get some replacements from the 2I; we had learned about the morale

advantage that comes from sharpening a man up on the history of the unit; the

honor of the unit; the integrity of the outfit. And as the replacements came, we

put them behind wire in an isolated area like they had the measles, until the

guys with the badge of the Third Zouaves could come back and talk to each and

every one of them about the religion, practically, he was going to take on...to

become a part of that outfit. And how he wasn't...in other words, not worth the

...you know, not worth the dust on the feet of the guy until he had taken on

the same idea about honor and about integrity. They were preached to by the

sergeants and lieutenants that went back to the...to the holding area for
the replacements about the campaigns that the 509th had gone through and never lost any ground and all the rest of it. And I can assure that it paid rich dividends. There isn't any question about it. At Anzio, that outfit held the gap between two divisions for a period of, I think it was 73 days, attacked practically daily and they counter-attacked as long as they had any men left because it was the honor of the outfit; to be in that battalion. You talk about people putting on jungle insignia so the enemy couldn't pick the officers out or couldn't shoot at them; we go through this in every war, you know, and finally get back to the point where an officer is still as proud to be an officer. That outfit wore over it's left pocket, this badge of the Third Zouaves. I forgot to tell you how that happened. Maybe it was in my paper, I don't know, but as we flew over... this is a little mixed up... Youks Les Bains, I think we had about two or three Spitfires escorting us, it was real hostile territory, because the German airfield was not far away at Kairouan, we could see on the ground fortifications that the French had thrown up and we felt that these guys were the same caliber as the fellow that shot us down, then the men who shot us down didn't really like Americans and felt that perhaps we were going to have to fight
when we got on the ground. They had all the advantageous position and they had the high ground overlooking the drop zone. So, when we hit the ground, it was a very tense period as we marched up the hill toward these French fortifications with our weapons in hand and this ... ominously quiet all along the top ridge. Finally, the Colonel Berges got out of his foxhole and came down to meet Ed Raff and stuck out his hand and embraced Ed and then the troops came out their holes and it was this all the way along the line. They took then, the Third Zouaves badge, they were the Zouave regiment, and pinned it on us and then we all joined hands in picking up the parachutes and taking away all signs that we had landed there. But, there was a new spirit in that French flank. The first time, you know, that they had been able to turn and try to fight the krauts. And having taken all this off the airfield, there was no indication that we were there and the German JU-88 came in to land the next day and was shot down by the French anti-aircraft machine guns. But, before I left the North African theater, I wrote a request to headquarters North African theater of operations, that we be allowed to wear the Third Zouave's badge permanently, as part of the 509th and I indicated why; the circumstances surrounding it. And the outfit wears it to this day, you know; it's in Germany.
But, always in combat we had it over the heart. Damn few people were shot through the heart as a result of having had that. But, in any case the spirit of the outfit was the thing that I wanted ... wanted to point out and it was based on intangibles. It wasn't based on easy sectors or lots of food or pay.

It had to do with inspiration that comes from a bunch of tough guys doing a hard job with a good worthy objective in mind. These guys were ... were tough in a lot of ways that required handling which ... it's hard to explain...

Coming out of Anzio and coming back to ... to our base at ... in Naples, the troops went wild as far as the bordellos were concerned. And the doctor and Captain Tomasek and myself went around to these places and literally tore them apart, I mean, physically. We'd kick the door in and come and grab one of these guys our from under the bed and throw his butt out into the street,

And yet they all accepted this kind of thing because they knew that we would have been derelict in our duty not doing it. And so it was the breaks of war. The got caught; they got their butts kicked; they got thrown out. The VD rate naturally soared, and we were trying to keep this instrument that we had from being too tarnished in view of the next operation coming up. We had uniformed reviews in the little city of Piscinola on the outskirts of Naples.
where you'd shine up your shoes and your brass and unfurl the guideons and
march past in review even in wartime, because we felt that this kept things in good
shape. Now, nobody resented that!! Clark came down to see a review of this
little outfit a couple of times. Well, I'm wandering afield, here, if you
call direct me back to the areas that you want more . . . .

Interviewer: No, that's . . . I was wondering in Anzio . . . was any . . . if that
stage or by that stage did you have . . . how were the airborne units equipped
as far as weapons? Had they been . . . were they lighter armed because they
were airborne and were they at that time . . . were you thinking about the
mission that they were getting . . . their ability to this sustained type
of fighting? Obviously it was successful, because you stayed there for the
72 days, but were you giving any thought to how airborne troops ought to be
equipped?

LTG Yarborough: Yeah, we gave a lot of thought to it. To come back to
the inception of the Anzio deal, as I said we were not disappointed that the
509th was picked to do that across the beach landing as compared to a parachute
drop, because we felt confident and we wanted to fight and wanted to be a part
of the scene. We were especially happy to have been assigned with Darby because I had known Darby before and had a high regard for him. But mixing paratroops and rangers was like mixing oil and water. I just can't tell you what the differences were between our two units. Here, we went for the for the traditional esprit of the soldier based on the customs of the service, even in shell holes. Every man shaved every day no matter what. We had these occasional guard mounts and formations even in combat. Our people looked sharp. I required it and they took pride in the parachute uniform and the badge they had and the whole bit. Darby's guys looked like cut-throats. They looked like the sweepings of the bar rooms. And they wore stubble beards, they wore any kind of a uniform that ... some of them had tanker uniforms on; some had well, just anything they wanted, you see. And Darb and I used to sit around and talk about this phenomenon and we both agreed that one should approach leadership from two points of view; when you have an extraordinary kind of a mission to perform. One was the traditional one, which I preferred and the other one was his approach which offered only blood, sweat and tears for the right kind of a guy. It could offer you nothing except the hardest bloody job and the smallest recognition. And you know, when you get a country
of two hundred million people, you get all kinds of guys that go for that
sort of an approach. And we . . . we . . . I'll tell you later about some of these
operations that we did together in another part of Italy where Darb and I used
to lie around at night with the water dripping in our face . . . further expanding
on this phenomenon. But, when we were assigned to go together into Anzio, we
at first resented each other to the point where there were a lot of fights
and a lot of . . . lot of friction, until we took the ranger officers with us to
perform a few jumps to let them see what it looked like from the inside of an
airplane, jumping into the grape areas down there which had a lot of sticks
sticking up and they came back saying, "Oh, those guys are not so bad, you know,
they got a certain something going for them, too." The biggest thing that, I guess,
got us together, was a dance we had at the Circolo de Nautico, which is a
yacht club on the edge of Posilippo in Naples. We had requisitioned that club, always
having the better life in mind. It had several yachts, small sailing vessels.
We acquired it complete with head waiter in tail coat and all the kitchen help
and the whole bit. It was right on the water on the bay of Naples. So, we
decided to have a big function there with the . . . with the Rangers and our
Parachute officers and some nurses and we got an Italian orchestra and had
a real bang-up evening. Part way through the evening, the Germans came over and dropped a string of bombs along the waterfront and one of these bombs landed very close to the Circolo de Nautico, blew in one of the plate glass windows, blew us all over the floor, blew the bottles off the racks and for a little bit the fiddles stopped scraping, see, until we could kick stuff out of the way and then the violins began again and everybody got back in shape. I remember one British officer there, a British commando, who had gotten a little tight and they'd wrapped him in a rug and he wasn't about to get out of that rug and I felt that maybe the guy was still there when we ... maybe he's still there, I don't know. Yes. But, that ... that evening and other things like this got us together in a way that we became staunch friends. So, when we went into Anzio we were ... we were a force working together. Our job, the 509th's job was to take Nettuno and then move inland. Darby's outfit had the left flank. I don't need to go through all that. It's all a matter of history and records ...

Interviewer: Right.

LTG Yarborough: Except to say that I ... I had a terrible case of jaundice or
what do they call that?

Interviewer: Yellow jaundice, you mean?

LTG Yarborough: No, hepatitis, yeah, thanks. I had hepatitis. And I was so sick that I just can't tell you ... I think I went ashore with my helmet on backwards, but I was afraid to break in the hospital in Naples because I was afraid somebody would say, "yeah, you have Anzio coming up, you know, a lot of guys go to the hospital." So, I ... I figured that I'd get better care by my own medics and in the combat area than I would have gotten in Naples anyhow, so that's the way it was. I think the second day I was ashore I broke into the ... into the hospital and stayed there for a day ... a day or so, but the hospital was under heavy shelling so I got the hell out of there and got back up to my outfit and oh, I guess in about two or three weeks I got much better and was able to eat and all of that. In the meantime, Darby's unit was separated out from mine and I was gravitated little by little into the position along the Mussolini Canal, hear a village called Carano and there we sat through not sat, there we fought for 73 days. I think we were down to about 150 officers when and men/ we were finally taken off the beachhead and taken to the rear to refit
Interviewer: We started off on equipment. Did they re-equip you especially for that, then . . .

LTG Yarborough: No. No, we didn't get re-equipped with anything. We . . . our main support there was the 83rd Chemical Company which had 4.2 mortars. This was heavy, heavy support and this outfit 'belonged' to us. We had had it in at, let's see, where the hell was that other place? Well, in any case, it saved our bacon for close, quick support. But we also had division artillery from the 3rd Division which was on call and Corps Artillery. And I . . . I remember one time at Anzio when the Germans launched an all-out attack which came down the divisional boundary between the 3rd and the 45th. It was aimed at the 45th Division. And since I was right on that boundary, I could see the whole thing deployed . . . like on a sand table with the advance elements; the armor units following up; the kraut infantry; the whole damn thing, and I was able to call Corps artillery on to that operation from where I could look at it. So, we had that kind of heavy back-up support, you see. But the Germans, knowing that there was this light, real light parachute outfit between the divisions and that that was a sensitive area, kept hammering on it. When we had started inland and
started for the Alban Hills: and had been stopped, one of my companies had been out ahead of the others and it dug in on a little hill, that was about three hundred yards from the final protective line. And when we were called in and told we weren't to leave the beachhead, we weren't going anywhere, we weren't going to Rome, we were going to stay there, there weren't enough ships to take us off the place. And after we got done crying about it, I tried to straighten out my line and get things in shape where ... they were obviously capable of supporting from a fire point of view, and I tried to withdraw their company and I was not allowed to. The word was whatever you have, you are going to hold it. It doesn't make a damn where it is or how tactically unsound it is, you are going to hold it, you see. So that thing stuck out there the whole time. And we'd get out to it at night to try to find out how they were doing and, God, they were attacked with everything, including flame throwing tanks and still didn't give up. And the casualties out there were high. A thing that has never appeared in the history books and I've never seen any followup on, was German air reconnaissance over that beachhead at night using dirigibles. I had heard everything from that front line. Now, there was a fellow named "Big Joe" Winsco. He was a Lieutenant out there. He was eventually killed. I used to talk to
him frequently on the phone and he would say, "Colonel, you won't believe it
but, you know, there's two tanks down in here." And I'd say, "Well, there is
no indication." "Well, now they are spitting flames on us." I said, "Well,
what are you doing about it, Joe?" "Well, we're keeping our heads down." And
when he called up that night and said, "There's a dirigible over us." And we
could see it hovering up here and if you listened you could hear the motors. I
said, "All right, Joe, no matter what you tell me, I'll believe it, it's happening
out here, you see." We had just before we got out of there, there was a German
all out attack that swept over that front line and these guys came out of their
holes and they were swinging their rifles around. We were not all that far
away, but we couldn't help them. Couldn't put artillery in there or

Captain John Martin
anything. And the company commander was taken prisoner. He's all right today.
He comes to the 509th reunions. But that was one hell of a fight and we thought
that the German attack was going to really roll over our final protective line.

It came within three hundred yards of it, I guess, two hundred yards. And then
all the Corps artillery that we had was churning up the ground out in front
of us. The Germans came forward in their usual disciplined way and tried to
dig in their weapons and tried to move forward; but boy, the stuff that was flying

into the air around there. Nothing could live and so they finally stopped and
then we . . . we got together about sixty men and counterattacked and tried to re-take that damn hill and we couldn't do it, so we were just . . . we had run out of steam. So, it was thereafter that we were then . . . we were sent back . . .

But in the meantime, we pulled a really fine operation out in that area, which I wrote up in the Army magazine. I'll . . . I'll . . . I'll show you a copy of it.

It was a . . . it was a set piece attack against three fortified houses that were along our front. The 3rd Division wanted to use them as a line of departure and since we were an expendable outfit anyhow and didn't . . . had no mother or father, they picked us to get these houses, you see. Well, those damn things were fortified in a way that you wouldn't believe and they had tiger tanks hidden behind them and . . . the Germans used an artifice that was, I guess, effective at that time. They'd move a tank into a stone house and the house would get knocked down around this thing and the gun would be sticking out of a pile of rubble. Well, they had that kind of a setup there. We laid this thing out on the ground, the scenario, and we walked through it. First in daylight I guess, two or three times and then after dark. Got everything down like a play, you know, how we were going to crack that fortified line. It revolved around sending
a column because control at night on the beachhead was very hard. The place
was muddy, it was full of dangerous things, mines, and machine guns would open
up from areas that you didn't know where they were. Flares, occasionally, which
would reveal what you were up to. And so we felt that moving in a column first
was good for control. When that column was fired on, the first task force would
peel off and when that was fired on, the second one would peel off and eventually
we'd be addressing the target by infiltration and each one of these had it's
supporting Bazookas and pole charges. And the damn thing went like clock work!!
I can assure you we captured those bloody houses and we took the prisoners out
of there and marched them back and we turned them over to the 3rd Division. They
couldn't believe we had them. We said, "God damn it, if you don't believe
it, you come up here and see it, we got them, see." It was a terrible fight
and it was just for a few yards of ground that ... just shows you the caliber of
this kind of guy. Parachute troops, you see, proud to be parachute troops, though
they didn't have heavy stuff but they had pole charges. Well, we left ... we
left this south of ... we left Anzio to get ready to go into the south of
France. It was at Anzio that I met Frederick, General Frederick who had
command of the 1st Special Service Force. And Frederick's outfit had been put in there, I guess to get a little combat experience. I was ordered to go over and see him, which I did. I found him over along the Mussolini Canal; reported to him because the word was that we were going to be working with him in the south of France deal. And we ... we ended up at Lido da Roma, outside Rome together with the other elements of the 1st Airborne Task Force, getting ready for the South France operation. Frederick relied very heavily on our experience because we ... we'd had a lot of it and his outfit had had very little.

The 517th Regiment was going to be part of that and they had had damn little combat. I think they had had maybe a couple of weeks to get their feet wet. The 551st Battalion and the 463rd, which was a field artillery or a pack artillery battalion, was going to be part of that action. You know, we had a review out there at Lido da Roma with the 509th, which had been through all of this of ... all of this business. And I ... I .... I ... I just can't tell you how much I loved that bunch. We ... we had new parachute uniforms, the war time parachute uniforms. And we had a ... an engineer outfit come out with earth colors and set up a station where each man would come through with a piece of cardboard on his face and a guy would spray the whole thing; man and weapon and
everything else with the impossible earth color, you see. After they got this
all done, we had a review with the machine guns masked, carrying them over their
shoulders, and the mortars the same way. And these guys came by at a dog trot,
you know, by the reviewing stand. And I remember really feeling sorry for the
kraut Army that was going to get this bunch on their back, you see. They were
tremendous. And I was also happy to have the 551st and the 517th, see the caliber
of guy that we had there. Awful lot of pride mixed up in the whole thing. For
the South of France, we picked our own drop zone. I was sick of having people
pick them for me and I picked the one at Le Muy above the ... above the village
of Le Muy because it was rugged and I didn't want to have the German anti-parachute
outfits on my back when we got in. I'd rather have taken the chance with the
rocks and the trees and all the rest of it rather than be policed up by a bunch
of armored cars, you see. So I was allowed to do that. And really I had a little
task force with the 551st, Wood Joerg's Battalion, and the 463rd artillery which
was commanded by a classmate of mine, Ray Cato. And this was to ... was to drop
on that... on that drop zone-Le Muy. That ... that operation was one to remember,
believe me because we took off from, I think, ten Airdromes. And if you
can imagine ten airdromes: jammed with C-47's and gliders loading at night,
marshalling at night. We didn't know all that much about marshalling in those
days. You know to get the right squads on to the right airplane when you see
a whole line . . . airplanes as far as the eye can reach in a war situation where the
lighting around the field is zilch at night, with jeeps coming and going and
three quarter tons full of bundles that have to get to the right place. Other-
wise you don't have your radios, you don't have any ammunition that fits your
weapon. And the problems of one airplane going out for instance. He can't
start the damn thing, so what do you do? Haul this one out of line. Where does
it go when we orbit the field to try to get in the right place again? Maybe
it's got something vital on it, you see. Well, with all of these problems . . .
all of these problems, we got the show on the road and on the way into south of
France. And the weather ... they had learned a lot about navigation from the
North African affair. They had navigational aids now on the Island of Corsica
and several different cross check navigational means that we didn't have before.
The flight into ... into the South of France was made more difficult by a change
in weather. The weather became very overcast and very cloudy. And the wind
changed, I think, about 180° from what they had predicted it to be. Our flight
path involved a land-fall and then a dog-leg almost immediately after the land-fall
and we were to drop like that; right after we made the turn in order to hit

that high ground above Le Muy, you see. Well, we ... we... we did ...we did it.

I remember jumping out into what appeared to be black as a pocket; you couldn't

see a bloody thing. Nothing. Not even the sensation of falling. Because it

was supposed to be moonlight but because of the overcast condition, you didn't

get any. And the first thing I knew that I was on the ground was when the ground

hit me, you know that feeling at night. I came crashing down through some trees

and found that the trees had been burned over for some reason and became rather

sharp and pointed. The next step was to assemble the command group, and I couldn't

hear a bloody thing except my heart beating, see, real loud. I didn't know

really whether I was in the center of a German PW camp or where I was and there-

fore I hesitated to begin to shout. The signal was supposed to be Very pistol

fired into the ground, so that the glow would not be seen from too great

distance and so the command group could identify this thing. So, I began

to shout and I said, "Henry, Henry." This was my S-3 and he let me shout a little;

bit more and then he said, "Hey, Colonel, take it easy, somebody ... the krauts

might hear us." Well, finally I got Henry, Henry Howland his name was, got him

up where I was and in the meantime we're cutting our way out of our parachute

harness. There is another story that hangs on that. I was test officer down
here at Benning, for the provisional parachute group, and we had inherited, or we had acquired the quick release box from Canada. Irving, I guess had sold it to Canada. The Americans didn't have the need for it and so we got I imagine fifty of them down. And we began testing them and we thought they were great stuff until Tug Wilson who was our old parachute Air Corps advisor, warrant officer. Me and I were up throwing a dummy out with one of these devices on and we flapped it over on it's belly which depressed the disk, turned it around to throw it out and when it came out of the airplane it fell out of the harness, you see and everybody watching the damn thing come down. So we immediately called a board of officers on it. In those days it didn't have either the thing that you depress or it didn't have a wishbone under it. It was just a disc you turned and hit it, you see. Well, that's what we had done. So they called a board of officers. Ryder was on it, I was on it, Jim Gavin was on it and we ... discussed whether or not this thing was safe enough to go for issue and I made the best case I could for the box. I said it was a human error that had done it. And I felt that trying to get out of an harness with snap fasteners under fire was ... I'd rather have the box. Well, it went against me. The contract that we had arranged for was abrogated. We went back to the snap fastener and when I was sitting on the top of that damn mountain at Le Muy
trying with my Fairbairn knife to cut out of that bloody harness. I couldn't work the snaps with my gloves on, I really cussed that board I can tell you. Well, finally we got ... got the command group together. I fired the Very pistol into the ground and people began to gather around and when dawn came, we found that we were overlooking the city of Le Muy, the village of Le Muy, and we could see the Germans down there like rats in a trap, trying to go this way and go that way, trying to find their way out. The British, I guess it was the 1st Airborne Brigade, had landed inland at the wrong place but they were still in an effective area and the strategy of it was good. They felt, boy, those hills are alive with American paratroops, our days are numbered. Well, we were still trying to figure out where we were, who we were and what we had. Some of the artillery, a couple of pieces got hung in trees. You could see them hanging up there; Pack Howitzers; and we got those down. But the worst thing was an entire serial of about forty-five airplanes were dropped in the wrong place. Landed in St. Tropez where Brigette Bardot hangs out; (she wasn't there then.) This outfit in true parachute style, instead of crying about being in the wrong place, went to work on the krauts; assisted the sea landings; and became invaluable. Joined the French forces of the interior and together had a task force over there and I think that was my B Company. But
the tragedy of that was two airplane loads got the wrong signal and went into the Mediterranean and were never heard of again. Well, we came down from the heights above Le Muy and started to push up the coast toward the . . . toward the border of France, I mean towards the Italian border. We had real fights in front and in back of each of the towns that we uncovered. The first one was what was the name of that first place? Just short of Cannes.

**Interviewer:** St. Raphael or . . .

**LTG Yarborough:** No, well, I'll think of it . . . I'll think of it later. We'd deploy; attack; and the Germans would put up a real tough rear guard operation, and then phase through the town and we'd see them on the other side. This continued right up . . . right up the coast. The 509th was doing fine along the coast. We felt that was a good area. But I was ordered presently to turn north up the valley of the Var River into the French Maritime Alps. And this started, I guess, screening the right flank of the 7th Army which was moving north. And the 1st Special Force then was given the coastal route and went up towards Montone.

But as we turned north into the Maritime Alps, we got into the most intriguing, interesting terrain from a military point of view and from a, I guess you'd by, a psychological point of view. My lines, if you can call it a line,
stretched ultimately over a length of some thirty-five miles and there was no way to keep it intact. The German mountain troops would therefore come through this line selectively and we'd chase them as best we could and they'd go back into the mountains and we'd do the same thing to them. And in the most beautiful country that you could imagine, where in the morning you could hear the tolling of the bells in the little villages around and the pastoral beauty of the Maritime Alps with this deadly game of cops and robbers going on along this long extended front. In many cases, the ... there was no place to fight, really, because the road was carved out of a mountain side and there was a sheer rise on one side and a sheer drop on the other. And complicating my life in that area, a bunch of guerrillas reported in to me.

This was the first time I ran across guerrillas in my career and at that time, I hoped it would be the last. I was having enough tactical problems of my own, keeping this outfit together over those long areas without any real support, without any eyes or ears, except those that we had and being way the hell off on the flank of the 7th Army. I got a note a courier brought through, saying these forces are going to report to you in due course, and I said I don't know
anything about it. And the notes became closer and then one day a woman by the
name of Madam Autrefage, who was a French agent, appeared at my headquarters and
said "it's imminent, they are here". So, here was an outfit that was dimly
outlined in my mind, its parameters unclear, but I was suspicious of them in
any case. I found they were under the command of a British officer named
Andrew J. Flygt. Now Flygt was one of these hardy British souls that had been
dropped in to form the underground and to create a guerrilla force in the south
of France. And now the fruition of his efforts to join up with a first Allied
unit that came in and so Flygt came into camp, you see. Cocky young red beret
British officer. Well, part of his force was Italian, part were French and he
wanted to know what their mission was going to be. I said, "Well," "Guard the
passes, the bridges, the defiles, help to provide some security for us," and
he agreed to do this. But, we ... we were making a lot of patrols up into the
Italian side of the Maritime Alps, having ... there were two Italian divisions
up there, incidentally, the Monte Rosa and the San Marco Marines. These divisions
had never given up in Italy. They were tough Fascists and they were not about
to throw in the sponge and consequently, there was some concern as far as the
7th Army was concerned about that flank, you see. So, we were running patrols to try to find out where and how many and all of that. And Andrew J. Flygt said, "Old boy, I'd like to do my part in these patrols." And I said, "Do you trust these guys under ... under tough conditions?" He said, "Why of course, old man, naturally." And so one fine day I allowed Andrew J. Flygt to undertake a patrol toward the Monte Rosa or the San Marco, whichever it was up in there; and he never came back. So, we then, and this is another little humanist side, decided to look through Mr. Andrew J. Flygt's personal materials. And he'd left a money belt, and he'd left a cartridge pouch and he'd left a duffle bag with some of his clothes and various things and so we began to inventory this and I found in the money bag ... money belt, there was, oh maybe a hundred thousand bucks. Well, you know the old green devil said hey, you know, nobody will ever know, just take it and forget about it. Yes?

Mrs. Yarborough: Do you want to take a break and have some lunch?

LTG Yarborough: Sure, Okay. ... Well, as I said there were thousands of dollars in this guy's money belt and after wrestling with myself as to what I should do about it, feeling that, one way, that nobody would ever know, the devil was talking to me. Take it, it's all right. It's the spoils of war. My training
in the Corps up on the Hudson there, came to the fore. I called in the adjutant, a guy named Phil Katz and the sergeant major and we laid this stuff out and inventoried all of the money. Then I put it in a package and sent it down to Nice to the 1st Airborne Task Force finance officer and turned it in. They didn't know what to do with it, how to take it. And I said, "In any case, give me a receipt for it, it's no longer on my conscience." And I forgot about this thing until several years later, ... no, no it wasn't several year later. It was at the end of the war, I got a letter when I was in Vienna from none other than Andrew J. Flygt who said to me the following: I should have taken your advice about going on patrol with these people of mine. I thought they were trustworthy but we ran into a German ambush up on the ... in one of the trails going up in to the Maritime Alps and I was shot and wounded through the stomach and my people deserted me; took off in all directions. And I was therefore captured and evacuated through German channels to a German hospital and at the end of the war I was released, and apparently in good shape. Now, old boy, there is a little question about where is my kit? What happened to my cartridge pouch and my duffle bag with my clothes? And the happiest day of my life was to be able to write to Andrew J. Flygt and say, "Look old boy, I don't know what the hell happened to your cartridge pouch and your duffle bag
but I can tell you the money that you left with us was turned in to the finance
department and if you want it, why you go through the ... This was money ...

this was money that was given to him for organization of guerrilla forces and

later getting to know how guerrilla forces are formed and undergrounds and

this that and the other, I understood perfectly. But, I ... I told this story

several times to young officers with the view to try to put across the fact

that in war morality shouldn't stop. If you have any of it, you don't abandon

it because when you need it the most is when everything is coming apart, all

the institutions and you are there letting a little blood whether you want to

or not and you don't just throw everything down the drain. And another thing

along that same line, in the south of France, when we landed at Le Muy and

started our move up the coast and had no transportation again. Heavy weapons

and all of that had to be carried on our backs. We requisitioned a couple

of French cars, French vehicles, and gave the French a signed piece of paper

that said if you turn this in to the proper authority, maybe you will get

reimbursed, you see. Well, maybe in all cases that wasn't done. In any

instance we took what we needed and were able to move tactically. So, when
I was up in this position that of, I guess it was San Marquet de Vesuibe, a young fellow came in without insignia, in a military uniform, looking for me and I found that after interrogating this guy he was a member of the CID and he was looking for evidences of stolen vehicles that had been reported. Well, the first thing I wanted to do was wring his neck because I thought what the heck, I mean this is war, a military necessity. And then I began to feel or reflect on the fact that the U.S. thought enough of law and order even in those very disruptive circumstances to set in motion the machinery that would try to keep things straight and proper. And I... I eased him out of there and felt very compassionate toward him because the thing that I had done was culpable in a sense but I no longer had animosity for the system that set it into motion, let's put it that way. I think unless in combat you try and keep an even keel on things like this, you can have a deterioration that will end up in some of the things that we saw in Viet Nam. I was just heartsick at the things that I saw there on the fire bases and I want to talk about that later on because I'm morally certain that if we had... if we had stood reveille; if we'd had an occasional band concert in the villages; if the officers had dressed for
dinner in the evening as we did in my 473rd Infantry - I took over an infantry regiment in Italy toward the end of the war there and - within the sound of the guns, one came into the officers mess. It wasn't infeasible to do it; it wasn't dangerous to do it. It was a little unhandy to do it, but it kept the integrity. You felt like a gentleman of some kind. You hadn't jettisoned everything you knew just because it was a tough surrounding, you see. And I feel that pot smokers and dope users would be hard pressed if their ... if their peer group had a different point of view on deportment in the target area. I can't imagine going into a British officers mess in a state of euphoria induced by dope, where one toasts the Queen, and you know, all of that sort of thing. There are reasons for this kind of a fast guy. Old Armies from the Roman Army on down have understood that, which we in listening to the 18-yr old and listening to Congress and listening to people who had no feel for the military profession have jettisoned. And I just have to fault our command all the way along the line for this kind of thing.

**Interviewer:** Do you know General Matheson by chance?

**LTG Yarborough:** Yes, sure I do.
Interviewer: Well, because when he had the 1st Brigade of the 101st and just
to say that much, we did have a full dinner meal every night. And informal
in a sense that we met first for our cocktail hour or get together. A fellow-
ship of officers, where we talked and then we had formal procedures that we
went through to start a sit down dinner every night is where we ate. And it
was fantastic, for what it did, I thought. I can see what you are talking
about.

LTG Yarborough: It's a means to an end, you know, and it isn't eye-wash and
it isn't "mickey mouse" in my view. It keeps an Army whole from a mental point
of view. Could serve to do that. Well, let's see where in the heck were we
here, coach? Let's get back on the ... Well, the Italian scene.

Interviewer: I think that what we would like to do, sir in ... in ... I think
we have a good feel for and adding to what is in the historical records of
this period of time. We'd like kind of a reflection on your part of - you
know, the Airborne again is under fire; it's too coastly a unit; you can do
it with helicopters and that sort of thing that - Parks and I in our viewpoint,
these
feel that/are roles and things that special units, paratroopers, can perform
and we'd just like; without getting in to the special forces aspects of it, what are your feelings about roles and missions for a parachute force, looking into the mid-term period if you can?

LTC Yarborough: Well, I ... feel a kind of esprit that being parachute qualified engenders is something that you can't buy. You can approximate it with formation of "guardsmen"-type, "Grenadier" type units. And you get there by a kind of a snobbery which you come by a little more honestly by requiring personal performance on the part of an individual in an Airborne unit. They are both means to the same end in my view. I think there is room in the military for the "guardsmen" kind of an approach. So that every unit has it's ... well, I don't know whether you read my paper on this or not, on "Modern Volunteer Army." I feel that no matter what the humble kind of an orientation the unit has, the fact that it provides unique services can be parlayed into a pride in itself. But the Airborne business has been unique in so many ways because it is the individual performance of the guy, nobody can do it for him. When he looks over the edge of that airplane down 3000 feet and he knows he's got to do it or cut bait; it winnows out some of those that are ... that don't have the
self confidence and the pride that then comes from this is put into the proper and beautiful military format can result in something that is just extraordinary.

So the dollars and cents spent on parachutes and parachute training are not the most important thing, it seems to me, it's what you get out of it in the intangible way. And that really transcends whether or not dropping out of an airplane into a tactical area is as feasible now as it once was.

Now one of the greatest faults we have, I believe as a nation, is to look always first on things in terms of their cost, in dollars. And I think our removal of the parachute qualifications of the 101st Airborne is a case in point. Where they could very well have continued this thing as being worth its weight in gold and gotten all that in return. Well, having said that and I think we perhaps all agree, I think most people who have been in parachute units, agree on that. Then the next thing is the feasibility in this modern era of dropping guys out of parachutes, in parachutes to... to take on tactical missions.

Worldwide aerial logistics is a fact. It's here and it's going to be here indefinitely. But tactical delivery on the field of battle is becoming more and more a gamble unless you blast your way through and make sure that everything
that could interfere with the air flow is out. This becomes a major operation. There's no longer, I don't think the capability of sneaking into a ... or effecting tactical surprise, to the point where a bunch of unarmed transport airplanes can come in and drop their load. This isn't to say that when a ... a tactical situation has developed to the point where you have air superiority and the enemy is in a position of having to either take a shellacking or fall back on another key point, that one couldn't under proper circumstances drop airborne parachute troops into an area that this other guy would otherwise occupy and now couldn't because your people are on the ground. And the feasibility of landing a lot of people as individuals, (as compared to bringing aircraft loaded with types in there, helicopters or whatever, in,) I think there are some cases where a guy could get in with a parachute that it would be very difficult for an airplane, or for a helicopter, to move in. I ... I think the philosophy of the airborne should now change back to what it was in the beginning. I believe instead of forming ranger battalions, that the rangers should have been the airborne. The 82nd Airborne now should be Brigades of ranger-type battalions who are parachute qualified, who have
the ranger mission of going in, any way that it is feasible to go in; by air,
by ground, by sea or whatever, to address missions that are battalion size or
thereabouts. I have never, right from the beginning, thought that an airborne
division was feasible because the mechanical - I mean desirable, because the
mechanical problems that surround dropping an element of that size in an ...
in a drop zone and getting them together in good shape to fight as a division,
were almost insurmountable. I don't think history shows that it has ever
worked out that way. On the other hand, brigades or separate battalions,
fighting as separate battalions, could very well have done it. I think there's
more evidence now on the ... on the tactical and strategic scene to show this
is a sound return to an old approach than would rule it out. As an airborne
soldier in World War II, I always was torn between two points of view.
One -- the outfits I was with always wanted to fight. They wanted to have a
sector, they wanted to be in there. They didn't want to be dragged out and
made ready for the next operation. This was emotional, to some degree. The
British on the other hand, felt that an Airborne outfit was designed to make
a lodgement in a way that others could not and, as soon as they could be
relieved, they were to be withdrawn and shoot that punch out again in the same
way. We didn’t do this for partially the reasons I mentioned and partially because we were always at the end of our resources. We never had enough to do what we wanted to do. Consequently we were always gathering up everybody from the support, all that we could scrape together, and it was never quite adequate even at that. On the other hand I always knew that an airborne soldier in line, we lacked heavy support. And one was torn between getting organic units that you could rely on and trust and that you worked with day after day and then knocking your mobility down to nothing, or borrowing outfits from a supporting unit who didn’t have the same motivation that you did and the same feeling about fighting. I forgot to tell you that at Anzio we had at one time a tank company attached to us that we got damn little out of, I might say, because they weren’t quite as inured to the idea that they might get killed as our guys were and consequently, when you asked them to do things that they weren’t about to do. They didn’t want to do. At one point in the Anzio line we had two tank destroyers that had been loaned to me that we moved up into the front line as close as we could get to where we thought maybe an attack would come and having camouflaged and ordered not under any circumstances to reveal their presence there until the great day came. And when that big
assault came that I mentioned to you when they overran our outpost company and
moved toward where the final protective line was, we thought this is it at
last. We threw off the covers off these two tank destroyers and one of the
guns would not fire. The guys that were with it had been so concerned about
being up there, just keeping alive and getting their canteen cups filled, that
they hadn't examined the firing mechanism every day and kept it in shape, you
see. And if I ever felt like having somebody shot or court martialed, at least
given life imprisonment, that was the time. So, it's a long way around to
answer your question but I couldn't give it a short answer. I believe the
spirit of the airborne should be nurtured as being essential to a great Army
such as ours and if that means continuing to pay parachute pay and having guys
jump out of airplanes, fine it's money well spent. Secondly, that the idea
of the airborne division should be re-examined with a view to providing the
kind of commando all-around parachute qualified man that can tangle with El
Fatah, can tangle with the middle east problems, that can do all kinds of
tactical missions that require real flexibility and decentralization of control,
you see. And that I wouldn't rule out the opportunity to launch a parachute
assault under extraordinary conditions but is no longer the ... the environment
that Crete was or something of that nature. Those ... those ... those cases
aren't going to come anymore, I don't believe. You got to be bigger than
life on everybody's radar screen in the area.

Interviewer: What did, we'll go a little bit deeper maybe into closer tactics;
but what is your opinion of the high-altitude low-opening operations that,
you know we cranked into the center - its capability and training people
is that sort of thing. How would you visualize their being used in mid-term
or long-term?

LTG Yarborough: I think they have very definite applicability to the irregular
warfare but where you want to infiltrate a key group of communicators or
liaison - types or a commander or whatever into a guerrilla area. I think,
if pathfinding has any continued significance, there is a field for them on
that score. But I think the ... I think the main return is again in the
sharpening up of that fine human instrument and the tactical significances
of lesser importance to my mind.

Interviewer: Well, to pursue this a little bit further, given the environment
we are in today, that everything is too expensive, including such things as
parachutes and tanks and all that sort of thing, can you think of any arguments that we might present in arguing for continuation of the airborne - more than the need or the requirements for this kind of esprit that I couldn't agree with you more -- that Congress might listen to.

LTG Yarborough: Well, the art of war is three dimensional today. We've abandoned the two dimensional approach forever because this isn't on any more. And a parachutist is a hell of a lot cheaper, if you want to look at it from dollars and cents point of view, than a helicopter is. A half a million dollar helicopter or maybe going higher. Your chances of losing a helicopter in the era of "Strella" are a lot better than your chances of shooting down a bunch of parachutists in the air. Of course, at the same time, the ... well, of course then the mass and the weight of the numbers of airplanes that could fill the air over a target area being that the strella or whatever wouldn't be a hundred percent effective, that's for sure. I'm sure this has been war gamed and computerized more than anything else on that score and I'm not in a position to say what the game odds were. But helicopters also, you know the theory of the air cav division is great, but the amount of logistics that
goes into it is unbelievable. The amounts of gasoline that these damn things drink. I spent a little time over there with the 1st Cavalry Division when they were in the throes of gasoline problems. And for an expeditionary force this becomes a ... an exceedingly tough thing to cope with. On the other hand, airplanes that can be sent strategically from bases that are quite far away, all ready with their fuel to go and return, dropping parachutists who then operate on their legs, there is something to be said for it. But you see, all of this in talking about the feasibility of an airborne division today and an airborne operation I don't want you to think that I believe that classical war is ... has the same objectives and suffers from the same determents as it has been in the past. I see in the formula that Mao Tse Tung; Giap; and Truong Chinh and these guys have developed an approach which obviates the use of this kind of a massive instrument against a target and relies instead on psychological disintegration. Formulation of a small resistance groups that can attack a vulnerable society; and creating dissention and diversion in the home base to the point where this business of head-on assault with a tremendous formation isn't in the cards anymore. I don't rule it out completely but when
I see what is happening to the United States, to its faith in itself, and when one can surmise that this is being done under our own power, then I wonder what would happen if it were a full all out assault from a psychological point of view together with the amplified underground mechanisms that our society doesn't really have a way to ... to prevent. How we think in an atmosphere of increased action like this, we could get together and mount massive expeditionary forces to go and fight on foreign soil. This is a question in my mind. So, when you talk about the airborne division, you're assuming out a lot of things, a lot of things. You're assuming a clean battlefield, a clear cut military objective that once in our hands, physically, provides a fulcrum for doing something else. Or is the ... makes the enemy lie on his back and say I've had enough, you see. I have to sweep all these considerations away before I can even think in logical terms about modern mounting of airborne attack. It's all right to go out to the Fort Bragg reservation and drop to take that hill, they can do it day or night. I haven't really answered your question but ... 

Interviewer: No, that's very fine, I think. Thank you.
That's the end of side two of a first tape of Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, taped at his home in Southern Pines, North Carolina near Fort Bragg. The interviewers are Colonel Meese and Lieutenant Colonel Parks Houser.
INTERVIEW WITH LTG WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH

By
Colonel John R. Meese and LTC H. P. Houser, III


INTERVIEWER: General Yarborough, in our first taping we tried to tie together your reflections of parachute and airborne operations during the early part of World War II. Today we'd like to jump far forward in your distinguished career and draw from you your remembrances as the Commanding Officer of the US Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg which later became the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. We'd just like to have you think back over personalities, how the center grew, the problems and then later on we'd like to get into the future of Special Warfare. So with that brief introduction, sir.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, well that's a pretty big order, John, and what I -- what I am going to say will not necessarily be in sequence. I haven't written out a comprehensive set of notes or anything on this. Consequently, I think, perhaps the things that I will talk about are the things that impressed me the most and from these we can extrapolate other things and go back and fill out the voids and whatever. I--I was assigned in Europe from '58 to '60. I commanded the Counterintelligence Corps Group in the beginning, which was subsequently changed to a Military Intelligence Group when the mission was split between acquisition of positive intelligence and continuation of the Counterintelligence role. I'm stating
this because some of the--some of the strengths of a guerrilla force, as a matter of fact, a great deal of the strength of a guerrilla force, revolves around organizational structure which can be related more to intelligence activity than anything else. When we talk about cellular infrastructure, the kind of cells that are implanted in a formerly healthy society have their counterpart in the type of intelligence cell or counterintelligence cell that active acquisition of information or active penetration of the enemy system might contemplate. Consequently, having had some exposure to the building of this kind of apparatus for the protection of American forces in Europe and for promulgation of active intelligence acquisition in hostile countries, I felt that I, to some degree, understood the nature of the guerrilla problem. However, how much I didn't know became quite apparent when I arrived at--at Fort Bragg in 1961. This was the period when there was a--an awakening at the highest level as to the nature of a new kind of threat which was invading the power structure of the world and this was a kind of slow-burn warfare; a kind of warfare that didn't ignite into extensive hostility until after extensive preparation had been undertaken on the part of irregular forces. It, I think, was understood first in our hierarchy, at least it occurred, it seemed to me it was, by the President himself. There were isolated individuals, I suppose, both in the military and outside that had followed guerrilla--the guerrilla phenomenon and knew it for what it was but in the--in the command, control political echelon, I think the--the first recognition that I--I was aware of was from the President of the United States. My orders and instructions for the philosophy that was to form the Special
Warfare Center, I always believed, came from the President of the United States. I couldn't at that period find any military chain of command that was aware of this phenomenon in depth or was preoccupied with anything other than the mechanics of implementation of the--of the philosophy. What I'm saying is that the military chain of command, perfectly adequate for--I say chain of command and chain of inspiration and all the rest of it--adequate for development of supporting structures, providing pay allowances, bodies, housing, things of this nature, but this three or four dimensional philosophy was not to be found in the military system; let's put it that way. The closest to, in the way of guidance that I could dig up of the--of the element of guidance that seemed to have the greatest weight came from the Department of State. And here it was my belief that my old colleague Roger Hilsman had--had a major--played a major role in the development of this concept. I'd known Hilsman in London. We'd both been on the--the Military Assistance Group, England. Let's see, what did we call that thing? It was the JUSMG in London; Joint US Military Advisory Group, London, which was really the advance echelon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually in business to preside over the formation of the NATO. I was in the plans section of that operation, a thing called PLANAT--the Plans for NATO, and Roger Hilsman, a major, was in the same section as I was and I saw him a great deal. Well, when the--the concept of the irregular warfare--development of the irregular warfare capability for the US Army began to emerge, Hilsman came down to the Center on several occasions, and I drew from him a great deal of background information. Another one of my--my
sources was Ed Lansdale. Now, when I say the inspiration wasn't within the military, I--I did make exceptions for some people who didn't represent the norm and were centers of great inspiration and information on irregular warfare. Lansdale was outstanding in this respect. I don't have to go through his history, you know about Ed Lansdale and what he did for President Magsaysay. And what he did for me was to--was to make creditable. What Lansdale made me understand was the--the relationship between what we clumsily call Civic Action and the ability of an irregular army to function among the people. Now, later on in my research, I discovered that Ed Lansdale was not the author of this concept. He was the promulgator of it and the concept had been responsible to a great degree for the--for the effectiveness of--of the counterinsurgency operation in the Philippines. It made the people feel that the military were not oppressors but the man in uniform represented the government and, if they were eager to assist and to help the people, then the government must be in the same frame of mind. And it made operations, that otherwise would have been infeasible, possible and successful. Well, I found that Mao Tse Tung had been the greatest modern proponent of this philosophy. In studying his campaigns which resulted in the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the Mainland, I found that in the beginning the Nationalist Armies were--numerically were very much greater than the Communist forces of Mao Tse Tung. But as Mao withdrew along his--long--the route of his long march, the people, instead of fleeing to get away from the Communist Armies, heard that the Armies treated people very generously and very kindly. Mao's Nine Rules for Conduct were inforced among his troops to
the degree that a man who violated them was given very severe punishment, even perhaps the death penalty. These rules had to do with deportment among the people, how a soldier would share his last crust of bread with the people, how many--anything that was taken would be paid for. If a door were taken off a house for a soldier to sleep on, which apparently was the custom in China, it would be replaced before the troops left. And a whole series of rules which meant that the troops and the people were "one". They were in fact, and Mao's idea was that the Army and the people were the same thing; there was no difference. So Mao's--Mao's Army began to swell in size as he retreated while Chiang Kai-shek's Army, following the ordinary rules that soldier's were used to in the field; where the civilian was kicked out of the way if he got in the way, the gun position might be put in the center of a tomb, if that was the place for it to go; was succeeding given the cold shoulder until finally, open hostility. So this lesson was not lost on a sensitive individual like Ed Lansdale who then used his persuasion and his good offices to put this across.

Did I say in the beginning Quezon? I meant Magsaysay. So it was with this feeling in mind that I began to try to shape the--the characteristics of a kind of individual that I thought should comprise Special Forces.

Now, let's turn back the clock a little bit even further. Right after World War II finished, I went to Vienna, Austria as the Provost Marshal. I was Provost Marshal of the US Forces in Austria and Provost Marshal in Vienna. And I--I began to keep statistics on crimes being committed because after the fighting stopped and the--the objective was achievement of law and order again, it was interesting to see what nationalities were
responsible for the greatest crimes and what kind of crimes they were.
So, I went into an extensive statistical program and published regularly a booklet showing the curves of murder, rape, arson, black market, whatever—together with the nationalities that—that perpetrated these crimes. Well, I—I found, to make a long story short, that the Russians were way at the top of the list; the British were at the bottom of the list; the Americans were second from the bottom; and the French were the—were the second from the top and this was a result of a lot of factors. The Russians screened their people practically not at all. The ones that came into the city. As a matter of fact the Russian commander, who became a good friend of mine over a long period of time, indicated to me that he was doubtful whether the commanders in and around the city knew who their people were; they were coming and going in a way that defied regulations. The American troops that had been in combat were pretty well behaved and pretty amenable to discipline but when the replacements began to come in and the occupation troops began to arrive, then crimes of all kinds began to rise on the part of the American. Here, I made representations regularly to the G-1 and the Adjutant General asking that, in view of the fact that Vienna was a political "sharp edge", that the future was being forged there psychologically since the military problem had already been solved, that it was essential that we send ideal representatives of the country so that we wouldn't be judged on the basis of individuals who had no right to act or speak for the country. Here I was told in no uncertain terms that this is not possible,"you take your share of the people just like everybody else!" There isn't anything the army can:
outside it's realm. Everything depends on leadership and I got the old answer. Well, now in recognition of the kind of politically charged environment that Vietnam and Laos, Cambodia and Thailand were, I became absolutely convinced through and through that it was essential that only picked men be allowed into those arenas. Because any American that had ever traveled to the Far East knew, even before a westerner opened his mouth, he had status and stature. He was presumed to be a representative of a vast, sovereign country that felt that the underprivileged part of the world deserved and was going to get help. There was sort of a idealism that surrounded the westerner and as a matter of fact, he had to "kick over the traces" several times before it was recognized that he was, in fact, just like anybody else. Well, where from Mao's people and Giap's people and Truong Chinh's disciples were vying for psychological leverage, it seemed to me that it would be folly to adopt the or to promulgate or to go along with the traditional Army custom of saying; "Okay, everybody from here to here, right face; you guys go to Vietnam. Everybody from here, left face; you go to Thailand." I may be a little harsh in that assessment but I was told, not once but many times, while I had the center that one; there is nothing "special"about special warfare; two, Vietnam is no different from any place else; three, the Army can hack anything under any circumstances at anytime. And, of course, I was born in the Army and grew up in it and I know that there are parameters to this kind of statement. There are even in regular and good units a company that can do damn well on the defense; there's another one that does well on the attack; there's another
one that needs shaping up under all circumstances and they each have--have personalities. And to assume that one could cut out of the vast body of the Army, just an ordinary slice, and send it to Vietnam in an atmosphere that was designed to prey on political differences, on class struggle, on all the intangibles that--that characterized Mao's war, to me was a folly. Well, I tried to outline here the--the nature of the central philosophy upon which a great deal of--of hard feelings--well, maybe that's too sharp a term,--a great deal of--of difficulty, for myself and for those that worked with me, came to rest. Early in the game, I've forgotten exactly what month it was, I believe it was in 1961, a board of general officers was convened to come to the headquarters at--on Smoke Bomb Hill and for me to brief them about what my view of Special Warfare was and for them to see just what kind of support the Army should--should give the phenomenon, in the way of development of--of forces. General Howze was leader. That board and the other members are a matter of record and I won't call them off to you, because some of us had some pretty good words at that conference. I guess I spent an hour outlining primarily the guts of the State Department document which examined the new kind of conflict arena. I supplemented it with some of Roger Hilsman's material and in--my end product was a plea for a new kind of vision; that force equals mass times acceleration wasn't going to work in this case. We needed to develop a breed of man that could be sent out into the boon-docks without supervision who would continue to carry his nation's objectives in mind. A man who is not venal, who is not subject to being over-influenced by the country that he was in, but who still had compassion
for the people among whom he would work. I brought up the question of uniform. I felt that, as I had felt in World War II and I developed the parachute uniform, that something distinctive for the individual would enhance his pride, make him a--a man apart. I wanted among other things the "Bowie Knife" to return, since the Army had taken the saber away from its individuals. I thought something symbolic, when a man was fully qualified as a green beret, would be that typically American knife. It isn't--it isn't anything that's more American than the "Bowie Knife" with the inscription on one side of de oppresso liber and on the other his name and the time that he got his "Bowie Knife". It would be something that not only could be used in--in combat, but it was a useful thing. It was a kind of a knife that a woodsman would use but more than that it could be a symbol of his trade. Well, I mentioned this because little things like this were looked upon with disdain because our Army, as far back as I can remember, has always rejected the intangible things and gone for the meat and potatoes. That is, the things that fill the stomach and--the same philosophy that changes the regimental designation over night, because it is easier for the people to account for a regiment. Rather than bringing the King's Royal Rifle Corps back from Burma, they'll change the number and leave the outfit there. Well, this same kind of philosophy rejects little things like the kind of intangibles that I was looking for. Now, I could be accused of going to the other extreme, of course. There are those that think that this is an overly romantic view of the military that the essential thing is--is--is the kind of thing that gives a man enough ammunition, clothes on his back, shoes on his feet and
transportation. Well, there's a middle ground and perhaps I'm too far on the other side. Well, let's--let's get back on the path here, now.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think that's exactly what we're looking for from the standpoint of the setting. The environment that you move into in the way you established, --of course, I'd heard the story about the philosophy you had. Let me ask one specific question. You met quite a bit of resistance on even acquiring the permission to use the green beret. Could you take a moment to discuss that with us?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Oh, sure. In retrospect, it's a little amusing but since it represents a continuing and on-going philosophy, I think it's important to meet it head on. The green beret staff, of course, had it's inception with the--the British. The commando's wore the green beret, just as the red beret or the maroon baret was British with the airborne. Some of our people, who had served with the British First Airborne Division, as I indicated to you, had worn the red baret. Others had seen these--these guys--these commando-types of the green beret. Green also was the color of our early--early infantry, it was infantry color at one time before blue. There are a lot of intangible reasons why the green beret seemed like a very fine thing for commando-type troops or irregular troops. But I must say that I had nothing to do with the beginning of the green beret. COL Edson D. Raff, who also had commanded this 509th Parachute Battalion and who had promised that battalion that they would have the red baret after they had been in combat, was the fellow who really started the green beret. So, I can say that it had British origin, but what the hell, so did the American Army. As a matter of fact, our field regulation in the early
days were--were British. That's from the--and the Revolutionary War days; so I'm making no apologies for the fact that it was British. But when I arrived here all of the "old timer" special forces types had green berets tucked away somewhere. In their footlockers, in their barracks bags and out in the field where nobody cared what kind of uniform they wore, they came out of hiding and they wore them. Well, they, of course, felt that there would be no greater triumph for recognition of Special Forces than to authorize the green beret. This the Army would not even contemplate. I don't want to mention any names here but the Army--the Army chain of command all the way up actively opposed the green beret. So, let's skip over a lot of things here. The President of the United States, having decided in his own mind that the US needed an instrument for activity and operation in the irregular warfare field, and having pushed the--the metamorphosis of Special Forces in the way that I'll talk about here a little later, decided that he wanted to come down to--to see what God had wrought; what he had wrought. Furthermore, his military aid, General Ted Clifton, who was a classmate of mine at West Point, -- (he had been the editor of the West Point Pointer, I'd been the managing editor) -- we were very close friends. And Ted had convinced the President when he was talking about divisions that he ought to really see one. A damn few people have ever seen a division. The people that talk most glibly about them are often the guys that don't really know what--what they are, you see. So he came down to Bragg to--to see about a division layout for the 82nd and to have the Special Forces show their wares to the--to the President. Now, this was a question as to how we were to show our wares. For
the division it was simple. The division was all deployed on Simmons Airfield out there--and all of it's--all of it's supporting weapons and the whole thing. But Special Forces, which is supposed to operate in widely separated areas and ways clandestine and covert that are not easily seen, it was a little harder proposition to envisage. Well, Clifton and I worked out a system whereby the green berets would in--in skill groups pass by on floats, each one of which would stop in front of the President and the nature of the activity of that element would be revealed by the sergeant or the lieutenant in command. The--the emphasis on materiel was--was very small. The emphasis on people was very large. And one of the things that Clifton wanted me to put across most to the President was that these people were the "Ph.D's" of irregular warfare, guerrilla warfare and that their cap and gown was the--their cap was the--was the green beret. And I said, "Well, of course, they're not authorized." He said, "Well," he said, "I think the President would like to see them in green berets." And I said, "I think he would like to see them in green berets too." "Well," he said, "you tell them--you tell them to come out in the green beret," and I said, "What happens thereafter?" He said, "Well, we'll fix that." So--so, to make a long story short; it's all history. The President did come down. We put on a magnificent show for him including the--we were talking about the Psychological Warfare companies that we had out at Bragg and I allowed that the company could turn out a million leaflets in a twenty-four hour period and then we pulled the chain and a million leadlets came out of the--came out of the sky and dropped, as the President marveled at it. But every man--every man appeared in the green
beret and when the President went back home that evening I got a telegram from the White House mentioning that the green beret would now be a mark of excellence among the Special Forces. So, there wasn't a thing that the Army could do. I hate to say the Army like it's an adversary but you—I hope you gentlemen know what I'm talking about. The Army is a tremendous place for an oddball or a screwball like me if you can stay alive and keep from being relieved of your commission while you're trying to get along. Because there's an element for every kind of intellect. There's unlimited field for exercise of ingenuity and imagination. But the Army being something upon which the welfare of the nation rests, is not going to jump lightly from one side to another because some guy comes along with a new idea. It's really going to have to be pushed and sometimes by two or three generations of people. So I'm not indicting the Army for not accepting the green beret or the philosophy of the irregular warfare bit, other than to try to explain the nature of the circumstances which both promulgated and prevented this thing from reaching the kind of fruition that it might have. Well, the green beret then became authorized overnight and the mechanical question of getting hold of these loomed very large. We found that there was no manufacturing agent in the United States that produced an acceptable green beret. There are all kinds of green beanies; a little tam-o'-shanter, those little togs in the center and things of that nature. So we had to go to Canada to get the green beret and this of course caused the procurement agencies all kinds of travail. The—I guess the night before the first issue came in I decided that each of—the groups
should have a distinctive flash. As we learn--as we--we found out when we turned out to display our wares to the President, each one had a different arrangement on his hat and this was not really acceptable. We began wearing our badges on the--on the Green Beret and then the Special Forces insignia and there was a conglomeration. So I decided that we should each have a flash and the colors were to be meaningful in so far as it was possible to make them. The red was for the--the 7th Group, the "Mother Group". The yellow was for the 5th Group. Now wait a minute, the yellow was for the 1st--1st Group, because it was in Asian waters and it seemed that Chinese sort of a mandarine yellow was--was the thing. Incidentally, later when President Kennedy was assassinated, the 1st Group put a black border around the yellow flash. That is a matter of tradition. The 10th Group in Germany was to have the green, for the green hills of Germany, and the, let's see, the 3d--3d Group, I believe it had the black, the black one because it's commander wanted black. But there were various reasons for picking--picking the flash. Well, we also, by hook and by crook, succeeded in getting a uniform even though a special uniform for Special Forces was not looked on kindly. I--I made a trip to Natick, to the Quartermaster Activity in Natick, to see what kind of--of tropical gear we had in stock. And I found some remarkable things up there that you--you would have difficulty in believing. All of the experience of World War II and fighting in the jungles and the tropics apparently was down the drain. There wasn't anything in stock at all for jungle activity--jungle action. It was assumed that one would wear the helmet liner in tropical climates, in places like Vietnam and Laos. Incidentally, part
of my interest stemmed from the fact that when I was in Cambodia on the MAAG in Cambodia, General Ciccolella and I made several trips out into the eastern provinces—Mondulkire and Ratanakiri Provinces—and we had the greatest difficulty in getting any kind of field gear that was suitable for tropical actions like that. That is the canteens and the—there was no tropical field clothing. But I did find in the— in the Quartermaster Museum one set of what they call "tropical fatigues." This had the same imagination to it that the ordinary dung shoeveler's fatigues have had. No utility whatever. There was a—a shirt and pants. The shirt had two breast pockets and no lower pockets. The trousers had ordinary pockets, no cargo. And I said, "Well, let's see. The cloth is good. We can start from that." It was the kind of cloth that was impervious to mosquito bite, which is good. So, I said, "Send me one of those down and we'll doctor it up a little bit and see what we can do about making it a little more worthy for combat." So we took this thing and put two lower pockets on it, then we put cargo pockets on the trousers, and little by little the first thing the quartermaster knew, they had—they had the jungle uniform for Vietnam. This was done in a roundabout way and I've sent all the correspondence on it to Boston University. To show you how you can give a guy a new nose by grafting a flap from his forehead down—there's no such thing as admitting that there was a requirement for a jungle uniform. The next thing was the jungle hat—and we had one hell of a time with a jungle hat. You remember the one that finally went out. It had a broad brim and it had a high crown because there was a place under the crown—in the crown to stow a mosquito bar. Well, after the Army discarded
this, LL Bean and other--other sports companies continue to sell it. It's
the same hat but the Army wouldn't have any part of the damn thing. We
also--we also felt that a collapsible canteen was the thing for jungle
operations because. First place it didn't provide that great brick bat
when it was empty, it was flat. For a jumper it was a lot better than a
hard canteen. It had a lot of things to commend it. But there was no
such thing as--as moving this great monolith. Well, there was continued
difficulty on--on equipment. Now, I want to make it clear here that I
felt always that equipment for a Special Forces soldier was primarily for
the purpose of keeping that magnificent creature alive and it had nothing
to do with--with weaponry, or damn little to do with weaponry. My feeling
was that if the health of that soldier, who was worth his weight in gold,
could be safeguarded, both by rations, by medical kits and by clothing,
then wherever he went the weaponry would--he--he'd make sure it was
adequate either by taking it from the enemy or whatever. This may sound
a little screwball but I--I didn't--I didn't see the Special Forces soldier
as a direct combat instrument. I saw him as a--as a catalyst who could
gather around him, those that he would then train and lend-help to lead;
show them the essence of leadership; provide staff instruction and communi-
cation skills and all of that, and what he carried in the way of a weapon
was not important. As a matter of fact, I felt in some ways if the American
had a superior weapon and he was out among guerrilla forces that had some-
thing else, that his own--his own creditability suffered a little. So I
put an inordinate amount of time maybe in--in personal equipment. Medical--
field medical gear and--and things of that nature. I was not--I was not
convinced that the M-16 should be the Special Forces weapon. I felt more that a survival rifle was the kind of a thing that he wanted, should have, and the direct—the direct action role to me was the last thing that I wanted these guys to do. Well, let's take a breather here.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, I wanted to ask before you took off on another track, a question that related to what you said when you first got started. Where you addressed the issue of many times the Army gets in—the chain of command within the Army gets involved in the mechanics of an operation in justifying the spaces to generate a new command and where are they going to get—where are they going to get the money from and they don't seem to have the vision of a grasp of what their concept is or the philosophy behind that concept. And you mentioned that as one of the problems that you... I was wondering, did you ever see that change in those years, say '62, '63 when everybody now supposedly is on the band wagon? Did they ever get a change and accept the philosophy or are they still just mechanically grinding out the spaces?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, I—I saw a lot of really fine soldiers trying to change and trying their best to do what the chief executive wanted them to do but, having been products of a different system, different educational background,—military educational background—and rejecting anything foreign as not being up to American standards. They weren't about to go through Mao Tse Tung with a fine tooth comb or again, as I said, Truong Chinh, then Giap and all of these people who had layed it on the line as to how the little guy designed a—a philosophy of conflict that could throw the big guy on his back, no matter how much we had of weaponry or strength or
whatever. I remember, I guess it was 1961, when the Army, getting tired of being booted from the highest level to get with the counterinsurgency bit,--and I want to try to explain that in the context of--of U. W., directed a film be put out so that everybody in the Army would understand what counterinsurgency was. Now, the fellow who was picked to build this film was my old friend Ciccolella. And he and I had many a knock down drag out as to whether or not you could in that short film tell the whole Army what counterinsurgency was. I--I didn't buy it, then or now, and the film that came out in my view is--was an attempt of somebody that doesn't speak Sanskrit to deliver a lecture in it, you see. And a lot of money went into that and the Army finally, like in the I and E Program, got to the point where it said, "Everybody's going to understand this. You guys understand me, you're all going to understand counterinsurgency, every damn one of you. You're all going to understand civic action." And they eventually got to the point where it was no longer taught at the Special Warfare Center as a separate subject because the presumption was the whole Army knows counterinsurgency.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, that even pervaded where--when you went to other courses at that time, '61, '62, '63 time frame. You were given, they call it (counterinsurgency)--career officer course, (counterinsurgency) and that sort of thing. So they assumed that everyone knew about it.

LTG YARBOROUGH: It'd get that far away. This--this was obviously an attempt to give the President what he kept demanding of the military. And yet it wasn't--it wasn't done properly for the reasons that I indicated. It was too deep, too abstract, too difficult to be taken off the top of
the head in addition to other duties. So it was not a success. Now, we're talking now about the expansion of the effort. You're familiar with the standards that we imposed and the requirement therefore for getting a great many volunteers in order to get a few who could qualify. This process of being able to take the cream of the crop from existing regular units had been--gotten into high gear by my predecessor, George Jones, who incidentally is an unsung hero. A guy who did an awful lot to get Special Forces going, who had sold personnel policies to the Department of the Army against their will to allow a grade structure which was out of line with anything the military had known otherwise. George Jones had done the--the really hard butt-kicking, spade work before I came in to ride the crest of the wave, you see. Well, he had, as I said, received authority to take people out of regular units and the--the unit commander couldn't do much about it. If I would have been a unit command I would have been justly peeved off about it too. The result of this was we got some really fine, mature NCO types and specialist types who, with a certain amount of retreading, could form the backbone of the--of the A, A Teams, the A--A Detachments. But there wasn't anybody that came to Special Forces that didn't need retraining. Whereas, a man might be an expert in his particular skill in the infantry, a light weapons man; the light weapons job for a Special Forces man was five times as great. It had to do with enemy weapons, weapons of friendly nations, applications of these weapons in irregular situations rather than in just ordinary musketry. The same thing applied to the communicator who had to be a CW man in addition to everything else. The--the medical man especially
had to be trained to the degree that was unknown in Corpsman's channels in the military. These people, incidentally, I believe we trained them for 43 weeks and part of the training had to do with operations on on animals for the purpose of insuring that the individual had no sadistic qualities about him, that he was conscientious, will take care of that creature just like he would a human being. And many foundered under close examination by doctors were were turned loose to do other things because they were not psychologically suited to become medical NCOs. I don't want to diverge too much here, but the United States shortage of medical helpers and people who have skills less than doctors, is now being filled to some degree by people who are comparable to the Special Forces medic. Now this principle had not been accepted before the Special Forces showed that it was feasible, by proper psychological selection and intensive training. The training revolving mostly around making the individual realize there were upper limits to his skills that he was not at liberty to try to transgress. That his first charge was that he should do no harm and thereafter treat within the skill level that he had. If a man couldn't understand that or wasn't likely to operate under those restrictive parameters, then he was not a Special Force medic. But I say we've filled--we've helped to fill the void in--in the American system, by that philosophy, and that development. So all of these people had to be retrained in the basic skills and then all the skills joined together to make a Special Forces soldier out of him. That means one that could operate behind the lines in a guerrilla environment, with all of the subtleties and intangibles that differentiate guerrilla warfare from regular warfare. So along the
Many really fine soldiers who had had a different view of what Special Forces were. The ones that I especially was anxious not to incorporate in the Green Berets were the types that were the "old jock strap" commando, the ranger type. And I must say there were a lot of those--considerable number of those in Special Forces when I arrived. I felt that I--I'd fought with rangers during World War II and I had known them for the gallant "blood-letters" that they were. They were fighting machines. They were not diplomats in any sense of the word and rejected that attitude. As far as the humanities were concerned, if they suited the occasion, alright, but if they didn't, that was alright too. They were in there to cut a swath. In some ways the Rangers and the commandos reminded me of the French "Goums" because wherever you turned them loose, boy they would--they would go, there wasn't any question about it. Well, some of my Army colleagues in higher ranks and in key positions in the Department of the Army, still continue to look upon Special Forces as a kind of a commando. They couldn't understand, therefore, why the attrition rates for judgment, the attrition rates for lack of ability to understand humanity, a guy who wouldn't get down on his belly along side a Montagnard and show him the sight picture, and--and why people were thrown out in such great numbers. So, we were continually called to task for the attrition rate. As long as I had anything to do about it we didn't bend one inch and therefore every man that came out of that cauldron, out of that system, I would back him to the limit. When I arrived at the center, we already had some forces in Laos, some Special Forces in Laos. The history on this is probably more accurate than I can
give you, but they'd gone up there first as instructors in weaponry—in conventional weaponry; and as the nature of the war became more apparent to some and less apparent to others, it seemed like it was inappropriate to have these people teaching conventional arms and armaments and they therefore graduated into something closer to the irregular warfare, which they were more capable of doing. But the nature of their exercise in Laos was never as clear as it might be. Partially because the ambassador called the shots, normally. The military's view was not always accepted. I don't want to get too far ahead of myself here but you— you can put some of this back in context, so I want to say it while I'm thinking about it, because I might not think about it later. Ambassador Godley was a good friend of mine in— in Laos. I had known him in Cambodia. He was the Deputy Chief of Mission there. He's a Far East expert. He followed Bill Sullivan as Ambassador to— to Laos. Sullivan, as you know, called his own war up there. It didn't matter what CINCPAC said or Abrams or anybody else. He— he ran the war as he saw fit. It wasn't really defined as a war in that clear sense. But, in any case, the Special Forces that were there, the irregular forces were more amenable to what the Ambassador said than to anybody else. Even bombing across the line could only be done with the approval of Ambassador Sullivan. A movement of guerrilla into various areas or guerrilla incursions were— were taken under consideration by the ambassador, and maybe approved or maybe not approved. So Sullivan was sort of a thorn in the side of the military, but on his side of the picture and on Godley's side of the picture was the feeling that the screw up in Vietnam was so great that they didn't want it to extend also up into
Laos. And if we couldn't understand the nature of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and we sent them big military headquarters up to Laos to promulgate the same sort of system that we've carried out in Vietnam, it was counter-productive. Now, Godley, my friend, used to tell me this up until two and three o'clock in the morning and I would say, "Yes, but there are so many things we can help with. We can regularize your supply system, we can make sure that the stuff that comes up here actually get to the people that--that should have it. We could monitor the CIA irregular effort to make sure that it had proper goals." That it was a campaign with--with proper objectives, instead of a series of action, some of which were not seemingly related to each other. "Now we can help you with--with personnel policies, with all kinds. We can inspect units to see whether they're "A ok" or not. As a matter of fact, I inspected some of their units, because Godley allowed me to go out and look around the countryside. And I found, for instance, supply rooms where Laos irregulars were being trained; where everything was in a pile--mortars, mortar ammunition, bangalore torpedoes, all kinds of spare parts. Things mixed and befuddled in a way that one good American Supply sergeant, green beret type, could have sorted out. As a matter of fact, in a previous incarnation when I was up there in 1961 and visiting the Plateau de Bolovens, I saw green beret supply rooms, with a minimal amount of materials that they had, laid out in a fashion that reflected nothing but credit on the--on the guys that had done it. Training scheduled tacked up on the tree, written on a piece of bark but--but there and the whole thing with a--with a management facade. I don't like that management term too much in connection with the military,
but, in any case, you could see the professionality which was lacking in
the Laotian setup because it was civilian run and--and the military--the
military were kept out for the reasons that I indicated. So--where in
the hell was I now?
INTERVIEWER: Well, you indicated that when you took over the Center,
that you did have some people in Laos already. They were already there
and then we were going to get after the training and the expansion
problems.
LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, that's right. Now to--to confound the--the issue;
as I said when I first arrived I thought that perhaps unconventional war-
fare was the major objective. That is, behind the lines organization and
equiping and promulgation of guerrilla actions, but very early in the
game the counterinsurgency bit began to surface. This was an extremely
complex philosophy, which instead of becoming simpler, became more com-
plex as we went along because it--it contemplated use of American forces
to aid indigenous peoples in avoiding takeover by subversive forces that
were being supported from outside sources. Now let's--let's look at that
a little. Subversion inside somebody else's country is--if it's promulated
by the Maoists or Marxists--is designed to avoid detection. It's an under-
ground kind of thing and a cellular thing that even "Special Branch," highly
trained police, have a hell of a time digging out. In order to dig it out,
a jettisoning of certain civil rights must take place. One has to resort
occasionally to curfews, to search and seizure, to mail monitoring, to
telephone tapping, in order to get at that vast underground. Well, here
we found the United States embarking on a course of action which was to
help an indigenous country go through all of the mechanics of ridding itself of that incubus which would eventually, or could eventually, produce guerrilla forces, regular forces, main forces and the whole bit. Well, you could say that if we were going to do that at all, the best people in the world would do it would be Special Forces. Because if you know how to organize an underground, if you knew what the guerrilla forces was, how they operated from mission support sites and base area, if he knew what a guerrilla base was in--in Mao's terms, then you had a hell of a lot better chance of being able to roll one up. But at the same time you had to be a little schizophrenic because, knowing that these things are in--installed to avoid detection and to avoid the kinds of actions that regular forces can carry out, then the--the question comes, well, how in the hell do you--how do you cope with that, you see. I think I'm on record here quite a lot as saying that any country that has a thing like this going, in which it really believes, you would be hard put to try to--try to take it out. I--I couldn't see how it could be done. But here in the case of Vietnam, the developing situation in Vietnam, we felt, I guess, that the will of the people was great enough so that if they wanted to rid themselves of the infrastructure which supported the guerrillas, that we could help provide the means and the way. Well, this is, I guess, how the--how the counterinsurgency mission descended on Special Forces as regards Vietnam. I'm--I'm abridging an awful lot here because we were--we were early in the game engaged in doing this kind of advice to--all over the bloody world. We had forces that went to Ethiopia and we had them in Latin America. I was invited
Came to Colombia by General Ruiz Novoa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Army, to look over the situation there that had resulted in over 300,000 people being killed by "La Violencia", and prescribed some kind of counterinsurgency medicine for the country. So we had teams everywhere trying to put out a little information here and there to try to get the indigenous clued in as to what the basis of counterinsurgency was. We developed a manual that was printed in French, printed in Spanish and in English which gathered together all the knowledge that--of the world that we could collate. Extensive French experience. Experience of the British in Malaya. The experiences in Greece. And codified so that you could see at least what the principles of counterinsurgency were and these--these boiled down--couldn't boil them down--but I mean, simply stated, they involved detection and destruction of the underground situation which was outside the province of the military; not possible for a man with a bayonet. Defeat and destruction of the guerrilla forces which was something that military forces, reconfigured and revitalized, could do. And then the change of the environment, the political economic environment so--so reinforcements would not go either to the underground or to the guerrillas--because they felt that the government's course of action was so right, so clear that there was no longer anything to be gained by trying to defeat it in that way. Now each of those things is vastly--vastly complicated. The change in the environment, for instance; the economic and political environment. Maybe it's an earth shaking thing; it takes ten or fifteen years. The--the defeat of the guerrilla forces! Not so difficult, but considering mass armies of the kind we had, if you'd break a division
down into very small packets, then the kind of leadership that you need to take those little packets out into the boondocks had to be worked on in a way that squads, "cheek by jowl", fighting in regular combat, don't worry about. They've got a commander who tells them what to do and they do it, you see. But one of the most difficult and technical jobs of all, getting to the underground without destroying completely any democratic façade that is in existence. Now above and beyond all of this, the lingering fear that by helping a country do this kind of thing you may be promulgating in power a government that shouldn't be there, one that the people don't want, and you prop it up, because you don't understand, you see. Well, I think we felt these--these problems very, very deeply at a time when the Army was by and large interpreting counterinsurgency in terms of counter-guerrilla and civic action. And civic action was reduced to an absurd simple--absurdly simple thing; so that any soldier would tell you, sure it's going out in the field and helping the people. What do you do? Well, you dig the well. You, you know, you help get small business started again. It's that easy. Well, we knew it was not that easy. I had talked to Tunka Abdul Raman of Malaya who had talked about strategic hamlets up here. He had said, "Yes, the military had taken people from widely separated areas in order to protect them and had--had in the process of getting them installed in their new villages, dug the wells for them, tilled the soil, built the houses, built the bridges, the schools." Whereupon the people began to sit on their collective ass and they said, "Well, the Army's supposed to do this." "Well, what do you do now?", Mr. Tunka Abdul Raman said to me. I said, "Well, I don't know. What do you do?"
"Well," he said, "I don't know if it. I guess what we tried to do was to get competition between the villages for civic betterment and economic betterment and so on, but you—you've done a kind of disastrous thing by having the government, with uniformed men, step in and--and do the work.

Well, we found later that part of the answer to that was to have the indigenous work alongside you. You never—the soldiers never did it later on but you see, putting across the intricacies of this idea. An idea which can destroy an economy or— or really push it into a different configuration. To a mass Army, where you've got people that are conscripts, people who come from New York City and don't give a damn about Saigon, don't know where they are and don't care. A whole flock of types with various kinds of motivations who may say, "I've come from Appalachia and the village that I'm working on over here is a hell of a lot better off than they are up where I come from. Why am I doing it over here?" Well, what I'm trying to say is that the over-simplification of that simple word, counterinsurgency, made us collectively look like very dull fellows. And yet, this was—the major talent or the major tasks that Special Forces were impressed into. After Andy Goodpastor came back from one of his visits and decided that that was where the Special Forces effort might well be applied. I can say this that, that being the decision, the best people in the world to do it were Special Forces because, if they hadn't picked up anything after the hours and hours and hours of dwelling on just these questions that I'm bringing up here now, then they were incorrectly placed in Special Forces and I think few of them were. So that then became the big thing, the counterinsurgency. Now the UN—you see, I recognize the principle of
limited war as being valid. History will show that it's a hell of a lot smarter to stop in some cases before you go broke, then it is to throw everything down the drain. There's also the question of reality as to whether the enemies really are going to knuckle under to the degree that you think they ought to, before you've used an inordinate amount of force, time and effort. I recognize the political—the political predominance of—of reasons for military actions, political and economic, but I still don't understand what the United States philosophy was in preventing the promulgation of unconventional warfare against the government of North Vietnam and against the supply lines and routes for the infiltrating forces coming out of North Vietnam. You know that we launched the beginning of such an effort in North Vietnam through SOG. They were forbidden to carry on guerrilla actions or to recruit undergrounds or auxiliaries and their—their charter became one of intelligence gathering which was—which was not—not credible really. So this mighty UW effort that we were capable of unleashing never had a chance in Vietnam. It was not really used. There were some things that approximated UW effort. They were more, I would say more direct action; the actions over into Cambodia. But the business of really going through the system of developing an underground which would spawn guerrilla forces, which would then be trained and worked with by Green Berets was really not—was not in high gear in Vietnam, I guess.

INTERVIEWER: Maybe that answers the question that I always had. I went to the Special Forces Officers Course in October of '64 and I couldn't understand at that time why such a high percentage of the POI of the
course was devoted to UW and I didn’t understand why we didn’t spend more
time concentrating in—I didn’t know if they hadn’t gotten around to
changing the POI and bringing it up to date with counterinsurgency and the
aspects of that. Was it because you were still hoping in that time frame
to get in some aspect of UW in what we were doing?

LTG YARBROUGH: No, I think it was because the Army was taking more and
more of the prerogatives of teaching—teaching counterinsurgency, you see.
Even though it was outside the sphere of the—or outside the ken of the—
of the Army as a whole and I don’t—I don’t even want to put it that way.
But the technical aspects of counterinsurgency were not—were not as well
taught anywhere else as they were here. But now, UW, we felt still if
you understood UW thoroughly, you would understand the nature of the
phenomenon against which you were fighting and therefore could cope with
it in a hell of a lot better way. You see, conventional forces didn’t
understand UW. They—they thought UW was guerrilla warfare and the whole
spectrum of—of assassination, kidnapping, underground logistics, propaganda
manufacturing, auxiliary sabotage efforts, which were only—which were here
while the guerrilla forces was here. They had no—no way and even in the
Phoenix Program there—which at long last somebody began to recognize that
there was an infrastructure that had to be dug out—I saw young second
lieutenants who were—I guess, just recently in MI—were placed out in
villages to cope with the Communist subversive underground. The Maoist
organized, beautifully tailored,—here these young fresh faced—The Army
had put them out there to—to try to do that, you see, and I’ll maybe talk
about it a little later, but as late as the time that I was ACSI, even
the Agency hadn't decided that the underground infrastructure was responsible
for the guerrilla forces; the screening effort for withdrawing main forces,
for logistics, for terror, for all kinds of things, you see. And the--the
weight of the intelligence effort, both military and CIA, was "how many di-
visions do these guys have"; how much--what's the size of the effort; not how
many are placed at village level, at hamlet level, where they're in a posi-
tion to intercept your signals, to sabotage your--your effort, to taint
leadership, because it was a different phenomenon, a different kind of a
thing, you see. A multidimensional thing that our overall system wasn't
able to cope with. Military intelligence is not the kind of thing that
you see to go after an underground structure in--in a foreign country like
that. Well, see, where in the hell were we now? We got off on a . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, the sidelines sometime become more interesting than
some of the notes we had down but during the time that we were trying to
get at you--you faced not only the problems of getting people to believe
the philosophy of the Special Forces and control, the requirements for it.
You had the problem of the expansion being pushed by the President of the
United States initially and then it carried on as coming out of the front
office. The forces itself went through a great expansion where we had not
only the 10th Special Forces and the 7th but picked up the 3d and the 6th,
picked up a sizeable psychological operations element. We went to the SAFS,
all of that during the period of time when you had this Center. I wonder,
sir, if you could talk on how you were able to build this--this great
force and expansion with the limited assets that were here at Bragg and
how you were able to--you cadred almost all--with your key people, all of
these separate Special Forces group, the 8th was cadred, the First Special Forces and all of this sort of thing. Could you talk about that. The problems in training and then I want to do when I get back to the missions and roles.

LTG YARBOROUGH: In Vietnam or . . .

INTERVIEWER: If they went to Vietnam . . .

LTG YARBOROUGH: Of course, one of the--one of the beauties of working with--with Special Forces was that cadreing was so much easier than any other kind of a force, because each man had multiple skills. And he was ideally the kind of a fellow who could be the nucleus for an expanded guerrilla force at many times his number and so this--this part was not all that difficult. The--the constant flow of volunteers was a real help. We--we got as many as we wanted. There was no--there was no paucity of volunteers; even with the high attrition rate, because it seemed that everybody wanted to be in the Special Forces. I must say this that the officers were more of a problem than the enlisted men. The enlisted men in many cases ruled the roost because they were products of a much more difficult school than the officers were. They really had to show their wares before they got the Green Beret. On the other hand, the junior officer sometimes felt that commanding an A Detachment was beneath him because there were so few men. And I--I had some sessions with young fellows like this to which I would put the question as to whether they felt that they knew as much about the skills as their men did; and every one of these detachments had a--a geographic orientation that really called for language; did they know the language? Suppose that A Detach-
ment happened to become the nucleus of a guerrilla regiment over night, did they feel that they knew all of the ramifications of tactics and techniques and supply and so on of a regiment? Well, they seemed to--in many cases not--how shall I put this? They--they were looking for more--more instant glory I guess than the enlisted men. Now this--this is--this is not a general indictment, but these were some of the problems I had. We turned out some of the finest officers I've ever seen anywhere but we also had some that by virtue of the fact that they were assigned there, and there wasn't much I could do about it, they got away with things that an enlisted man could not because I'd throw his butt out, you see. The physical plant was a very distinct hazard. It was the old artillery barracks set up there on Smoke Bomb Hill; completely inadequate for classrooms, for command posts. Cold as the devil in winter and hot as the blazes in the summer but I--I don't think we--we worried too much about that. The--the burning feeling of really getting something done in a new direction and something that was vital to the country and--overcame all of these problems. Maneuver areas were no problem because Special Forces can maneuver anywhere and we didn't need the standard tract of land where you did fire and movement; we could go a variety of places. Money was a problem. I still don't know how I avoided being called onto the carpet by the GAO or somebody for the building programs that were undertaken on a--on a shoestring and expenditures of money. There wasn't anything crooked about it. It was--it was malice of forethought and it was all on--on record. But I always felt, you see, I at first had the commander of the Third Army behind me and then somewhere along the line there came
sort of a parting of the ways. I think we differed in our views as to what guerrilla forces were, what they were supposed to be. And the support for--for the physical plant wasn't as great later on as it had been in the--in the beginning. I'm couching this in--in rather terms of (convenience) if I'm brought into the court martial this late in the game maybe the statute of limitations will get me off but--but throughout this whole thing, with a cadre of really terrific young staff officers, who were--had the same feeling that I did about the whole thing, I felt that we could go down with flying colors, even though we were doing things that were unorthodox, because they were in the interest of the government and the interest of the Army and they were not dishonest. So let's--let's leave that whole thing at that. That plant, the impetus that it was given because of the support from the highest level continued to carry on long after a lot of guys that tried to slow it down every way they knew how, just couldn't get a hand on it, you see.

INTERVIEWER: I remember that. It was pretty slippery. They did try though. Well, then I also--after it grew and you were able to accomplish so much during that period of time and get these units, these groups, area oriented, language trained, closely associated with their areas--I guess the 64 time frame--the big argument about what type of support and what types of units were best for--for Vietnam and then of course we took the bulk of the CIDG role. Do you care to discuss the CIDG role and its intent and . . .

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, well, CIDG, of course, was one of the greater accomplishments of Special Forces. They, as you well know, performed
the tremendous function of denying huge areas of land. Whereas, even
though they weren't resisting actively in every case, the area was hostile to the
VC and the NVA and the--this much used phrase the hearts and the minds of
the people, were bent in the right direction. Now I felt that early in
the game the--the mountain peoples needed to be subject to particular
attention. And to that end, I think it was in 1962, we began to look
around for materials on the mores of the hill tribes and we found that,
in spite of the fact that there had been foundations and study groups and
all kinds of actions in Southeast Asia using up public and private funds
to find out how tribal peoples live, there wasn't anything really that
we could use. There was a book on the hill tribes of--of Thailand. It
had been written by a member of AID who had been a--a--an evangelist, but
there wasn't anything on--on Vietnam. And we intended, I think we felt
all along, we were going to work with the hill tribes, because we worked
with the Kha in--in Laos and felt that that was out--our strong suit to
get out with people that nobody else really had a handle on and we could
have rapport with, and were in strategic areas. So we turned out this
book on, "The Hill Tribes of Vietnam", threw it together in a fairly short
length of time using materials from our returned detachments, from public
and classified and private resources, and it became a kind of a text. We
also began to gather tapes on the various languages, a few which were
recorded. I--I've forgotten just which ones we began to--to listen to back
here, but there were a couple of those tribes that nobody had ever written
the language down. I don't think the Bru was one. There was another--
another tribe that was hostile as hell and nobody--nobody ever even gotten
close to them to talk to them for a long, long time. Well, that book we
turned out together with a guide for Forward Air Controllers. We felt
that being able to whistle in air support was a necessary thing but at
that time, in '61, there was no system whereby Special Forces soldiers
or detached groups could get air support. Really, the system was too
cumbersome. So we developed this guide and it had to be--it couldn't be
called forward air controller because of interservice problems--so we
called them Forward Air Guides, FAC, you see. And we practiced it out
here and at one time--one time I think in '62, I took this Forward Air
Guide manual, the book on--on the Montagnard tribes and our counter-
insurgency guide and I went up to the Chief of Staff of the Army and I
asked to be allowed to go to Vietnam again because the Army had turned
me down. They said, "You have been over there too damn many times." I
said, "Now look, who has a better right to be over there. Who should be
over there other than--than me. Here, I'm training people here. We've
got the--the--what was the name of that MATA, the MATA. . ."
INTERVIEWER: MATA Course.
LTC YARBOROUGH: " . . it's got to be current. Now, we've got all of these
things in the mill here and--and your staff has classified my visit over
there as a--as a "feather-merchant" trip." Now, this was one of the times
we had--had some words. Well, suffice it to say, I got--I got over there
on the trip. What was the other part of your question there?
INTERVIEWER: Well, whether you felt that that role that we assumed such
a large part of, the CIDG. It wasn't just the hill tribes, it began to
expand all over. Whether that was an appropriate role for the Forces.
LTG YARBOROUGH: It was--it was not only an appropriate role, I don't think that there are--were any other forces that could have done it as well. And I think it was a highly successful thing and the strategic value of it I think will come through again and again and again for students of the history of that operation over there. But I was going to say something about hill tribes. Bernard Fall was a friend of mine. He was down here frequently lecturing. Bernard Fall was one of the early individuals that opened my eyes as to the nature of that war and he tried to do it to the officers down here. He--he was not popular because he--he was sort of abrasive about the way that he said things and he indicted us all over the place but, he still had a lot of facts. Well, he gave me at one time a document called VC Document 22, that he had come across, and this purported to be a pattern for the future political and economic welfare of the Montagnard once the VC had taken over. Among other things it outlined the plans for safeguarding the crafts, keeping the identity, ennobling the mountain people, giving them a place in the sun, and this document was so good I thought, that I took it to the US Department of State and asked that they change the name and the date on it and issue it as our--our idea because we had not been able to--to get from the Department or State or anybody, especially through the military, any coherent policy that our people who are working with the Montagnard could put across. Now it was my feeling right from the start that they should little by little get the Montagnard to salute the Vietnamese flag, that they should recognize they were part of that country, even though they didn't like the guys in the lowlands. I had hoped that maybe out of the Montagnard
groups would come something like the Gurkhas; people who had their own knife and their own beech-cloth; like a Tartan, fiercely proud of being a member of the, whatever tribe they were, and that the Special Forces could be--could be instrumental in doing this. You remember the uprising that the Montagnard perpetrated because of their feeling of dislike and the feeling of having been had by the--by the Vietnamese. We were in the middle on that and the reason we did as well as we did was because, even though we had not gotten political instructions in a political war, our people had the right feeling toward the Montagnard. I think right up until the last they--they loved them and they had respect for them and--but gain, it's another--it's another example of how failure to understand all of the facets of that war led us into promulgation of a GI kind of combat that could only end the way it did.

INTERVIEWER: One little step then. What did you think about the next escalation that happened when Special Forces went into the subsector advisory role? First we had border surveillance, which came in there, and that was followed up with that subsector advisory role mentioned.

All-all the subsectors on the border.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, you see to--to critique that I would--I would have to go into a critique of the whole damn organizational structure over there which I deplored. To have Corps areas in a counter-guerrilla war and corps--corps organization. To--to have lack of centralized control of something like Special Forces which were designed for central--central control and designed to operate outside the physical areas where other forces are able to operate, violated all kinds of principles. I--I
don't want to go into a complete critique of the Vietnam War because this is going to take me a little while, like a couple of years.

INTERVIEWER: Well, those of us who were in at that time saw that we could do some good, of course, and Parks was at a subsector advisor, but it definitely detracted from the initial idea of going out and working with the mountain tribes and worth the, you know, and the border surveillance is something else but it definitely was a change in the mission.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Of course there was--there was no kind of force that was more flexible for change in mission. They were self sufficient under all and any circumstances and I think this is one of the reasons why there were so many missions thrown at Special Forces at various times. They could do them with distinction and . . .

INTERVIEWER: That really wasn't a loaded question but I had--I had the first camp that went subsector in the IV Corps. I was in the Hoa Hao area right between the Basac and the Mekong. Later, I saw how MACV copied all of the things that we had that were successful there. Really excess to money that make impact on certain things and quite reaction to supply that we need to do things and a much more decentralized system that--it was to some degree centralized but I--I could radio straight to Nha Trang and to the--to the S-4 and get anything I needed right to the spot. I can remember hearing Colonel Spragins, he was a deputy at that time, briefing pestering us with more things than we could do and stuff and I just thought. . .

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, we--we developed that system while--when I was here. Built it in Okinawa. It was based on the Agency's system and this--we--we
inherited that or took it from the Agency after the transfer of mission in Vietnam from Agency control to Army control. We held out for that as being essential. Because you could imagine the Army supply system getting you 5,000 camouflage suits size five, you know, or--or a live sheep or something like this. The arguments you get all the way through and so this--this was one of the--one of the good things that came up. We also, you know, we took advantage of that Agency's set up on Okinawa to package materials for introduction into various areas. The Army had no way to do that sort of thing or the Air Force, you see, and I'm--I'm not indicting them because they're operating on a different--they were operating on a different philosophy, for a different kind of force. And I can imagine with twenty divisions in the field if each one had a, you know, a supply system all of its own and access to all kinds of open market purchase, this that and the other it'd be chaos, but Special Forces couldn't operate without that. They couldn't supply the--the irregular troops that way.

INTERVIEWER: Excuse me, sir. This will be the end of side one of tape two in the oral history program being conducted with General William P. Yarborough.
and the mistake was so massive and involved every element of our national power structure. Not just the military, for goodness sake. The whole political structure was involved in the thing and the numbers of people that understood what the enemies' real objectives and what his means for carrying these out were--were--you could count on the fingers with one hand. Well...

INTERVIEWER: Well, sir, we've--we've taken you back on the remembrances of when you took over the command and how it grew and some of the problems that you were able to overcome in expanding the role of Special Forces. As we walk around Fort Bragg today I see less and less Green Berets. I was a party to the 1st Special Forces Group being brought back to the States as USARPAC was condensed, I get a feeling about the future of Special Forces and it isn't a good one. It isn't the kind that I'd like to have about it's future roles and its continuation as a--as a unit. We also see a growth of such things as the Ranger battalion as an outgrowth of something else. I wondered if you would care to project for us, with your great interest in Special Forces and particularly the Special Forces soldier, what roles you see for Special Forces in the future and what you might feel will come out of the Special Forces units as we look down the next five or six to ten years?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, in the first place, I--I think there's some feeling within the command structure that Rangers are a trade-off for Special
Forces. This is naive because they're not the same breed of cat at all. There is very definitely a place in the Army for Rangers I feel. I wish we'd had several Brigades of Rangers when the Vietnam War came about, because the kind of action that these people can carry out with minimal equipment and maximum esprit and fighting capability and, if the World War II is any example, there are many. I felt that—that the kind of ranger action that perhaps we could count on now should count on ought to come maybe from the 82nd Airborne Division. I—having been one of the original "paratroops", when we looked upon parachute actions behind enemy lines about in the same category as one would look on Ranger actions now, I always had a feeling that the airborne division was sort of an anomaly or an atrocity, because to deliver an outfit like—of that size by parachute and expect it to get into action in any reasonable time as a division, was just not in the cards. Even in—even on a maneuver if you drop a—a parachute division, it is quite a long time before this damn thing is able to fight as a division. On the other hand, if it were brigades of separate battalions, lightly equipped and designed to operate in areas where—where combat or—or that kind of unit is indicated, rather than a divisional kind of thing, would have a lot more credibility. Now, with the—with the survival of troop carrying airplanes in— in the atmosphere of Strella and improved Strella kinds of weapons, you have—you have a situation that is paradoxical. I—I—I just—it's difficult for me to think of where airborne divisions as such as going to be able to ply their trade. So Ranger—the Rangers might have well been embodied in the divisional structure both
the 101st and the 82nd. I feel that something is really gone out of the 101st. Being a parachutist is a thing that only a parachutist understands and any civilian layer that thinks that because there's not the creditability of delivering a guy by parachute that parachute qualification isn't worth its weight in gold for morale and espirit is following a long line of guys who think in similar ways and have always emasculated some of the finest in the military. But that strength then and that effort that has gone into the Ranger battalions, it seems to me, should have remained with Special Forces. The reason being that war in our time is such a changing commodity that only the types of organizations that have the flexibility of Special Forces, or the people that have the flexibility of thinking, are going to be able to react to the new situations in the way that they ought to. I don't believe that collectively we have thought our national defense posture through to the degree that we can really, with confidence, say that we can cope with what is coming up in the future. First place, we're not sure about what is coming up. We've weren't prepared for the "Peoples' War" in Vietnam. We assume now, I think, that the kind of war that we may be involved in is will be a classical war and yet all of the most likely opposition has has used the other kind of war with much greater success than laying it all on the line in the--in the conventional sense. So, I think what I'm saying is that we--we didn't cope with irregular war in Asia; therefore, we've closed the door on it and, rather than recognizing that we didn't learn our lessons, we are turning back again to the hope that there will be conventional war if there is a war and we'll use our
conventional forces and not Special Forces. Now we see in the world today continued erosion of the kind—the area of the world that is sympathetic in the United States, by means other than direct—direct aggression. I—we—the African scene strikes me as particularly applicable. The Portuguese Armies quit—Mozambique and Angola and Guinea Bissau, not because they were beaten but because they didn’t understand the nature of the conflict. Their casualties were not all that great. The means that were used against them were the classical means that we saw in Vietnam and that the British saw in Malaya. Frelimo, which is still in operation in Mozambique, will live to fight another day against Rhodesia. There is going to be conflict in Angola over Cabinda; the oil—the oil enclave of Cabinda with—with Zaire on one hand trying to hold on to that oil rich area and whatever state is in Angola trying to hold on to the other side. And the kind of war that will be fought will be the guerrilla, subversive, underground, propaganda, assassination, ball of wax on which the United States does not have a handle with the exception of the few people that are looking in that direction. We’ve shown that we think so little of this philosophy that we’ve placed the Special Warfare Center out here under a Corps. Classically, a Corps is a light maneuvering unit that changes its size and shape according to the nature of the enemy. It’s something that was classically designed in the Napoleonic era to avoid large logistic tails and other—other encumbrances. They’ve got a Corps Support Command with this one out here. And they have attached the Special Forces to the—the Corps. These things lead me to believe that—that unless we can get somebody in—in a high position, either
civilian or military or preferably both, that continue to recognize that we haven't fathomed the depths yet of the Maoist kind of aggression, that we are not going to be prepared for the next one. The beauty of Special Forces now is that investment in a few people can be parlayed into a great many. Mike Healy out here, General Healy, thinks that the "force-multiplier" role is a good one. I think he--he may have a good point there because Special Forces that can multiply somebody else's forces could also multiply our own and bring with them the high standards, the professional skills of--of real--real professional soldiers. So whether there's a foreign adventure or not for these people to engage in, it would certainly be a domestic one in--in times of--of stress and helping us to get the forces ready. But area oriented forces now with--with linguists and people that have studied the mores of the target countries. Everytime we've had a big go-round these people have been at a premium. It's been difficult to find and gather them together and sometimes we've had to go far afield to get people who were not soldiers but had some skill in some foreign country that we were interested in. So I think first that the nature of the wars of the future need to be looked at a lot more realistically and searchingly and I think your institution is one of those that ought to be doing that. The danger, the difficulty though, is that--that a lot of people are afraid to put themselves out on a limb. If it's too far away from the norm, then they're afraid somebody on that--that general's promotion list is going to say this guy's a crackpot. For God's sake don't--don't put him on the list. When I was ACSI there was an element of ACSI that was looking at the na-
ture of wars in the future and we had--we had head bumpings frequently because all I could see out of that outfit was more of the same. They just projected the--the lines as they are now and the curves were the same thing. I see in the R and D structure perfection of machines and procedures which would make the current battlefield more of a--of a technological kind of a thing but no--no change in dimension of conflict. There were a couple of young fellows up at the War College that turned out a study a couple of years ago. One was a Marine Corps officer and the other was an Army officer, on the vulnerabilities of American society to... The vulnerabilities of society--the affect of social change on vulnerability of the United States. And they--they pointed out that the development of technology in our country, with all of the supporting services that are required for each individual action and operation to take place, have made innumerable targets both for psychological attack and physical attack. The interruption of seemingly unimportant ancillary actions can bring a whole major operation to a halt. Whether it is production, whether it's done by inciting strikes, whether it's done by sabotage or whatever. And they concluded that military attack on a country now is--assumes a role much less important than a confluence of other kinds of pressures, which could bring a country to it's knees internally. Now having--having seen the example of the complete preparation of Vietnam from the takeover, the same thing in--in Mozambique and Angola--That process having been developed to--Cambodia's another one and will--and Laos will soon follow. Thailand probably. The techniques are there in the enemies bag of tricks. The logistics, the personnel structure,
the political formulas, the military part is fitted skillfully in this whole--this whole matrix. Maybe the kind of thing that this United States of ours is going to have to face, rather than Russian Armies coming across our border, is first an atrophy of our trade areas which we have seen begin in Vietnam and South--Southeast Asia. Foreshortening of our access to raw materials, a weaning away of allies and then the final disillusion of the country on the basis of internal conflicts that can be fanned by sociological pressures, by psychological, by physical activity. And since our country has never believed in propaganda and psychological warfare as an instrument for aggression or for attack, by the same token our defenses against psychological warfare and internal dissension caused by psychological operations are equally as weak. And if you're going to project the curve out, and look at the problems that we may face in the future from a power point of view, it seems to me that there is more of a case for this kind of a demise of these United States of ours than there is of our confronting an enemy in battle with guidons flying somewhere on the plains of Europe. I see--I see Africa as the battle-zone for the last remaining bonanzas in world supply of vital materials. Everything from the desirable ones of gold and diamonds, right on down to oil, uranium, chrome and even many foodstuffs if the great dams along the--along the Cunene River and the Caborabassa--across the Zanabezi provide million of areas of fertile land and son on. But battling for survival with conventional forces in areas like that, doesn't seem to me to have--have any--any real meaning. At the same time the Russians and the Chinese are battling for those areas right now, using means that
only Special Forces or officers who have been--who have been exposed to Special Forces, really understand. I don't think you'll--I think if you probably went to DCSOPS and asked what their concept of future war is you would probably not get anything like that kind of thing, you see. Maybe they're right. Maybe--maybe they're lucky I'm retired. But this is my rationale for continuing this thing out here. It is a--it is really a Ph d kind of thing that the--the answers are not all in--and it requires continual study and a continued corps of people that can apply the principles in case we--in case we need it.

INTERVIEWER: But I think it probably relates to the budget and money. I wonder--how do--with the present Congress, we're still using the device of the Russian Bear and at a time to justify our 16 divisions--and his qualitative improvements that he's making. A pretty good ploy they've got going on; Russian makes--a Russian is rattling the conventional saber and making qualitative improvements and the Chinese are there, other forces.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, for this--for this to be a telling argument a creditable scenario has got to be developed as to how that Russian Bear would use those forces. I'm not saying by any manner or means that we should abandon our conventional posture. Don't--don't misunderstand me, for goodness sake. But I feel that conventional forces as a standoff have--have in no way prevented the continued erosion through the unconventional means, which are developing and becoming more expert all the time, and we're not part of that system. We don't understand it, can't use it and have no means of applying it; and it's another--it's another
weapon in the bag of tricks that these United States ought to have. I don't--I don't see anything that the Soviet Union can get with conventional forces that it can't get cheaper and easier by the--by the Marxist formula. And I do see that--that when those parts of the world that are essential for our survival, economically, have been taken over that they try to retrieve them by anything that we can build in a way of Army, Navy or Air Force, is just out of the question. I--I don't know whether you people have addressed this "bubble-headed" business of going into the Middle East to secure oil or not, but I just reject that with every--every force that I have as being absolutely impractical and not feasible from political, psychological, military, mechanical point of view, you see. And if that is the kind of rationale that anybody is using to keep American defenses up, then it's no wonder that the Congress takes a dim view of it. I think--I think the best way to keep our defenses in shape is to first develop the brilliant concepts of--of world strategy that we should have and secondly be able to--put them across in laymen's language to--these good Americans who are in the Congress and would like to know, you see--and to the people, but I--I hate to--I hate to appear, you know, as a detractor of everything but it seems to me that too long our strategy has been a recessive one in so many ways. It's--the strategy of--or restoration of the line. The strategy of holding the status quo and the dynamic forces that are at work in the world won't allow that to happen. Consequently, we've got to develop people that can think like Clausewitz and Jomini, that recognize the part that politics and economics, particularly, play in the life of a country, and intelligently help configure forces
that will safeguard those--those things. Even though we've got a hangup about this; we--we say out of one side of our mouth that this is the way a soldier always, you know, what he does is promulgation of political strategy, but on the other hand say steer clear of politics boy, this is none of our business. The State Department figures that out and we'll--when he tells us what to do, we'll bring in the tanks and the guns. We're--this is a schizophrenia or it's a paranoia that has come from our colonial days and our other incarnation in--in the European area. One thing is certain, that is we cannot under any circumstances launch an external activity from this country as a base without having the country behind it. And that means healing that tremendous number of things are tending now to pull the nation apart. One thing that could heal that problem is popular consensus on the nature of the target. Identifying the threat for what it is and I don't mean--I don't think a threat is that if a kid doesn't have a full tank on his motorcycle, recognizing it is worth spilling blood for, and then having the confidence in the military command, that the skills--their skills are adequate for the strategy and the tactics promulgated; but I--I don't see that in the system. You see it's sort of a vague kind of thing; we need 13 divisions. Well, how do we get them. Well, you cut out the Fat. Fat, you mean you bastards have been having fat all along here at our expense. Well, if you explain it to them, you know, an infantryman has twelve guys behind him carrying ammunition for him and carrying his body out and building his uniforms and the whole damn thing. This is a swindle! To say to the American public, "You've got more defense now for less money. You've got 13 divisions because we've cut out
the "fat" and we're going to get sixteen by cutting more fat." But here comes a war of any kind at all or even a police action and where the "fat" springs into being over night at five times the cost. To me, this is--this is a swindle of a kind. It's giving the public a false sense of security. Now, who's responsible for that? We've done it before. What I think is that--that a new look at world strategy, based on the revolutionary situation that is loose in the world today and is affecting our own country, by a kind of leadership that can both understand and be articulate is the only hope. I--to try more of the same in a new environment, with millions of struggling GIs, even though they're hauling around a ball and chain in a form of a nuclear punch, doesn't solve anything, in my view. So you want to know from me what should we do. Well, I've tried to tell you.

INTERVIEWER: Well, no, I--in getting back I think that, you know, it came out clear what you felt Special Forces could and probably should do and the main roles that it could perform in the future. The only way we were able to expand and you were able to get what support that you got was through the--the personal belief in--in--of the President of the United States and that filtered down. Now, in looking now up the chain of command and being familiar with some of the key people in the Army and having a grasp of the economic situation and multiple pressures for money that we're having now, do you see a champion still yet within the Army hierarchy who will insure that the Special Forces stays, you know, at least a nucleus remains in the inventory for the--the mid-term or long term period.
LTC YARBOROUGH: No, I don't. I see one close to the president though. That's Jack Marsh former Congressman from the Seventh District of Virginia and he's the interface between the Defense Department and the Office of the President. But even Jack is not going to ride rough-shod over the feelings of the Joint Chiefs. This is not politic, and probably would be counterproductive. But I think giving any kind of a chance that there will be a champion there. I can't--I can, of course, General Emerson is a--is a strong supporter and he--he may go higher. I hope he does. Mike Healy, of course. And I can think of others that are actively opposed, you see, and are responsible for the current situation. Some of them have a lot of stars on, too.

INTERVIEWER: Well, that's from our viewpoint in looking at this. This is the feeling we get because, whether we like it or not and no matter how we view the world situation--if we take your view or another view, we see--I see a great need for the continuation of Special Forces, but I get no feeling that we have the kind of champion either at the chief level or at another level who will actively defend and fight for the continuation of Special Forces--over the long term.

LTC YARBOROUGH: But you see I feel if--if you get into the theory of war as I have indicated and you--you try to project the complicated situations that are going to occur and are not harnessed by the purely military view of the application of force, that there will begin to emerge all kinds of areas where these forces will be invaluable and they can't spring into being over night. Their orientation toward various areas of the world and their continued delving into the theory
of irregular political warfare, political conflict. Their promulgation to the Reserve and National Guard units who will have members of Congress in them. I--I spoke to the 11th Special Forces Group in Washington a week ago Saturday and there were members of the CIA in that group, DIA, a couple of Congressional assistants, lawyers that work for FAA, types like this. Then you have a--begin to have a reasonable nucleus of people who understand the intricacies of that--of that kind of war, you see. It isn't that I think tomorrow Special Forces are going to go behind enemy lines and organize a resistance unit in behind the Iron Curtain. It isn't that. It's the--it's the flexibility of thinking and the personal qualifications of individuals who can do and provide a hard carapace that with proper direction and inspiration can tackle any kind of a scheme that a--that an Airborne division can't or an Armored division. Now don't misunderstand me among other thing. I--I feel that Special Forces have got to be dynamic. There have been a couple of times that I have had the feeling that "this is where I came in", when I see the equipment laid out of the A Detachment and they go through the rote. This is not my view of what--what they ought to be doing. They've got to continue to search upward and outward and--and their Bible ought to be the--seems to me the successes and the philosophy of the--of the enemy which we still haven't plumbed.

INTERVIEWER: Well, one of the--one of the people who had this problem when he was here and tried to make it dynamic, of course, was General Emerson when he was trying some of the civic action to give them actual real world projects to work in. I know you're familiar with that. What was your reaction to this type of thing that he was trying to give them to do?
LTC YARBOROUGH: I thought he gave them visibility for one thing. It got good press. It helped the--the Indians and the types that were recipients. It--again, however, could result in a vastly simplified view as to what civic action is for and what it does. On the other hand, we--we were doing this in Alaska when I was down there. We went all the way around the northern periphery of Alaska up to Point Barrow up above Nome, Kotzebue, and we were working with the Eskimo National Guard, who had never been worked with before, apparently, on this basis. We got letters like, "You come back next year, signed Joe Muc-Luc, we like you guys," and we were carrying out medical support and dental support, teaching them how to shoot. We had a look at some of the corny armories they've got up there. The awful kinds of--they were bad then. We found that the Eskimo scouts were organized like regular battalions; with .50 caliber machine guns and two and a half ton trucks. You know, in Alaska, for God's sake. There wasn't a dog sled, there weren't long range radios and we felt Special Forces' format for those guys was just perfect. Well, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army told us to get our butts out of Alaska that the medical part was for the Public Health Service to do. We checked with the Public Health and they were delighted we were there and the--I guess the Adjutant general of the state had everything to do with the organizational concept of the National Guard and Reserves. Those have changed incidentally. There--they've gone around the circle now and I think they're probably organized a much better way than they were when we went up there but I--I think we performed a real function, in doing this. But again the lack of understanding on the part of the Vice Chief,
who said, "What are you guys up there giving medical care to the Eskimos? You know that's not your job." "Yes, but, we're learning how to do it under adverse circumstances with peoples that are ethnically different, where finesse is necessary to learn the customs of the village and not transgress on the rules for living and whatever." It was'nt enough of an argument. Incidentally, I don't know whether you know the story of Ethiopia and whether I--I told it to you or not, but we sent a detachment over there to work out in the--in the boondocks where the--where the Somali tribesmen were coming inside Ethiopia, Ogden Province, and we began by trying to teach the soldiers about correct attitudes toward civilians. Civic action; I hate to use the term because compressed--it doesn't mean what you want it to, and word got to His Imperial Highness that there was some pretty heavy doctrine being noised around in the boondocks out there. And consequently he called for an audience with the commander of the detachment and said, "I--I've heard that some pretty--" well, the embassy was disturbed about it. And when it was explained to him that this was really for the purpose of making his troops look good in his behalf, a new--a new tack completely with that bunch, and then he was all for it and, as I understand it, they had a couple of glasses of champagne in the palace and everything was fine. But it was a--was a new venture and we promulgated this through the 8th Special Forces Group throughout Latin America and it caught on like wildfire in places like Peru, Venezuela. "Bull" Simmons was--was one of the, you know, the guy that looks like a wrestler and a boxer but he's got the soul of a poet and really an articulate kind of a fellow. Did a tremendous job down there, Panama.
INTERVIEWER: I don't know any of his people that feel that he had the soul of a poet. Though, they...

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, he, you know, he's a sensitive kind of a...

INTERVIEWER: I know he is, yes sir.

LTG YARBOROUGH: ...even though he doesn't look it and... I think he's a tremendous soldier.

INTERVIEWER: When you look at him you certainly wouldn't get... Oh, outstanding, superior, yes. He's made--I scolded him... He planned the operations for the POW thing and I told him that he--I didn't know that he got all of the--the first team he got some second teamers because I wanted to get in on that and I didn't get gone.

INTERVIEWER: Well, sir, that's been a--I think a real good session. I think we'll call this for the side of--the end of tape two and then we could progress from here maybe tomorrow.
GEN YARBOROUGH: I hope that nothing that I have said falls into the petulant
category because this is not of any historical interest, but it might be in
determining what kind of a character I am or was, but it's not my purpose to
lash out against a lot of things in a destructive sense. I might have given
the impression that I felt that the Army didn't really appreciate Special
Forces. There are a number of points of view on this particular attitude
that I think I ought to enlarge upon a little bit. One is that if it hadn't
been for the Army's foresight in having the nucleus of Special Forces which
had been there for some time, there wouldn't have been anything for John F.
Kennedy to have built upon. And the same thing was true of the psychological
warfare units. No place else in the entire national structure were there
psychological organizations that could carry out any kind of a national mission.
Now, never mind the fact that there isn't anything on the highest level that
can be translated into psychological guidance for these organizations. There
was a great void between formulation of national policy as it regards psycho-
logical ops and the promulgation of that policy through psychological warfare
units. But what I'm saying is the United States Army had in being and has
these highly esoteric organizations and through thick and thin, they've existed
to one degree or another. Now, the fact that they weren't generally accepted
by the Army as a whole doesn't . . . is not as detrimental, really, to the
image of the Army as I might have made it sound. I don't mean it in that sense.
The Cuban Crisis—I wanted to speak a little bit about this because this brought
into play the potential that we had for carrying out the biggest UW operation
that was contemplated during the time that I was at the JFK Center. Again, to
the credit of the Army, the concept of the joint unconventional warfare task
force had been on the books for some time. They really never tested it but it was
there in any case. So, you can say that there were men of imagination and men
who thought broadly and men who were not fettered by the drill regulations to
the degree that one would think. If you indict the Army as a whole for not
understanding irregular warfare, so, let me say a few words about that joint
unconventional warfare task force. It brought together for the purpose of
carrying out the nation's strategy against Cuba, diverse elements of the Army,
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps whose task it was to collaborate on entry into
Cuba into the guerilla areas, if you want to call them that, organizing forces
behind the lines of the conventional units and taking over a semi-political
military type of activity in promulgation of our U.S. overall military effort
against Cuba. The force gathered here at Fort Bragg. I was the Commander of
it and I began immediately to see the things that were wrong with our unconven-
tional warfare posture. The theory was one thing; putting it into practice
was something else again. To be specific, the staff that was convened which
was a tri-service staff or four services if you want to count the Marine Corps,
were by and large, conventional types who hadn't a clue as to what the nature
of irregular political military psychological warfare was all about. Now,
this lack of understanding and lack of expertise spanned the whole area between
logistics for irregular warfare forces, to intelligence, to concepts of operation.
Consequently, to get the force into any kind of an attitude for the pay-off which seemed to be in the offing, an intensive training operation had to be undertaken at the same time that we were getting ready for action. There were not, and to the best of my belief, there are not right now in the woodwork, people who can convene to flush out the joint unconventional warfare task organizations that are on the books at this time for the reasons that I indicated. Some of the actual problems now, the gathering of the kinds of unusual items of equipment that were needed for surreptitious entry, amphibiously, into Cuba. Rubber rafts with silent motors; silent motors were not an item of issue of the Army. The Agency had some that were difficult to get our hands on because of the inter-agency, inter-service problems of transfer of equipment. As I recall, the motors had been used and needed to be rebuilt and this was a problem of getting that done. We had planned to put Pathfinder teams ashore amphibiously, and guide the elements in rubber boats using metascopes and infra-red detectors. These were not available. Silent killing weapons were something that the Army chain of supply threw up its hands and, of course, you know what the press thinks about things like that and how requisitioning these things through channels would have caused nothing but trouble. We had to see whether through the Agency's system it was possible to get these items. In any case, we were preoccupied by a whole host of supply problems which the standard Army supply system couldn't begin to cope with either from a qualitative point of view or from a conceptual point of view. Some of our men were supposed to go in from submarines and the kinds of gear that a man needs exiting a submarine and making an assault landing, were just not in the system. All right, now, of more importance really than the supply picture was the question of intelligence assets ashore in Cuba. Now, I want to bring this up as a very important point
because anybody that thinks that Special Forces can operate with only the resources of the Army doesn't really understand the multi-dimensional nature of Special Forces. If one is going behind the lines to, or help organize, to help equip and to consult on the leadership of guerilla forces, then it's necessary to have clandestine or covert assets in being. In other words, it is not correct to assume that the entry of Green Berets into combat is going to spark the rise of guerillas who will magically come out of the ground and convene for equipping and direction and all the rest of it. The assets have to be in place. There must be some sort of subversive organization that can produce guerillas, that can recruit them, in some cases, supply them, supply intelligence and all of these things. The infra-structure that we're talking about. Now, it was presumed that over the period of some years, the Agency had, in fact, developed these assets in Cuba. In fact, I was told repeatedly that yes, they are there. But up until the time we were destined to bail out of our airplanes and come out of the submarines, we still had not been able to get out of the Agency the names, the locations, the actual identities of their assets. One was led to believe then that they didn't really have them, although the better answer was that the assets that they did have were dedicated to the acquisition of intelligence and the Agency wasn't about to jeopardize its intelligence gathering structure in order to give Special Forces guerilla the matrix for a guerilla organization. This deficiency has persisted, I think, up until this time. I don't think it is cured yet. Note well that it is outside of the charter of Army intelligence to check on subversive organizations in a foreign state. We are not supposed to do that. None of the services has that legal right. This is reserved for the Agency. The Agency has not done it, is not doing it and therefore, there is a void in the overall structural concept of Special Forces which has either
to be filled by a change in direction of the Agency's efforts or broadening
of the authority of the Army, Navy, Air Force intelligence so that they
themselves can gather the subversive materials. Now, the latter course I
don't buy. I don't think it is within the province of military types to get
into the sinew and fiber of foreign states to find out where and to what degree
there are dissenters against the state. So this is a problem that unless it is
solved, satisfactorily and in a practical sense, you can talk all you want to
about Special Forces going behind the lines to organize guerillas, it won't
happen. It may . . . one could approximate a guerilla force by sending a
commando kind of an operation where dissidents in the open flock to whoever
comes in and are supplied and led and whatever, but this is not truly what we
are talking about in the sense of unconventional warfare. Now, I continued after
the Bay of Pigs--no, strike that one; I want to talk about that one later. The
Bay of Pigs operation--I continued after the end of the Cuban Crisis to try to
right that wrong or to fill that void and with little success. Later on when
I was Deputy CINC of USARPAC and Chief of Staff of USARPAC and had the occasion
to review our unconventional warfare plans for Asia, I found that this striking
void still remained; therefore, the plans on the books for unconventional war-
fare in Asia were not worth the paper they were written on because they were
based on feet of clay and on completely false premises and there wasn't any move
at any echelon that I could determine to correct that problem. One of the
difficulties here being that the conventional soldiers wouldn't have a clue as
to what you were talking about in the way of subversive assets for the building
of a guerilla force. The next problem of some stature in Cuba was surrounding
the psychological warfare bit. It was my feeling from being exposed to all
kinds of doctrine on psychological warfare and studying the business for some
time that offensive PSYOPS in a case like Cuba were very much indicated, that
one couldn't at the same time attack the policies of the . . . or attack the
government of Cuba with a physical force and not attack it with psychological
means. As a matter of fact, one would think that the psychological attack
would be even better than the physical attack. Here we had the U.S. Army
PSYOPS units geared for action, but we found that the material to go into the
machinery that they had was not adequate, first because the soldier researchers
were anything but experts on the mores, the background, the political nuances
of Cuba, but more than that there wasn't the flow of information coming from
the government echelon down to the soldiers to turn into leaflets and broadcasts
and whatever. This brought me face to face with the hard truth that there is no
propaganda set-up in the United States government, really. The U.S. Information
Agency denies being a propaganda organization. In fact, a study of their product
will indicate that they are absolutely right. Preoccupied with telling the rest
of the world how the United States lives, hoping then that other people will
think we are good guys and want to emulate us, but not in any sense fitted to
carry out offensive PSYOPS which are a part of the overall ball of wax. To make
this problem even less understandable, when the invasion of Cuba was imminent,
we were instructed to cease all psychological operations; that there was to be
no attacks on Castro or anything that had to do with the Cuban Revolutionary
government because this was not U.S. policy. Now, you see, one of the points
that I hope that I can make for the record is that most of the aggression on
the part of our enemies in the world today revolves around psychological and
political operations. If defection of the enemy is sought by psychological
means then military means are that much easier; that is, the military operations
are that much easier. The Communists have a well developed psychological system
as we know and they use it with devastating effect. I think history will show that one of the reasons that the U.S., the mighty U.S. folded in the middle of Vietnam before the war was actually won or finished, was psychological. How much of this was self-generated and how much of it was helped along by the skillful enemy propaganda system, I don't know, but at least there is a system in the Soviet Union and a system in China for handling this at the highest level. There is none in the United States of America, one reason being that we seem to reject anything that has to do with tampering with "psyche's" for political purposes or for military purposes, but we will do it for commercial purposes. I think this is a void that the Army of the future is going to have to try to fill. The cessation of the effort toward Cuba came as a great relief to all of us in the joint unconventional warfare task force because I felt especially that had we been introduced into Cuba in the state we were in without the necessary intelligence, without the PSYOPS back-up, without the clearly identified materials for guerilla warfare, we would have made a pratfall of major proportions and perhaps the demise of the Special Forces would have evolved around that. I only hope ... I made an extensive report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this operation and things that were wrong with it. I don't know how much of it was looked at because I don't know who was interested to the degree that they would go into that sort of thing, but it is something that perhaps ought to be dusted off.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, you might ... of course you were gone, but hadn't been gone too long when the Dominican crisis broke out. The 7th did respond with all the available linguists with the 18th Airborne Corps. These exact same things that you pointed out became our problems down there. It was almost like your lessons learned or after action report of things that should have been done, we checked
them off and couldn't do. There was no coordination. The agreement was never 
invoked where the Agency would give us the equipment or would be authorized to 
give us the equipment; it was the same type of equipment and of course, when I 
came to USARPAC, I moved into working with Colonel Doyle down in the UW planning 
business. We still had this void, even though you specified and had given specific 
directions of the things we should work for, but the void still exists. Whoever 
has that planning responsibility the CINCPAC plans still have this void.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, you see, when I'm accusing the U.S. Army of not really 
understanding unconventional warfare, I can haul out some of these specifics 
cases in point. But, I want to make it clear that I feel that it is not 
just the Army's job to understand UW because UW is a multi-service kind of 
thing that involves a political overtone. It involves national policy, transcending 
military policy and I have, over the years, developed a feeling that Special 
Forces as part of this, as an essential part of this machine, perhaps ought to 
be under the control of a much higher echelon of the government than the Army. 
The Army might well have the privilege and the honor of being the executive 
agent for fielding these superb individuals but the melange, the mix of forces, 
the psychological forces, the political forces, the high level intelligence 
forces and the other service support ought to be done at a level I think of the 
National Security Council. However, this means revitalization of the National 
Security Council in a sense that would make them, I think, adequate for handling 
world strategy in a way that they are not now. This would mean a staff for the 
National Security Council and the political military warfare machinery instru-
ment would be applied through the strategic staff work of a staff at that level. 
Of course, the approval of the President of the United States and now of course, 
the Congress would have to get into it. But what I'm saying is to leave this
kind of a determinant to the Army as one of the three major services is to misplace it, in my view.

INTERVIEWER: How would you visualize it being . . . where do you think it should primarily work but would you . . . it would have to have elements out in each of the areas of interest in order to provide this informational data and where would they work, sir? How would you . . .

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, the geographical distribution is not germane. I could not be in a position to even surmise where that ought to be, but what I'm talking about is the responsibility for its strategic targeting and I think, maybe the concept of the Gehlen organization, the German BND, although it was an intelligence organization, is an intelligence organization, the characteristics of which I think might apply to this concept; i.e., each of the Armed Forces is seconded to the BND. Elements that then came under the control of Gehlen and were used for the overall national purpose. When I say intelligence, it was a little broader than intelligence as the CIA's charter is broader than just intelligence. But the services prepared superb representation and it was then given to Gehlen for carrying out his purposes. I would see a political military warfare instrument with the United States handled in a similar way. What I'm saying is, or implying is, that I think that, the travail of the Army over spaces, over resources, over grade structures should not be reflected into something that has national fallout as the Special Forces system does. And again when I say Special Forces, I don't just mean these A, B, and C detachments. I mean the whole ball of wax that can attack a political-military-economic kind of conflict situation using military force where it is appropriate and using all of these other means that have been taught to us by our opposition when that is appropriate as well. Right now we have no instrument for doing this.
INTERVIEWER: Just this aside, sir, could this be something that the old STRIKE Command could have handled? Thinking of the problem of generating a staff for the National Security Council and getting the approval of all the forces involved?

GEN YARBOROUGH: The STRIKE Command from the point of view of its concept of being semi-independent type of force, yes.

INTERVIEWER: Could they have done the strategic planning and getting into the political side . . . did STRIKE Command have political advisors?

GEN YARBOROUGH: Yes, they did have political advisors and under the proper inspired commander and with the proper charger from the highest level, I think perhaps STRIKE Command could have been reconfigured to have handled the thing, but the strong service overtones were still present in STRIKE Command as you well know. They jockeyed for position between the Air Force and the Navy and to a lesser degree, the Army. These things would have to be excised and one would think that perhaps the commander should be on his last legs and not have to go back to his service and face it when he returned or, . . . you see, I felt that in a joint unconventional warfare structure, one of the deputies should be a CIA guy. A deputy, a fellow who could winnow out of these vast resources through the Central Intelligence Agency those things that were applicable to unconventional warfare, leaving aside those things that the UW types had no right to know and didn't need to compromise. It wouldn't necessarily mean that you would have to take those assets out of an agency and give them to the UW but a fellow in a position like that could take the-producates and do it properly. And therefore, in a set-up like the STRIKE Command with a CIA Deputy and a Department of State assistant with U.S. Information Agency help, although I certainly wouldn't pass the psychological mission to them. Well, I'm not in a
position to really outline a complete structure but only a concept and my concept is that it needs to be at a high level because all of the resources for fighting esoteric kind of war should come together where they could be manipulated without service problems. Well, what else do we want to talk about here? Yesterday you were asking me who at the higher levels could understand this kind of thing? I've forgotten one outstanding individual at a high level and that's General Dick Stilwell, who not only understands the nuances of the irregular warfare but has tried his best even as DCSOPS and in other jobs to put across the idea with indifferent success, really. I might tell you now about the job that I had right after I retired. I was ... when I was in USARPAC the last two or three months I was there, I guess, the communications on Cambodia began to come across my desk. The plans for bolstering the conventional forces with artillery, armored personnel carriers, the weapons of infantry, and I could see so clearly the same old pattern of Vietnam on an austere basis but without the help of the Yanks, shoulder to shoulder with the Cambodians and I saw nothing but problems and failure in that course of action. I saw a lot of money down the drain, a lot of equipment in the hands of the enemy and I put this in a telegram to General Stilwell, saying that there's a better way, another way, and I outlined a little bit of my philosophy on irregular warfare defense of this country. One reason being that I had served there and I had been out in the field with Cambodian soldiers and let me tell you a little story about that, if it isn't too far afield. General Ciccolella and I, serving on the MAG there, made several trips to the eastern provinces. At one time we went all the way from Phnom Penh over to Ban Me Thuot and through a road that the French had carved when they were there and was overgrown with vines and whatever. The rusting machinery was still there and along the border areas the
forces on both sides had met and recoiled, I guess, because there was nothing along the border between Cambodia and Vietnam but when one got inside the boundaries of Vietnam, this was in 1956, incidentally, there were fortifications that were looking over the most logical approaches. The going in those two provinces was very, very difficult, especially in the rainy season, and at one time we made a trip, only to be caught by torrential rains. We had a small contingent of Cambodians, we had a three-quarter ton truck, two jeeps and a trailer. And darkness fell, as it does in the tropics, quickly, and the road that we were on began to disappear under the water. On each side of us there was nothing but flat land and I began to feel desperate to the fact that we might even had drowned or at least we would have floundered around and had been completely lost and this was not acceptable either. So, what to do? Well, just before the last vestiges of light were gone, we found a little mound, a small hill, and we pulled our equipment up onto that hill as the rains continued to pelt down on us and deployed our sleeping bags and whatever and tried to get a little rest and see what we could do in the morning. Well, about three o'clock in the morning, I guess, we heard some sounds from the direction from which we had come and we could see blinking through the rain storm a flashlight here and there and it sounded like mule train coming up the road. And do you know in about a half an hour a young Cambodian lieutenant came up, wet to the skin and saluted and said is there "Est-ce que je peux vous aider"--can I help you out? And we said, "Well, who are you? Where are you going? How did you get here?" And he said, "Well, we are going up to a border post along the frontier and we're just moving along through the mud." "Well, how are you doing it?" Well, they had a winch on the front of a three-quarter ton truck and they were reaching out and grabbing on to a tree and going forward twenty-five or thirty feet and then
doing it again, and they had moved all the way along the road in this fashion. I said, 'Well, would you like . . . are you going to stop here for the night; would you want to until the rain ceases?' "Oh, no, there's a much better place on up ahead and we'll go on up there." He said, "Can we pull you along?" And I said, "No, we'll wait for dawn." So when dawn came, we moved out, the waters had receded a little bit, you could see where we were going and I guess about ten miles up ahead we came on to the encampment where the Cambodian lieutenant had now laid out his command post gear. Cambodian officers were wrapped in their 'sampots.' They took off their uniforms and put on this wrap around and the soldier orderlies were serving them and they were completely at home in that environment, really good jungle and frontier soldiers. Well, to make a long story short, we got finally up to the frontier post which was like a fortress in the old west. It had sharpened stakes around it to keep out the montagnard of that area that they called mnongs. In the morning the bugle would sound, the flag would go up and the Khmer soldiers would go out on the town, trading for zircons, like in the days of the old west, the frontier soldiers trading with the Indians and at night they would come inside of the fort. Well, my feeling was that the Cambodian would make a superb irregular warfare soldier, the guerilla warfare type, and so having outlined this scheme to General Stilwell and doing it in pretty sharp terms, I should say pretty exact terms, I expected that he would send me a message back saying, "Look, mind your own business. We're perfectly capable of handling the planning up here in DCSOPS," and instead of that he said, "When you retire, we'd like to have you take on the job of figuring this out, flushing out your ideas." So for almost a year, I worked out here at Fort Bragg and up at the Pentagon, had offices in both places, where I developed a complete system for defense of the Cambodia. This was designed to promulgate
the hold that Lan Nol had over the provinces by development of underground and auxiliary structures, even into the two provinces that had been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. We picked a number of guerilla bases using the U.S. overhead reconnaissance system for identifying areas where guerilla bases could be secure, where mission support sites could be pushed forward, had a complete organizational structure which would have permitted fitting of the guerillas into the Gendarmerie National after they had finished their guerilla work thereby removing one of the usual problems of guerillas, demobilization, which in this case didn't have to take place. We developed a guerilla manual in French which was to be translated into Khmer and then I was called upon to present this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I did. Stilwell thought it was a viable concept. General Westmoreland went along with General Stilwell's judgements. But I found in the Joint Chiefs an aura of mystification, I guess you'd call it, because the price tag that I had put on this operation was so low that obviously the thing lacked credibility. In other words, the dollar signs on it really raised a red signal to the Joint Chiefs who felt that no operation worth a damn could be done for this little money. Furthermore, the concept of cellular structure, inside a then fairly healthy country, was repugnant. Recruiting of cell members inside Vietnam to implace against the day when the Khmer Rouge or the VCMVA would overrun the areas, not understood and I can understand that because anybody that has not worked in clandestine intelligence has a little difficulty in grasping it. But suffice it to say, it was not ... it went over like, I would say, like a lead balloon. One part of this concept had to do with building a Special Forces operation base on one of the islands in the Gulf of Siam, training the Cambodian crew for the Special Forces operation base in Thailand on U.S. equipment and moving the whole thing--lock, stock and barrel--by
airplane down into the island when it was ready to assume control of the deployed detachments by radio. A logistics system was devised to go along with the SFOB and to avoid the kind of attack that being on the mainland might have let in for. Well, I happened to see Admiral McCain in the hallway of the Pentagon and I liked Admiral McCain. I saw him frequently in Honolulu, of course, when I went to the staff meetings there at Camp "Howling Mad Smith" and I mentioned to him that we had such a plan, and he said, "You've got to come out to CINCPAC and give it to the staff out there." So, I got into an airplane and went out to CINCPAC and here, I keep assuming that the plan was sound because it was based on sound principles. Maybe history will show that it wasn't sound and that the staff officers knew a hell of a lot more about it than I did, but I found out there that part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept on how operations should be run in Southeast Asia involved unconventional warfare and the principles that were enunciated in the JCS paper were unsound, therefore the young architects of this input were not willing to, apparently not anxious to say well yes, this new view is the correct one and the materials that we put in the paper are not. Now, let me give you exactly or a couple of specifics. The JCS paper contemplated raising of Khmer special forces. Part of these were to be trained in Thailand and part in Vietnam. The special forces trained in Thailand together with Thais were to come into Cambodia and help organize the underground. Well, of course, that is completely asinine because an underground is part of the fabric of the country. To have an outside agent such as a Thai special forces element party to organizing an underground in Cambodia, not acceptable for one thing. Furthermore, Green Berets are not supposed to raise the underground. Green Berets are soldier instructors who take the raw materials that have been provided by an underground and auxiliary
structure and form it into guerilla forces, fighting forces. Their part with
the underground consists primarily in understanding it, taking the spin-offs
from it, intelligence and logistics support, monitoring the input into the
guerilla structure of the raw materials. So, to assume that by organizing
Khmer Green Berets, you could then have a handle on the formation of an under-
ground structure, it was absolutely cockeyed and the JCS document was full of
mistakes like that, which to me showed little understanding of the mechanics
of irregular warfare. Incidentally, this study is called FARSEA and one of
my former aides, Lieutenant Colonel Rod Pascal, upon being assigned to Cambodia
a year or so ago, asked me since I had been in Cambodia at one time, if there
was any advice I could give him while he was getting sharpened up to go over
there, and I said, "Well, why don't you look over FARSEA because the auxiliary
documents have a tremendous amount of materials on personalities, on organiza-
tion, on political economic situation in country," and do you know that during
his indoctrination period they hadn't even pulled this thing out. Well, he
found it. And I got a letter from Vietnam or I mean from Cambodia indicating
to me that was the only way to go, that that should have been invoked. Because
even now with the Communists in occupation in the country, the legitimate govern-
ment would have a hold in the provinces and in the areas that wanted to retake.
Well, I gave you this to show you that General Stilwell is one of those who
understands all of the minutia of irregular warfare. And if a man of his
stature has difficulty putting it across, why then you see what the nature of
the problem is.

INTERVIEWER: Does that plan also, I believe you mentioned it did, include a
PSYOP campaign plan?

GEN YARBOROUGH: Absolutely. Oh, yes.
INTERVIEWER: And was that part of the problem with the JCS that they, there was just too much in there that was, you know, just over the head or technical terms in detailed instructions that they were just unfamiliar with in this respect?

GEN YARBOROUGH: It would be interesting for you to ask some member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff what they thought of that. General Cushman was one that I thought I would get real support from because he had been with the CIA, but when I began to talk about undergrounds and auxiliaries, I drew a blank, and I was at a loss to understand why especially he didn't give the thing support. I think the way the JCS left this was that if CINCPAC would approve it, that maybe they could go along with it. And the pratfall in CINCPAC, I think, was resulting from the indications that I have given you. I don't know that that is the case. Now . . .

INTERVIEWER: Do you remember a civilian named Herb Taylor?

GEN YARBOROUGH: Oh, very well.

INTERVIEWER: I did ask him. I had a long talk with him about lots of things we'll get into later, but we talked about FARSEA and he did have that feeling. I don't know if he was present the day you gave the briefing or whether he was reading through the study, but he later heard, or he thought that you had gone over their head in terms that they didn't believe or understand. I didn't know who the principals were in the JCS at that time, but . . .

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, Ryan was the Air Force Chief of Staff. Of course, General Westmoreland, General . . . Admiral . . . you know, the last . . .

Moorer, yes, very polite and very solicitous, very kind, but I could have been talking to the members of the clergy, you see. I think they were afraid, really, to deal with something that had such strong political overtones, and yet there's
no way to address irregular warfare without getting political overtones. And if war is in fact a promulgation of politics by other means, and the high command doesn't understand that . . . Of course, they would have had to prepare the way with the interested Congressional groups by making a case for this kind of action. You have out here at least one member that was on the CINCPAC staff at that time; maybe you ought to talk to him. The side materials that we dug out on that operation were just fantastic in amounts, and at the end of that action, I destroyed most of it out here, had it burned because there wasn't any way for me to hold onto it. I don't think the Special Warfare Center was interested in it, but I had gone into it extremely deeply, I can tell you.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I'll definitely look for it. I wonder if it's on file.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Yes, it's on file. It would be on file in DCSOPS - FARSEA. I could show you a copy of the guerilla handbook that we turned out here on waterproof paper and I had the PSYOPS outfit out here do it. It's a superb job. But this thing was . . . which was supposed to have been held until guerilla forces were ready, was through some curious set of circumstances released to the Khmers and probably Khmer Rouge had been using it as well as the Khmers. It never was supposed to go out that way, and having started out under U.S. control, it was the U.S. dereliction that resulted in that—putting the cart before the horse. Well, yesterday when I was talking about the jungle uniform, I don't think I made it clear that the jungle uniform was finally approved for Special Forces as an experimental uniform only. I made the strongest case that our people were in the tropics, there wasn't anything for issue in the way of tropical gear and they needed it. We were the only ones really, that were over there in any numbers. Now, therefore, I think it was 10,000 that were approved, and I worked with NATICK on getting that contract in shape. And the same thing with
the fabric topped boot and other items of tropical equipment. Then when the stuff hit the electric fan and our troops went in great numbers into Vietnam, they were happy to have the jungle uniform. They would have gone in fatigue clothes, I can assure you, if that hadn't been the case. There is something, really, that needs to be looked at in the system where equipment that has been proven over a period of time in jungle warfare in the South Pacific, lessons learned, in Arctic warfare, whatever, gets lost somewhere and you find GI's with nipped-in fatigues so that they can't even kneel down in going into combat, no pockets, no nothing, you see. Same thing was the case in rations. I won't go into that deeply but I became very unpopular up at NATICK by pointing out that even in Sears, Roebuck there were desiccated and dried rations that a Special Forces soldier could carry seven days on his back whereas the canned stuff, it wasn't possible. Furthermore, the soldier left a trail of empty gum wrappers, plastic spoons, stuff that he wouldn't eat, and you could follow him through the jungle. The British SAS regiment came over here and trained with us for awhile. The first, I guess, British troops that had been on U.S. soil since the War of 1812, since they burned our White House. Incidentally, John Woodhouse was their Commander and we maneuvered out here in Uwharrie Forrest and Pisgah, and we found that the British SAS could in fact carry seven days on their backs because they had dried stuff; they had the condiments to make them palatable, but the Yanks could not. Well, when I confronted that empire at NATICK and there was no answer to this, it was embarrassing. With all the years of research in the foodstuffs, nutrition, there still wasn't the proper Special Forces ration.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever get briefed on the Operations Research Center they had there at . . .

GEN YARBOROUGH: Yes, yes.
INTERVIEWER: I visited it. I had a... I visited Woodhouse and his regiment and it was a fantastic set-up that they had there.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Oh, you did visit Woodhouse?

INTERVIEWER: Yes sir. I was...

GEN YARBOROUGH: He's a tremendous guy.

INTERVIEWER: Yes sir. At one point there in '66, I was the UW Branch Chief at CONARC and I was going over and setting up that first Flintlock exercise when the 10th SF came over and after we set that up, I swung over and visited the SAS headquarters and went through their center there.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Did they get you crocked at their bar?

INTERVIEWER: I wasn't over there very long and didn't get into that...

GEN YARBOROUGH: I was over there one night when they served ... at the end of a very lavish dinner with all the wines and everything ... cognac with the rim flaming, and you had to drink it without getting burned, which I couldn't do.

I got burned all the way around my mouth.

INTERVIEWER: I did, and that saved me when I got to the 101st. General Matheson was big on this...

GEN YARBOROUGH: Another thing I wanted to point out was that General Rosson was a tremendous help in the early days in the Office of the Chief of Staff. He helped me jockey through that uniform bit by making, I would say, very courageous decisions on his own and in some cases it was a fait accompli before the staff could pull it apart but I treasured his help and he was down here repeatedly conferring with me on force structure, on financing, on problems that he could make easier as they progressed through channels. Another thing I wanted to say was that, and these things are out of sequence, but I have to say them as I remember them, you see. The history of Special Forces, that is, the lineage of...
Special Forces as determined by the Department of the Army, again shows a basic misunderstanding of the nature of Special Forces because their lineage officially goes to the Rangers and to First Special Service Force. Now I fought with both of these outfits in World War II, both with the Rangers and with the First Special Service Force and I know that they had practically nothing in common with the concept of the detachments, the three dimensional or multi-dimensional mission, the kind of personnel selection; the most logical antecedent of Special Forces was OSS and yet for some psychological reason they won't touch that one as far as the lineage is concerned. But you find on the lineage in Special Forces the First Special Service Force which is Canadian-American outfit, nothing to do with the kind of things that these guys do and Rangers which are jock strap direct action fighters. But, I point that out to show you visible manifestation on the part of the mental block, you see. I was up on the Plateau de Bolovens in Laos in 1970, I guess it was '70, it was either '70 or '71, and I went up there with Ambassador Godley to look over the deteriorating situation. The VNVA were inside the country and could almost be seen from the Plateau de Bolovens as they came down the Sihanouk Trail. None of the press in this country seem to worry about the invasion of Cambodia by the enemy, but they were there. After observing some of the Laotian troops overlooking Atapeau, I guess it was, or Seravain, no I've forgotten which . . . Atapeau I believe, we went up to the. . . a place in the interior that I had visited, I guess in 1962 when Bull Simons was up there, and as the Laotian troops lined up for the Ambassador to have a look at them, an interpreter came up and said there's an old man that wants to say something to you. And the old fellow came up and he said, through an interpreter, "you remember that truck which you gave us and the rice-mill, they are still in operation." Now, this was 1970, I believe, '70 or '71, and it had been almost
I guess eight or nine years before that the Green Berets had procured a salvaged vehicle, put it together on the Plateau de Bolovens in the interior of the Plateau de Bolovens, had helped the Kha organize a little cooperative store where they had shovels and a few bottled goods and things of that nature, soft drinks, and had put a rice mill into operation. This fellow wanted me to know that he remembered the Green Berets and this thing was still going. You know, cumulative stories like that from all over the areas where Green Berets have operated should be gathered together as an indication that the impressions that the United States has left have been so much better as a result of these few people. They added immensely to the stature and to the prestige and to the acceptability of the country by thousands of acts like that. Now, let me say something else here about, I may be getting this all out of whack here.

INTERVIEWER: That's fine.

GEN YARBOROUGH: The command structure in Southeast Asia, this should concern you gentlemen from the War College because I think the command structure is under review each year, and I don't know that in my time it ever lay hands on the reality of the intrusion of the Ambassadorial system into the military command structure. From where CINCPAC sat, it looked as though Southeast Asia was his responsibility, that the forces that operated there, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried out military operations according to what the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific's concept was. However, in reality, Southeast Asia was broken up into Vietnam, into Laos, into Thailand, into Cambodia and in each of these, the Ambassador had an inordinate say about even training as I think I mentioned briefly. There was no such thing as a military, overall military command of operations in Indochina. Now, how can . . . how could our force pre-dominate over another one which had unity of command, looked down the peninsula
and saw the whole thing as military terrain without the political boundaries, without the prohibitions. It's a neat exercise in logic if you can determine how, from the strategic point of view, you can win under circumstances like that. Now, related to that and supporting again my thesis that we think more of materiel than we do of things of the spirit, when we undertook to send large numbers of drafted men to Vietnam and they only stayed for a year (really less than a year when they were getting ready to leave) up against seasoned regulars who were there for the duration. We couldn't have accepted the fact that one was as good as the other in a soldier sense, from the point of view of dedication of soldierly skill because the other side had worked longer and was working constantly on these things, so our philosophy was to fill the gap with materiel, to give them bigger and better, more bang, more artillery and yet this was the very thing that the enemy's machine was designed to cope with, to counter. And when we left, and left that mountain of gear, more materiel than many first class Armies had ever had in its entire course of life, it was a monument to the terrible mistake of assuming that you can close a psychological gap with equipment. As a matter of fact, even our best texts and materials on leadership point out repeatedly; there are cases where regiments that had been surrounded and were outnumbered and everything else, have lived to fight another day and predominated because of the spirit; it wasn't the materiel or the equipment. So, if there's any and there will be examinations as to who struck John and what happened, and yet the fact that we are an industrial society and we defend for our life's blood, we have, on production of things, makes it difficult for the military to look in a different direction. You want to move out of that sun, there?

INTERVIEWER: No, sir.
GEN YARBOROUGH: Do you want some screening material for your face, because you've got a fair skin, you know and you might . . .

INTERVIEWER: No, uh-huh. We can stop for a minute.

SIDE 2.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, to back up a minute on your assignment in USARPAC, I'd be interested in your assessment of that region of the world now, based upon your experiences, what you saw there then and the developments now and I guess leading into what we really ought to have as a strategy. We talked about this a couple of times . . . who should be formulating the strategy, where does it all fit in. Somebody has got to start working on strategy out there and start articulating it. What can we do?

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, to begin with, I think I saw the beginning of the apathy of our strategy in Asia while I was Chief of Staff at USARPAC. The withdrawal from Okinawa was the start. A lot of things followed in train there. The removal of the propaganda broadcasting stations from Okinawa, the termination of our ability to train foreign types in the Special Forces over there. You could see the beginning of the turning of the United States face in a different direction from Asia. From a Naval point of view, the loss of Okinawa was a major setback and because diplomatic relations with the Philippines had not been carried out expertly or effectively, one couldn't count on the continued use of the Philippines as a base for Naval operations. As a matter of fact, it's getting shakier and shakier now. Our attitude towards Taiwan was a real body blow, the change of our attitude towards Taiwan. From a strategic point of view it didn't really make sense in my view because what has been gained with the so-called Peoples Republic of China has to offset the loss in Taiwan. So, we could
see even at this time, the requirement for establishing some kind of U.S. presence in the Pacific, but where? Well, the actions that were incipient then are coming into focus now as we are searching around among the Trust Territories of the Pacific for bases for the mightiest nation on earth. You look around among Ronegelap, Ponape and Majuro and some of these little atolls, the mighty have fallen, I can assure you. Furthermore, the ethical side of that takeover, sometime will come up for re-examination. Those were "Trust" Territories. The U.S. has always prided itself in not going into a war to gain territory. Those territories were very badly administered under the trust arrangement. As a matter of fact, in several times in Honolulu newspapers, the scandalous mismanagement of the Trust Territories was made a matter of public record. Now, for the purpose really of getting a forward Naval presence, and I use this "forward" in quotation marks, we are on the point of gathering these atolls into the great American Federal Republic.

Korea has been a source to me of nothing but pride. I feel that the sacrifices that were made in Korea were done to the greater glory of the U.S. to its benefit and to its strategic position. The ally is a strong and steady one. When I left USARPAC however, we were already arguing over whether or not the overage in grade equipment was going to be replaced. I think there was 500,000,000 dollars worth of equipment that was needed to bring the Korean, the South Korean Army just up to a modern level. The stuff they had had been well cared for, well maintained, but worn out. And I feel that the shaky position now of the U.S. strategic presence in Asia provides the best time that Kim Il Sung has ever had if he wants to use aggression, well he wants to, but I mean if he thinks he can get away with it, now is the time to do this with our weaning presence on Taiwan, our wavering alliance with the Philippines, with our complete pratfall
and loss in Southeast Asia, that Kim's modern armies with a supply of Russian and Chinese equipment, might even try it. It's deplorable to me to see that the press continue to attack Park Chung Hee whom I know, I've known for a long time. Some of the people close to him and around him, who picture him as a dedicated, spartan-living citizen who is giving his life for the Republic of Korea which has made such a phenomenal economic advance in the world and even with the enemy just a few miles north of Seoul and completely has succeeded in having a kind of democracy with Oriental overtones that ought to be even acceptable to us. There are holes in it. I think mostly chargeable both to the interpretation of the democratic ideal in that area and to the danger that's there.

Now, you've come down to Japan. I knew very well the former Chief of Japanese Intelligence of the Ground Self Defense Force, General Matsukane, who had been the military attache in Washington, and General Toga. I've talked to both of these individuals over a few cups of saki and a few belts of Asahi beer and I've tried to get to the bottom of the rationale for the Self Defense forces in Japan. I pointed out during my last visit over there that these forces weren't capable of stopping an amphibious attack, they certainly wouldn't be worthwhile in coping with a nuclear attack. They were not even all that good in helping to put down civil uprisings because there was a sort of dichotomy between the police and the self defense forces. So what kind of a defense posture was Japan considering to be adequate, aside from the obvious thing of the shield that the United States cast over Japan. Well, that shield now has got a few holes in it; psychological, philosophical, mechanical and practical. Well, Toga's answer to me and Matsukani's interpretation took the form of a piece of paper that Matsukani drew a couple of Japanese hieroglyphs on and he said, "This is the Japanese term for strategy." And it means making something look like something else. I said,
"Well, have another saki and let's see what we are talking about." So, Matsukane then proceeded with Toga's nodding and approval to point out that the economic footholds that Japan was getting all over the world in a way of multi-national business adventures, acquisition of foreign land, interests in ongoing activities in a hundred places around the globe, all might add up to a situation like jujitsu where wherever the enemy might attack he'd be hurting himself if he were attacking Japan, and that there are lots of ways to win a war other than the kind that didn't pay off for them. Well, now if the economic sphere of activity, both offensive and defensive, preoccupies Japan as it appears to do, then rapprochement with the masters of the mainland appears to be in the cards somehow, someway. What good is it going to do to continue to go along with the United States if we can no longer back up in that area those things that require some sort of firmness to do. Of course, the Japanese leadership is very dedicated to the friendship with the United States. I used to read the Japan Times every day in Honolulu, and the editorials frequently got back to the requirement, not desirability, but requirement to keep a close accord with the United States and keep our courses pointed in the same direction. This to me is a result of the kind of free enterprise capitalistic system the Japanese had built and had done tremendously well with. But this system now has been under some attack inside Japan itself in the era of depression and recession. There are forces inside Japan that would like to throw that system out, and if the mainland becomes predominately socialist, the stresses and strains on that system are going to get greater and greater and these are not something that can be blocked by military action. So I see an eventual change in the alignment of Japan with the United States and I think this will be a tremendous thing for us to cope with in the economic sense because if Japan's manufacturing capability and business capability
is linked with the socialist world, then floods of materials that we couldn't even begin to compete with will get into the markets of the world and either we'll have to adopt a new system of working harder and longer and better or we'll go under from that point of view, not from bombing.

Now, Thailand, the handwriting's on the wall there, too. The Thais have no reason to allow us to remain in Thailand if the rest of the Indo-Chinese peninsula is gone down the drain. It would be stupid to do it because they couldn't hold out by themselves and with no promise of military aid from us, the cause is better served by capitulation or making some arrangement before the fact. Now, this brings up the situation in Sattahip and Utapao and as I've said before, if you look at the map of the world and see Sattahip there you see that it can affect the situation in the Indian Ocean. Now, it was put there in the first place from strategic considerations revolving around the Malacca Straits, the Straits of Malacca and one of the oil exit routes, not just to prosecute the Vietnam War, you see. So this would require a retrenchment and a new look at our strategic position.

Indonesia--Admiral McCain was responsible for the reopening of our contacts with Indonesia in I guess 1969 - 1970, re-establishing a communication link with them providing limited military assistance, technical help in putting a communications system across the country. And, incidentally, we gained a lot out of that too, because there was a hell of a lot of Russian materiel in Indonesia that we hadn't seen before. Komar class boats, missiles of various kinds and we were able to check some of these out. So, I see our star really on the wane in Asia and I see with it the demise of an economic area and the only reason for going to war is economics in our time, the only reason that makes sense is economics. I heard one of these big shot commentators, you know, the
empty word merchants, saying that America goes to war because of moral reasons to help the oppressed and so on. We never do it for economic purposes. Well, the only thing that makes sense is to keep the world viable for the provisions of the things you need now and the things you are going to need in the future to live. The judgemental factor comes in determining where you can pull in your belt and where it's worth dying for to continue access to something like oil and this is really what we pick leaders for, guys that have that kind of judgement and feel for the situation and know that it is time now to get out the bayonets and go because if we go beyond this point we are going to hurt. Well, excision of Asia off our access list will throw the rest of the world into an eccentric. It has been a fairly well balanced kind of thing for the U.S. to be able to look both to the east and to the west.

Our first concern really, should be our own hemisphere. I was on the Inter-American Defense Board, you know, and I became imbued with the idea of making our hemisphere tight—would mean that a fall-back position could be handled indefinitely because we got resources north and south, we've got all kinds of sociological treasures and social systems that we can learn from and we can help places that can be developed economically without paternalism, but we made our beds in Latin America to the degree that this is not a sure thing. The corrosive influence of Socialism and Marxism has crept in and the incredible naivete of the Congress not to understand that Chile, what was happening in Chile, was the rot that had to be excised and the cheapest and easiest way to do this was the way it was done. The hardest way would have been to have waited until it was exporting revolution and then gone in there with expeditionary forces. Maybe these deficiencies in our strategic thinking add up to a kind of myopia that means that we are destined for a lesser role in the world, no
matter how we deplore it, I somehow think that that is the case. Well, the hemisphere being the last stand is not under control by any manner or means. I don't use that word control correctly but we're not sure of the stature of American presence in our own hemisphere, either with Canada or with the countries of Latin America, even with Mexico, our closest neighbors. And as the viability of the Marxist formula for disillusion of existing governments gains credibility from the Asian area. We can expect more problems in Latin America that are going to lap on our very borders, you see.

So, what is left then? Well, there is the European area and I don't have to go through the weaknesses in the NATO; you are well aware of those. NATO has little meaning anymore. It's an accord of kind, a political accord; it is still a forum where plans and ideas and talks can go back and forth, but as a military kind of a structure it has had it. It's not there. Portugal is shot. Spain is on the verge of a change-over and there are feelings that this will be a bloody, could be a bloody one, and could announce the arrival of the Socialist government in Spain. France is a nonentity as far as the NATO is concerned. Germany has now come to the point where she places provisos on the movement of American materiel in and out of Germany as she showed when the Israeli affair occurred. Britain is emasculated completely. It has character still and it would go down to the last man if it would call for it but there's not much there. Norway and Denmark are nothing to think about. Denmark is not even defensible from a terrain point of view, as we know.

So, the time has come for complete re-evaluation of our strategic posture. And from what I've seen of the way our strategy is formulated and when I see the lack of brilliance in our strategic plans, I feel that some new authors have got to get in there, some inspired types of the kidney of young Napoleon,
that you get in there and think big in many directions. Not just on where in the hell the armored divisions are going to go or whether we should buy a million dollar battle tank or not, but what areas are necessary for the survival of our country in the future. You see, I felt for instance, to get back to the Philippines just for a minute, that a real diplomatic offensive launched in behalf of the Philippines and our presence there could have guaranteed for us indefinitely bases, support, training, everything that we needed, but we went about it in the same half-assed way that we address Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay to the point where now, according to the last report I got, Marcos is talking with Hanoi. Well, what the hell kind of situation is this? I put this down to diplomatic failures, you see.

INTERVIEWER: But, you know in the Philippines, and I'm glad you moved back to that because I have that question in my own mind. There you have a leader, Marcos, who is considered, I think, in the conception of the majority of the people in the United States have that he is a dictator and that here we are backing another almost Thieu-type regime. I've seen ten or twelve articles along this line, with that same thought, you know.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, I'm glad you mentioned Thieu because I wanted to say a couple of words about this poor fellow. I sat in on a meeting in the Pentagon--no, it was in the State Department. It was attended by some big names that I don't know whether I should mention or not. One was Henry Kissinger; one was Ed Lansdale; one was Colby and there were several others with similar stature. And this meeting was for the purpose of talking about free elections in Vietnam and of outlining the circumstances which would affect free elections. The old hands of Vietnam very quickly came up with an idea that there was no political party structure in Vietnam and therefore, having free elections was going to be
a little difficult. Well, how the hell do we do it? Well, we have to have political parties. Well, what do we have there? Well, we've got the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, we've got the Buddhists but these aren't political parties. Well, we've got the military--oh, hell, no, you can't have the military as a political party. Well, suppose we organize some; how would we do this? Well, it takes money. Will the government pay for political parties that are in opposition to it? No, this is not practical, either. Well, how the hell are we going to have free elections then, without the same kind of a set-up that we've got here. Well, this meeting went on for, I guess, an hour and a half, two hours. I made a long memorandum for the records for it, because I wanted to remember this. The upshot of it was, they had no answers to the problem, but by God, they were going to have free elections anyhow in that country because the United States wants it, and by God, we will stand by the boxes where they put the ballots in, to make sure that it's kosher, it's on the right side of the Lord, regardless of the fact that ninety percent of these guys don't know what the hell a free vote is, couldn't care less and are doing it only to please the Yankees. So, look what came to pass. They went through that charade and out of the end of this hopper came Thieu, who was duly elected, whereupon we immediately began to attack him as being totalitarian, corrupt, inept. Nobody bothered to tell him that we do this. We did this with George Washington, with Abraham Lincoln, with Eisenhower, with Nixon; it's a characteristic of democracy to take your leaders apart, once they are elected. Now, Thieu all along said, "I'm just an Army officer." I ran into another guy like this down in Argentina who had the same feeling. He came in there to try to keep the Peronista out and we said, "Well, what qualifications do you have?" "Well, I don't have any. I'm just a poor damn Army officer that"
trying to fill the gap until somebody that knows how to do it comes along."
So, we have castigated Thieu, pulled the rug out from under him and to me
this constitutes a kind of imperialism, you see.

Now you take Marcos--how do we know what Marcos's problems are with
insurrection in his country? They've had insurrection in Mindanao since Black
Jack Pershing got out of there. He couldn't stop it either. In insurrection
situations, you declare, ordinarily, martial law; you have curfews, road blocks,
passes. These are natural and normal. In a country that's afflicted by that
kind of thing, and I guarantee that if our country was on the verge of that
sort of thing, we'd probably find the invocation of martial law, too. And
the guy that brought it to bear would be called a dictator. I'm not--you
know one of Henry Kissinger's strong points in my view, came out in his inter-
rogation before the House Foreign Affairs Committee--or maybe it was the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee--in which he was being asked what his attitude
was toward various countries in the world. And he said, "If we have to make
sure that the internal structure of every country that we deal with is accepta-
ble to the American public, then we are going to be barking up the wrong tree
because a lot of these countries are not going to change and we are not going
to have any relations whatever. Those countries that are susceptible to change
in the way that we feel they ought to be, if we can do this without jeopardizing
our relations, we should do it. But foreign relations don't rest on internal
reconstruction in other countries." So, for our press to take Marcos apart
as being a dictator, to be on Park Chung Hee's back as being a dictator, to be
on the back of General Pinochet in Chile for being a dictator or getting after
the South African leaders for being dictators, who the hell is running this
world, you see? We can stand for what's right, but when we insist that another
country to it our way, well, I . . . we undoubtedly agree on the thrust of
what I am saying.

INTERVIEWER: One thing else. At USARPAC Headquarters--a unified command plan.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Oh, this is what you wanted . . .

INTERVIEWER: No, no, I just thought of this after you had gone through here,
but consider the new structure and what's going to be left there. I was just
wondering what you think about the elimination of USARPAC Headquarters in Hawaii
and the talk that the Air Force is considering elimination of their headquarters,
too. They are down to about twenty-five percent of what it was when you and
I were there. So, all three headquarters out there are changing. CINCPAC is
going to grow slightly, but the others will be getting smaller. What do you
think our strategy ought to be out there?

GEN YARBOROUGH: I don't know what our strategy is going to be out there.
USARPAC is now in Korea as you know and I would presume that the pressures to
withdraw from Korea are going to mount. We don't have anybody on the line any-
more anyhow. I think we've got a battalion across the road to Panmunjom . . .
battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division, it's going to move and that'll give
it all to the ROKS. Well, it ought to be in Honolulu it seems to me because
of the central location. Everything is accessible from Honolulu. But with
the demise of the U.S. Army presence in Asian area, USARPAC headquarters is
teats on a bull, you see. I don't know whether you all know what it was doing
when it was in full operation out there or not. There were many that wondered
why the hell it existed at all, but it was primarily in the hardware, financing,
and funding business. It had damn little to say if anything about tactics,
practically nothing about strategy except by personal representation of people
with a little clout in the headquarters.
And I think it funneled people... 

Yeah, but even at that, it was... they didn't have to take who you funneled; they could change the TO&E's on you, but it had acres of computers that handled one year there, to my knowledge, four and a half billion dollars worth of stuff. USARPAC was running the rebuild stations all the way from Taiwan down through the Philippines, Okinawa down to Singapore. I went through Sagami depot several times in Japan. You'd see multi-million dollar contracts rebuilding tanks and APC's. I've seen these vehicles literally, almost stretching over the horizon, where the little fellows with the bare feet had blown these vastly expensive weapons to pieces and they come back to Japan for rebuild. They had a rebuild program for watercraft that would astound you going on in Taiwan... rebuild the motor vehicles in Taiwan. But the thing that... one of the things that really shocked me about this... I'm telling you all the things that shocked me--there are a lot of good things, too, but what the hell, I mean, we'll get around to those maybe. But the processing plant on Okinawa, where materiel was coming back from Vietnam to be re-boxed, re-furbished and re-issued if possible, was an object lesson in the profligate use of the nations treasure that shouldn't be lost on posterity. I had hoped that they'd made a film out of it because it was shocking, absolutely shocking. These CONEX containers were coming in a steady stream from Vietnam because we felt there was some justification that if we put too stringent rules on how stuff should be packed for retrograde movement, nothing would come back; it would be bulldozed under. We put no rules, so when you opened these boxes, the most heterogenous kind of crap would roll out that you could imagine. Everything from caskets to types of cellular components for anti-aircraft weapons, electronic gear, everything that you could think of.
And I saw an assembly line where there were items that were unidentifiable, obviously expensive electronic components and the little Okinawan processors would draw a picture on the wall and say all like this, put here. They didn't even know what they were. Billions and millions of dollars worth of materiel to fight a "counter-guerilla" war coming back to try to be boxed up and salvaged in some way. There I saw American GI's cheek by jowl with Okinawan artisans, workmen, working on assembly lines, rebuilding vehicles and re-furbishing weapons. And you would think that we had met Rommel in the desert and defeated him three times with the gear that was coming out of that kind of an encounter with an inferior enemy and one who had no aircraft. I think I said that they rebuild . . . the rebuild program for idler wheels alone on tanks at one time was, I think, one year we figured it was a half a million bucks, a quarter to a half a million bucks, to rebuild idler wheels alone, you see. Now, you wonder how the country could assume that without going on a wartime basis, without rationing, without pulling in their belts, you could spend out of the body of the country that amount and not really go into a depression after the war. And yet, you heard nobody say that any part of this was chargeable to the profligate use of money and materiel out of our economic structure because this was a political decision as well as a military one, you see. Well, I think the greatest impression I had in USARPAC was that mountain of materiel that we were trying to flog, trying to get rid of, trying to get it off the peninsula, out of there, out of sight, sell it for a few cents a pound. And I can guarantee you that I was deeply concerned that some of this stuff was going down to Singapore and going into the hands of the Communists and we tried to trace it a couple of times through the intelligence means that were available to us and lost some of it, didn't know really where it went but could assume it went
where it shouldn't have gone. I at one time wondered whether the U.S. should be retrograding it back to our own scrap piles and was told as others were told in World War II, that this is too expensive; you can't do that, you see. Well, I thought even if we rented an island somewhere and took the steel scrap and melted it down into ingots and put a Marine guard on it, that sometime the burgeoning of our economy or the requirements of the military machine would make it worthwhile, but hell no. That spending of treasure was the thing that really raised my blood pressure, and I became actively, and paranoiac, hostile towards the supply agency. I was up in Danang, for instance, and saw steel desks up to my butt, broken open cases of uniforms that had been out in the rain because the boxing, the packaging wasn't adequate for Southeast Asia but the pressure from the rear, the push packages that come in there anyhow. Mountains of stuff that had not the remotest applicability to counter-guerilla war in an active and moving theater, you see. And I was paying for it and you are paying for it. We all are going to pay for it, and for the logisticians to put their chests out and get a pat on the back for this; they should have got a kick in the ass for it. At the end of the campaign over there--I think we had three or four ships that could provide enough electrical power for a major or a medium size city and the question came as to what to do with these. Where can we flog these? Where can we get rid of them? Hell, they could have hauled them over land into Appalachia for what they paid for the whole effort and they could have provided electrical power in a time when we need it. Now, I'm being facetious on that, but in any case the Delong piers were another case in point. Fantastically expensive. And I don't know whether you two gentlemen know or not, but there was no engineer element in the whole U.S. Army that could install a Delong pier. This had to be done by commercial
companies. Is this the kind of a strategic basis that you build an expeditionary force on? Do you have to take Vinnell Corporation if you go into the Middle East or somewhere to build your Delong piers for you? Well, in all of this bad, there was a hell of a lot of good, too. For one thing, the Army perfected the packaging system for what is the roll on-roll off vessel which has revolutionized a lot of ocean traffic. Some of our big depots were handled in a way that would make any corporation, I think, sit up and take notice; that is, the computerized stock records keeping and all of that. But again for history now the Marines who went into DaNang had adopted a different computers system than the Army and when the Army . . . when it came time for the Army to take over the supplies and stores in DaNang, there was one hell of a travail in trying to get things into phase with each other. And I presume that a lot of it went through the cracks as a result of that. But it was easier to maybe push it somewhere else.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, that's real fine and enough for today.

GEN YARBOROUGH: That's enough for today. Well, I hope I'm giving you guys what you want . . .
INTerviewer: General Yarborough, the last two days we've ranged wide and far; zeroed in on special forces and your experiences there; yesterday we ended up ranging over the—almost the whole world, talking about what you would see in the future and the perspective of the involvement you had as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in Chief of USARPAC. We'd like to go back today, sir, and take up a period of your time when you left the JFK Center for Special Warfare, turning it over to General Stilwell, and took over as the Senior Member of the United Nations Commission at Panmunjom. I'd like your reflections on your reaction to that assignment, if you would, and then describe in some detail the "Yarborough Approach" to the talks at Panmunjom and what the reaction was, the ground sell and also from higher, if you could, please.

LTG YARBO Rough: Yes, well. As I approached four years at the JFK Center, Special Warfare and JFK Center, having been deeply involved in Southeast Asia—I mean, we visited Vietnam and Laos and Thailand repeatedly over protracted periods of time—I felt a sense of absolute frustration and indignation when I was ordered to Korea, to the Armistice Commission, instead of being ordered to Vietnam. I couldn't understand why because I felt that I had some vigor to give to that operation. I've learned later from my classmate, General Westmoreland, that he had asked for me on two or three occasions only to be told that I was not available. And I guess other sources and other rationale that I know nothing about will have to explain why I didn't get to Vietnam. I'm not trying to imply that I was
all that highly qualified but I certainly had the interest and the will.
To me, Korea was an unknown quantity. I hadn't fought there, although when
I was a student at the British Staff College and that war started, I wrote
to General Clarke and said, "Don't forget me; I want to get with you."
And he wrote back saying, "Your qualifications are well-known to me and
in due course, I'll put the arm on you." Well, for a variety of reasons
there, I didn't get to Korea. So being ordered there on the Armistice
Commission was, pulled the rug out from under me. However, I was to learn
that it would be, like many other assignments I've had in the Army, one
of the most rewarding and interesting that I'd ever undertaken. In spite
of the fact that I always felt that I was not in the main stream because
the things that were really going to be germane to the future of Asia were
happening in Vietnam. I tried to find out what the nature of the job
was from people who had been there. A classmate of mine named Cecil
Combs, Air Force officer, who had retired as a major general of the Air
Force, spent some time with me telling me what a challenging assignment
Panmunjom was. He had to do a lot of talking because I felt that negotia-
tion of an Armistice which had gone on for that many years was beating a
dead horse. His enthusiasm, a little bit of it rubbed off on me. I'd
naturally made a trip to the Department of State in Washington to get the
scoop. OSD/ISA gave me a briefing. And the up-shot of all of these was,
you can't win but you can lose. You're not going to make any dent in the
North Koreans. Your job is to be dignified, honest, and straightforward.
Admit everything that is a dereliction on the part of the United Nations.
Investigate and report fully and completely to the Armistice Commission,
and that's about it. So I arrived in Korea with my lower lip hanging
down, feeling sorry for myself, but determined to see whether or not what
Cecil Combs had said to me had any foundation, any real basis of fact.
The officer who was the Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission
when I arrived was an Admiral Blackburn, Rear Admiral Blackburn, who had
made a couple of tapes that I heard and I found that his philosophy of
confrontation of the North Koreans was something that didn't completely
appeal to me. It seemed to be a little too recessive. Now, on the posi-
tive side of the ledger, having been exposed at the JFK Center for four
years to the best the United States has in the way of psychological-warrior-
types; the lecturers, Paul Linebarger, the author of the famous and fine
classical work on psychological operations was one of our regular speakers.
And some of our outstanding young instructors like Colonel John Johns. I
had picked up a certain amount of feeling or empathy for psychological ops.
I had also gone rather deeply into the philosophy of Mao Tse Tung and I
was pretty well familiar with the tenents of Marxism, the framework around
which their arguments were likely to be based. So, I wasn't completely
unarmed in going into this arena. The more I studied the thousands and
thousands of pages of confrontations at Panmunjom, the more I realized
that the Communist ran in the same track: there was nothing original,
nothing new; the venacular, the epithets, the argumentative approaches
had repeated themselves again and again and again to the degree that they
could be anticipated and preempted. The great void in my armament
the lack of any United States coherent policy in Panmunjom. You know,
having failed at a political settlement of the Korean War, the political
echelons removed themselves from the negotiating structure and turned the
contacts with the North Koreans over to the military. Consequently, there
was no real forum for the conduct of political affairs. It was really
outside the charter of the Military Armistice Commission to talk about
political affairs. There was no link in that instance, that score. So,
was it correct for me then to ask for guidance from the Department of
State as to what kind of material I should put out across the table? If
not from Department of State, where should it come from? Well, there
wasn't any source in Korea. I inquired, of course, eventually in the
headquarters and found that they were content really to leave it up to
me as to what was going to be said and how it was going to be said. So
I began to then, on the basis of what had gone before, to configure my
arguments and my counter-arguments and I must say that from the completely
dispassionate point of view, some of the material that I turned out was --
violated the rules of propaganda, let's put it that way. I don't know
really where to start on this other than to say that, I went into the
first meeting, with my Korean colleagues flanking me and bolstering my
presence, with a feeling that perhaps I was confronting some military
types on the other side who could be reasonable, and if my attitude was
in fact correct and polite, that as military men do all over the world,
we could talk in a dispassionate way and maybe even get something done.
My hopes were shattered at the first meeting. My opposite number,
General Pak Chung Kuk, proceeded to tear a strip off me for the derelictions
of my predecessors, telling me that, if I was going to follow the same
bankrupt policies as the unworthy types that had preceeded me, I would
get the same kind of a shellacking from their side; that what I repre-
sented was no damn good and I'd better recognize that we were there to
keep the armistice and, if my performance were as undistinguished as
those that preceded me, that we weren't even going to be able to do
that. Well, a lot of these tapes are a matter of record and I have a
lot of them if you want to wade through some of that raw material because
it is real mental cruelty, I can assure you, that at the end of this
first meeting I stood up, even though I'd been chastised and I was innocent,
and I was either going to shake hands with this fellow or salute or do
whatever military men do when they've met under circumstances like that.
But he, holding his cigarette in Russian fashion, turned his back upon me
and strode out of the room. Well, this was my initiation at Panmunjom.
Well, I guess being human enough to have my feelings hurt resulted in my
going at preparation of these meetings with a fervor and, whereas perhaps
some of the -- my predecessors had prepared only for the meetings and had
done a certain amount of golf playing and whatever, I felt that research
was the thing and I spent all of the time between meetings delving into
the back issues of the transcripts and reading the *Pyongyang Times* and
listening to the broadcasts from Pyongyang and trying to get a fix on the
personalities of the people who were opposite me at the table. And in
talking to the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the
Czechs, the Poles, the Swedes, so that I would be as completely armed
from a psychological sense as I could when I went into the confrontation.
I developed a set of principles upon which I would configure my propaganda
and they were roughly these. The meetings that Pak Chung Kuk called were,
99% of the time, designed to humiliate. They were propaganda forums for the promotion of North Korean Communist propaganda. I felt that if that was the case then I could return the compliment by finding ways to humiliate the fellow who would call the meeting for no real reason. The second, I saw quite a bit of evidence in the transcripts to the effect that the endurance of the United Nations side was not as great as the endurance of the Communist side. Frequently, as United Nations ran out of material, they would ask for recess which was then granted magnanimously by the Communist side with the inference that well, you people want to get out of here, we'll let you go now. So I decided to stay as long as they wanted to and in some cases for longer meetings. This resulted in one meeting going for eight hours and they called the halt. The next one was that I made -- I didn't have to make a vow because it is a principle of the regular officer in our Army not to lie -- I decided there would be no lies. If I was ever caught in a situation where the facts had not been given to me either by the United Nations Command, the Koreans or the Americans, I would not talk about the issue; as in the case of intelligence operations, I would not answer the question, but there would be no such thing as lying. The opposition did that a great deal. Pak Chung Kuk lied at the drop of a hat. The next thing was to evoke the principal of ridicule. When the charges were as outlandish as they frequently were and repeated in the Marxist--the typical Marxist way--to the degree that they became oppressive, then I would use ridicule to try to stop that. The next principle was the principle of wedge-driving. The North Koreans had, sitting in attendance, both members
of the Communist Chinese delegation and the North Koreans. Well, I didn't explain that quite fully. Kim Il Sung whose name, whose real name is Kim Song Ju, was a creature of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, he was even a Soviet citizen. It was rumored that he had fought guerrilla warfare along with the Soviets at one time. If he had, it was a very small part. But his arrival at Pyongyang, as the Chief of State, was engineered by the Soviet Union. The bulk of the equipment of the North Korean Army was, and is, Soviet. However, it was the Chinese that came in to help North Korea in their operations during the war and the Chinese continued to sit on the North Korean side at Panmunjom. And I felt that since there was quite a dichotomy between the Chinese and the Soviets and the person of Kim Il Sung was in the middle, that there was a real chance to play one off against the other, which I did on several occasions in the light of wedge-driving. The next thing, having read as I said exhaustively Mao's works and many of the works of Kim Il Sung -- ghostwritten undoubtedly -- as I could lay my hands on, I was in a position to check on the accuracy of some of the doctrinal statements of my opponents and didn't hesitate to point out that their lapses in doctrine were going to get them in trouble with their own commissars. Finally, there was the question of outgoing artillery. Even though Linebarger and other propaganda psychological warfare experts will tell you that counterpropaganda is a lost cause, or ad hominum attacks are no good, I felt that, answering the Communists in their own vernacular, was a good thing for our own side; both for the Koreans and for the Americans, who listened to this on radio and saw it on TV. And as a mark of the success of this, I got many letters from
GIs in Korea saying, "General, give them hell. We're just delighted to hear this going out." At one time I made a long distance call back home to my wife and the operator said, "General, I want to tell you, we're really enjoying hearing you shellack them up there." I said, "Well, you probably didn't hear them shellacking me." But in any case, it was good for morale, regardless of what the books say, and this is probably another facet of propaganda that ought to be looked at by the students of propaganda. Well, these were the things that shaped the kinds of material that I presented at the table. I won't go through all of the, or even summarize for you the kinds of things that came up, but they ranged from return of bodies, airplanes that were shot down in North Korea without provocation; attacks on our reconnaissance airplanes in neutral waters; infiltration groups that continued to come across the DMZ; infractions of every nature—and one could always be certain that when there was an infraction on the Communist side that they would call a meeting to accuse you of the same sort of thing. No surprise to us that knew Communist dogma and doctrine. But apparently, I layed the wood on the Communist to the degree that our Department of State became a little concerned about it. Although the interest had been dormant for a number of years, the rise in the numbers of people that came to Panmunjom to see the confrontations continued and press coverage became very wide and I was called in to our ambassador to talk to him about the conduct of affairs at Panmunjom. The Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command went along with me and said to the ambassador, after we were given to understand that I was being a little too sharp and too direct and too
forward, the CINC of the United Nations Command said, "Mr. Ambassador, I like the way he's doing it." There really wasn't any diplomatic link, in a sense, because it was a Military Armistice Commission, if you understand what I mean. But I said to the ambassador, "I'd be delighted to have some guidance on how, on what to say, because I'm writing all my own stuff, researching it, I'm hoping it's correct. I have a feel for the national presence and for the strategy over here. But if you can provide me with something, this would take a great load off my shoulders. I would know it would be official and fill the bill." He said, "Well, I'm going back to the United Nations, I'm going back to Washington, and I'll try to get you some guidance." Well, in due course, he reappeared, and the guidance was the same that I had received when I was getting ready to go over there. "No ad hominem attacks. Be dignified. Answer all charges. Don't create too much of a stir." Well, this was no good for me because, like the guy standing in the doorway of an airplane ready to jump, the only person that knows how he feels is the guy himself, and here I was, the focal point of all of the venom of the North Koreans and the Communist Chinese, sitting there as a regular officer in the Regular Army, expected to take that. There wasn't anything in my charter that said I should, and furthermore as an American, I resented the fact that these people were not being called up short by any agency of our government that I knew. And therefore, I delighted in the opportunity to do it in behalf of the people that were listening and I felt that if they didn't like the way I was doing this, I would also be delighted to be hauled out of there and be sent to Vietnam, where I belonged in the first place. So really, I must make an
admission to you that part of the enthusiasm with which I attacked Pak Chung Kuk, resulted from the fact that I was so distressed over being there in the first place, that maybe I took it out on the Communist. I don't know. But I did learn a tremendous amount about the way those people operate, first hand, which corroborated what I read and what we'd studied here at the center. So that was the Panmunjom affair.

INTERVIEWER: Can you give us an example, even if you want to summarize it, an example of an incident that took place where you were able to use effectively any one of those techniques or did you ever see any result when you were stinging them and they showed that in some way?

LTG YARBOROUGH: My close colleague -- yes, I began to appear regularly in the Pyongyang Times in terms of great disrespect. Also the broadcasts from Pyongyang tore strips off me and this was high honor to be singled out in this fashion. At the table, I got to know every physical characteristic of Pak Chung Kuk, like the palm of my hand. He is a very handsome looking fellow, in a hard cold way. No matter how long I looked at him I couldn't tell whether things were going through or not except occasionally a little nervous laughter when the people in back of him would laugh, his writers and his young political commissars. But my colleague, Admiral Nam Chul, who is now ambassador, I guess to Norway or Denmark, would tell me after these meetings, "Bill, you really got him on that one." The Koreans knew when I had scored a mark on a Korean. I tried also to score on the Chinese indirectly and I think I was able to run the Chinese member away for a protracted period while he repaired his face. This was a fellow named Ting Kan Ju. Well, I don't know whether I should go all
through that or not, whether it's interesting to you. But let's say in one of the cases where I felt that humiliation or ridicule was in effect--was an effective tactic, stemmed from their introduction of three spies up the Han River in a homemade submarine. The submarine ran aground on a sandbar on the Han River and our security forces succeeded in killing two and capturing one and capturing all of the equipment. I took the equipment and the submarine, a miniature sub; put a dummy in the wet suit of one of the dead infiltrators; put the North Korean flag in his hands; put him in the conning tower of the submarine; and hauled the whole thing up to Panmunjom where I had it on display out in front of the meeting room, knowing full well that Pak Chung Kuk would deny the whole thing and having the hard evidence there, which people were wandering around and beginning to laugh about and--even the North Korean soldiers. Well, I left this thing until the last, going through a lot of other materials, counter accusations and whatever and leading up to the big punch. In doing this, I went through the history of submarines from the time of the Revolutionary War where a fellow named Holland had built one for us and then up through the Civil War. And I had pictures of these things that I put on the screen. And finally we talked about our nuclear submarines and the "Snook" which they had objected to coming in to Pusan, and I said, "Now this remarkable piece of North Korean ingenuity shows that you people have really come a long way. If you had kept it simple, like my imperialistic forebears did in the Civil War and the Revolutionary War, maybe the thing might have made it." And I carried on in this vane and Pak Chung Kuk didn't know what to make of it. Finally, his rejoinder to me
"The next time you come in here, somebody's going to come in with you in a white coat. Obviously, you're off your rocker," you see, but everybody got a big laugh out of it, including his people. And then, when we went outside to see the submarine there, his embarrassment was very great indeed. So there were things of that nature. We at one time picked up three MIGs passing over our line illegally. They showed up on the radar track. There wasn't any question about it, any doubt about it. And when confronted with all the facts, of course, Pak Chung Kuk lied about it. He said it never happened, that this was some more of the imperialistic accusations which had no basis in fact. And when later one of our little airplanes, with a Korean lieutenant at the stick crossed over into North Korea inadvertently and was shot down, the counter there, of course, was that this fellow had done it on purpose. And he hadn't done anything at the kind—he was lost and he was killed. And there was a long negotiation for the return of the body. The body came back to us in a decomposed state; he hadn't been embalmed or anything else, was thrown back like a dog. And the two cases, of course, were played against each other. The fact that they had violated the line and lied about it and we knew from the modern, most modern technological means that they had done it; and the Koreans and the North Koreans saying that the reason this guy came across was on purpose because the most modern technological guidance assistance would prevent him from being lost and coming over the line. Well, it was a succession of things like this. I used to leave these meetings soaking wet. I really detested the atmosphere in which one national would speak to another the way that I spoke to him, or the way
he spoke to me. It was the antithesis of everything that I believed in from the point of view of a regular officer talking like that to another individual, and I took no joy in it nor do I take any joy in it today when I occasionally look over the script or play one of the tapes or whatever. It was combat of a kind that was cruel and unusual, let's put it that way. And when I left there, I'm not certain that I left any real mark at all, except in the hearts of the South Koreans, who felt that somebody was helping their cause by talking the way I did. I certainly didn't change any minds in North Korea. Well, that's enough on that subject.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir. I think that's a real good coverage and that's exactly what we were looking for. Of course when you finished this relatively short tour over there, you were reassigned to Washington, DCSOPS as special assistant.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, I wanted to say one more thing about Korea. The senior member of the Military Armistice Commission is a creature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When I came back, I wrote, I thought profusely and persuasively, to the effect that whoever was picked for that job should be sharpened up on psychological operations. He shouldn't be just picked out of the line because he's a general officer and sent into that meat-grinder without some objective and some goal that was creditable and some sort of moral armament or intellectual armament to stand up under that kind of a strain. To my knowledge, nothing was really done about this. I believe maybe the next man after went down to Bragg and listened to a couple of lectures on PSYOPS but thereafter I'm sure it
petered out and I don't know that the JCS even read the results of those encounters. They may, but they more likely do not. To me, it is another front in whatever kind of a war we're carrying out and if we don't acquit ourselves any better than we have there, then it's just another example of losing a little bit. A lot of little bits add up to a lot, it seems to me. So I guess what I'm saying is that there should be some system for preparation and honing the guy that's going into that up there. OK.

Yes, I did come back then to become Assistant DCSOPS for Special OPS.

INTERVIEWER: We know that ranged over a lot of things. I think one of the things we would like to have you touch on, in addition to any area you'd like to talk about, is the involvement you had with Latin America and a look to what was done there, what maybe you thought should have been done, and where we're going today. As we look at it, it's an area that always stays way back on the back burner, in actual things which are done for and with it. There's every now and then some rhetoric, I guess a Henry Kissinger's going down there very soon to make a semi-annual or annual appearance. If you would talk to the special things that you had in that office and then look to that area which is an area we're both interested in.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, that job carries with it -- Assistant DCSOPS for Special OPS -- did carry with it the requirement to be on the Inter-American Defense Board and -- I was the senior guy it so happened -- I was the Chairman of U.S. Delegation. Also I was on the Canada--U.S. Defense Board and the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission and the Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Board. Each of these things were separate.
The Canadian affair was pretty formal. Our relations there are covered satisfactorily by all kinds of accords and agreements. The cooperation is complete in a military sense. Very little to argue with or to worry about with the possible exception of technicalities of air defense. When, for instance, a threat would come in the other fellow's country, how far into his country should one address it from the other side. But really minor things considering the real deep accord of Canada. The Brazilian-U.S. Defense Commission was an outgrowth of long and friendly relations with Brazil. Brazil, I found, had a tradition of cooperation with the United States; took great pride in the fact that they'd had an expeditionary course in Italy during World War II; wanted to go to Korea to... I don't believe they did, did they?

INTERVIEWER: No, sir.

LTG YARBOROUGH: They wanted to provide forces. They felt that they needed a special relationship with the United States because of a lot of things. First, their tremendous potential to Latin America put them in a place where they would be the, eventually, the second greatest country in our hemisphere, in their view. And whereas they sought this special relationship, they weren't always getting it, it was my feeling. To give you a case in point, their representative on the Joint Board and on the Inter-American Defense Board was a Brigadier Edgardo De Figuerido. Edgardo was a good friend of mine, socially and officially, and during my time, we were negotiating the delivery of tanks to Brazil. The difficulties in the way of this delivery were fantastic. Whereas it wasn't my job as the Inter-American Defense Board representative or the Joint Brazilian-
U.S. Defense Commission representative to handle this, I tried to intercede with good offices with the elements of the Defense Department which had it to do. They were fairly unhappy with the way that aid program developed, but there was another one that was even a greater thorn in Edgardo De Figuerido's side and I presume he represented the people that sent him there. He wanted to get several thousand steel helmets. And this being a relatively simple item of equipment, it seemed that there would be very little difficulty in getting it. However, De Figuerido was put off repeatedly and finally told that we didn't have any to spare, we needed them all for our own troops. Whereupon he asked for the plans, for the specifications, in order to build them in Brazil and increditably was told that they were too complex; there would be a double armload of all the specifications. You can't get there from here!! Now this sounds like fiction, but I can assure you that we cried about it over drinks many a time and there wasn't anything really -- I don't know how it came out finally. But these were little things that stood in the way of really... really good accord. It was, I think, another example of the big brother looking at the smaller brother the way we sometimes do without enough understanding, you see. Now, I made a trip down to Brazil with the Inter-American Defense Board, went to Brazilia. I guess, that's about everything I want to say about that particular situation. Now the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission was an extremely interesting thing too because here I found that, in spite of the fact that Mexico is our closest neighbor, there's still a lot of impasses in military accord. One of them being our fairly open southern flank from an air defense
point of view, and I think the facts will bear me out on this that during the time I was in that position, that remained unsolved, really. I went down to Mexico I guess two or three years in a row as guest of Defense Minister, Berrigon, to see the Mexican Army on the occasion of what they call "El Grito," their national day. And here I must tell you, I was most impressed with the Mexican Army, about which I had known nothing, because it was simple; it was armed with the most rudimentary equipment, I guess some of it almost World War I-World War I, World War II-their cavalry was superb. But the thing that impressed me most was the discipline of the units. Every school, every college, had an ROTC of some kind or military unit and they all showed the evidence of real leadership and real training. Everything was maintained properly and in good condition and one could say that for a country like that, that had the kind of an internal security situation that they had, that that Army was superbly designed to fill that bill. I respect the Mexicans. I enjoyed my contacts with them. I learned that because they're our closest neighbor doesn't mean that we know a hell of a lot about them—and we need to know more, we need to consolidate our position down there, it seems to me. Now, while I'm talking about these two countries, I want to talk a little bit about intelligence because this also became a subject between Edgardo De Figueiredo of Brazil, and myself. We were pushing for counter subversion in Latin American in order to keep Castro business from spreading and to hold down the Tupamaros and whatever. But this required intelligence. There isn't any way to operate without having intelligence or counterintelligence. So it was the United States' position that we should push these Latin American countries to pool their
intelligence resources on movement of subversives and counterintelligence information. However, we would not share our intelligence with Latin America. It was a one-way street. We wanted them to do it, cross borders and give it to us but we wouldn't give it to them. The reason was not any willfullness on the part of our people, it was just the fact that our laws don't allow it. We couldn't even back a secure communication system throughout Latin American because the mechanics of communication security were protected by law and even our outmoded ones at that time we couldn't give them. So I decided that, as far as Edgardo was concerned, that if I wanted intelligence from Brazil—incidentally, I'm talking now about later into the ACSI period when I continued to know this guy and continued to have contacts with him that it started in the Inter-American Defense Board—I gave him, verbally, materials that I couldn't pass him in writing and he gave me in the same way to circumvent the law which was stultifying. In the Inter-American Defense Board, we made trips to various places. I went with the Inter-American Defense Board to Central America and there I found that the South Americans looked on Central America with the same kind of interest that we did. They knew very little about it. And we were the guests of Samoza, of Nicaragua. Much impressed with the way Nicaragua was being run. We went through one beautiful prison system outside of Managua. And it had the most up-to-date sociological support elements in it and rehabilitation elements and all that. Some of our colleagues said, "Well, one of these guys is concentrating on prison, they ought to be doing something else." But to me it was a mark of real forward, forward thinking. The little Army of Honduras which is in the news now is, I
thought, a beautiful miniature replica of the United States Army. They put on for us a ground-air support operation that would have done the Infantry School justice; everything in miniature. Guatemala to me was way down the list. Their troops were undisciplined looking. On a couple trips to Guatemala, I ran into the problems there of internal security. I was held up at a road block while I was going to a meeting. I didn't have a very high impression of the Guatemalan military forces. El Salvador's military forces were all mostly reserve or all reserve I guess. And yet we were taking those reserve officers and sending them to our Infantry School and Leavenworth and they were going back to go back to inactive duty. I want to give you a little story about Argentina. While I was a member of the IADB, the Department of State, I guess through OSD/ISA, warned me that a coup was imminent in Argentina and that, through my contacts with the Inter-American Defense Board representative from Argentina, they wanted me to sort of let this guy know that the U.S. took a dim view of coups. I was given the task of going to lunch with this individual and putting across the U.S. point of view. I approached it with some circumspection because I knew it was a dangerous kind of thing. We went to a seafood restaurant in Washington and after a couple of martinis and a lobster tail, I began to approach this guy on, in a round-about way. I said, "You know there are many Americans that think that the word "Latin America" and "revolutionary" are synonymous. They have a very bad name down there for changing political systems in a violent way." I said, "You know, we, this kind of thing is apt to reflect itself in an atrophy or congressional support in a military sense and
economic sense and all the rest, and furthermore, it gets bad press in
the U.S.." Well, this guy listened to me, after I done this roundabout
approach as diplomatically as I could and listened to me for a while and he
said, "Look, I want to tell you something." He said, "First place, you
Americans don't know anything about Latin America, otherwise you wouldn't
call it Latin America." He said, "Every country down here is different,
but you wouldn't understand that." He said, "You have a history of trying
to preempt actions that we want to take in our own behalf, and we
take a dim view of that, I want you to know that too." He said, "Now,
the problem in my particular country is this. This fellow Peron is a
son-of-a-bitch," he said, "he has perverted the elections for a number
of years to the degree that physical force was used; peasants were given
money to vote in the right way or the wrong way. We're not going to put
up with that." And he said, "If your democratic system can tell me -- if
your State Department can tell me how we're going to keep this guy Peron
from coming back in, by your methods -- I'd like to know. I'll take it
back to my people and tell them." So, I said, "Now look, general, I'm
only a bearer of tidings here. I want you to know that I've delivered
my message and that's all there is to it." Well, the Revolution took
place and Ongania, General Ongania, came in. And subsequently, we were
to visit Ongania in his palace where he again told why he had done this
as a general officer. He had a picture of the Pope, a signed picture of
the Pope on his mantle piece; a peaceable man of God, a fellow who was
trying to do the best for his country. But this is an example of our
attitude towards that kind of thing. Right or wrong, I'm just reporting
it as an item of history. Another good friend of mine in Latin America was General Marcado Jarrin who in 1967, I guess '68, was the Chief Intelligence Officer for Peru. He subsequently, I think, became foreign minister, at least he was high in the hierarchy down there. I attended an intelligence conference in Bogota with General Marcado Jarrin and other members of the entire Latin American intelligence community and found that this guy stood shoulder to shoulder with me on attitudes against subversion, against Communism, against orientation of our hemisphere anywhere except in our area. Something happened to Marcado Jarrin and he, along with Peru, have drifted to a degree that now they are seeking help from the Soviet Union where they are progressively more anti-American. I felt that the congressional attitude toward Latin America, which is revealed in reams of congressional records, shows the paternalism that is responsible for a lot of this. I remember one statement in a congressional record which indicated that the Congress that wasn't impressed with the fact that if we did not give arms to Latin America, they would turn to Soviet Union or someplace else for help. So I think, digging back through the record, we can see why the situation has developed the way it is and I hope that the trend could be reversed. One of the major instrumentalities in winning friends in Latin America, right from the word "go", has been the military, our military. Unfortunately, we haven't always chosen our representatives well. We would send an individual to some little Latin American country and forget about him. And it didn't happen -- and it wasn't necessary that his caliber be what it ought to be. I could give you some examples of that but I'm not going to; they're on the record,
a matter of record. But again with the press' attitude in this country against military dictatorships and the fact that most of the countries in Latin America have had military guys in there. You can see that there is a double kind of a stress, sort of a reflection of the national feeling that the guys there shouldn't be there because they've got jack-boots on and secondly, that if our military is dealing with people like that, we're promulgating the wrong thing. But the diplomatic impact of American military in Latin America is something that really ought to be looked at. It's a fact of life. They sometimes are much more persuasive in a personal way than members of the embassies. OK. What do we want to talk about now? INTERVIEWER: Well, having been there in Latin America not too far back, you know, the same things pervade that you had problems with. We had a problem with Venezuelan parachutes, the Venezuelan small parachute element wanted the maneuverable chute, and our system wouldn't provide it to them. They didn't need it; that was somebody else's judgment. That they wanted it and had the funds to buy it and very much wanted to buy a U.S. item, they finally bought German parachutes. But simply because, I could not get anybody to sell them to them -- it still goes on. LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, there was another example in Chile. After having put across, the best way we could, this business of counter-insurgency through civic action and improving the image of the military in the eyes of the people, the military aid to Chile -- the Chileans wanted to re-configure it so that it would be heavy on things that had to do with taking care of people in the field. For instance, field hospitals, kitchens, sanitary equipment, things of that nature. And this wasn't
acceptable to the AID business; it had to be TO&E of some kind. You've got to get an austere TO&E, you see. It wasn't flexible to the degree that it should have been. There also continues to be the problem of the police-military confrontation in Latin America. The AID types had the police program for training and yet in many cases the police were para-military types and were the first line of defense against guerrillas. We had, therefore, great difficulty in laying hands on that problem from the Army point of view. It became illegal to do things with police that AID were charged with taking care of. Well, there's so much to be said about Latin America. We could talk the whole afternoon about it and I don't know; I . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, you know, you've made some points in reflecting. I would like to comment that for the short term, there's no indication that the things, for instance, U.S. military continue to extend influence to do some good things down there. They're cutting back on the military personnel and cutting our program; it has to be cash and carry. Everything is retrenching from the standpoint of what good can be done by the military.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, considering the fallback position that I'd mentioned before to our own hemisphere, I think this is very shortsighted. Again, looking at strategy of the future and trying to reassess the position of the military in that strategy, it would seem that the old taboo against using military as sources for rapport with foreign countries, should be looked on with great favor. If there's a military regime and you have military guys that can go down there and build face with the country, it ought to be done, in my view. I went through the Argentine Military Academy and it is a most gentlemanly, beautiful kind of set-up that you
can imagine, with all the tradition they can muster. Every piece of
tradition to them is like a piece of pure gold because they don't have
all that military background. But it's all there, enshrined, and the
products of that military academy are intellectually well equipped,
gentlemanly well turned out citizens, and the fact that they gravitate
to politics is not germane. The fact that they have a uniform on, they're
products of a fine educational system and dedicated to their country, you
see. But there's something paranoiac about the United States' attitude
toward anybody that is a military guy, being in a political position, you
see. Not justified really.

INTERVIEWER: Well sir, that's fine. That gives us good coverage on that
part. Well sir, to finish up your tour in ODCSOPS, I noticed that General
Johnson selected you to be the ACSI. And I'd like some of your thoughts
as you were selected to go into that position and why you thought you were
selected, and then as you came into the job and you access the task that
the ACSI had or which direction you might be able to move that organization
profitably. And then the later developments that came along which caused
you to shift your emphasis perhaps.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, of course, I was mystified at first as to why I
had been moved into the ACSI position. My hope had been to get the hell
out of the Pentagon because I was never happy a minute I was inside that
building, really. I later surmised that it was because I had had intelli-
gence experience in an operational way. I commanded the 66th CIC MI Group
in Europe. There were some pretty active periods, I might add. They were
catching a lot of spies and training a lot. So I knew the mechanics of
the sharp-end pretty well. However, I was not really prepared for the bureaucracy that surrounds ACSI and the Pentagon, or at least surrounded it at that time. It was a question for me to feel my way to see what the ground rules were, the funding prohibitions and the funding justifications that had to be made, took up a lot of time. I was privileged to sit on the U.S. Intelligence Board where at the highest level I saw the intelligence functions of the entire United States come together under Dick Helms, who I thought was a magnificent guy in every way, who handled that U.S. Intelligence Board with a kind of quiet leadership, sense of humor, always with the feeling that the weight of the effort had tremendous importance to the United States, let's put it that way. And I must say that the things that I saw in the U.S. Intelligence Board -- the sophistication of the effort -- belied some of the public manifestations which would make it appear in some cases that we were dull fellows. We weren't at all. Fantastic things were in the mill and the most brilliant people that I've ever been in contact with who were evaluating and extrapolating and making up -- projecting requirements, let's put it that way. I guess we can talk about it now but we, the inception of the Russian Talin missile system took place about the time that I was assigned to ACSI, and Talin began to appear in a shadowy way across our intelligence screens. We didn't have any real fix on the exact size and shape of it. We had a few pictures taken with means that now have become fairly public, but at that time were super Top Secret. We saw the network of Talins begin to spread across the Soviet Union and, being familiar with the Hen-house and the Dog-house radars and the great protective system around
Moscow, we were looking for the tie-in between Talin i and these radars, the radar system, with a feeling that maybe Talin was an anti-missile-missile. It had "push" packages strapped to the sides, that is extra lift devices which we thought might be jettisonable, to allow this thing to reach really high speeds. But I think among the first real technical education and sophistication that I got as ACSI was to hear our experts go over their rationale for determining what they did determine at that time about the Talin. I guess that ends up as the SA-5.

We learned an awful lot about the developments in the Soviet Union through means that only the most dedicated and highly educated and trained and skilled people could possibly arrive at. Samples of materials or samples of air taken at wide intervals around the world, to the experts added up to sizes, shapes, amounts, makes and all the rest. There is no place in American industry that, if you disbanded that corps of types, that could go and find guys that could go and do this sort of thing. It was a fantastic experience. Now part of the problems with MIRVing, on the part of the Soviet Union, was a function of different technology that the Russians had developed for nuclear explosions. The tamping system; to the use of enriched uranium; plutonium was handled in a way that required for the Soviet Union, heavy lift vehicles. Consequently, their missiles were capable of much greater lift than ours. This was for a purpose, for a reason. However, the very size of the missile and the size of the re-entry vehicles would have to present ballistic problems for re-entry which meant that "MIRVing" would result, for the Soviets, only after they had succeeded in building lower yield weapons.
Consequently, we knew that the underground testing program, after the atmospheric testing program was abandoned, was in the low yields; 2 KT, \( \frac{1}{2} \) KT, whatever, to try to pull their technology down to the point where they could MIRV inside a proper re-entry warhead. Well, how do you know this kind of thing. I don't know. It's a composite of a most esoteric kind of scientific brains that must have a military over-tone that can't be assumed overnight. At the same time, this is the kind of thing that one can not give the public. He can't explain it either to large congressional groups or certainly to the newspapers. When this submarine was grappled for and raised, the technology that was discovered inside the warheads was in corroboration of the extrapolations that our scientists had made on the nature of the qualities of the warheads to permit "MIRVing" or permit other scientific developments in their weapon systems. So I was subjected in ACSI to a steady stream of the most overpowering kind of intelligence that had to do with the very foundations of strategy of the country. How they worked in the fairly low level espionage business, counterespionage business. To me this was like coming from the small corporation into the big one and I was suitably over-awed. To get to more prosaic and things germane to ACSI, I discovered early in the game that requirements, intelligence requirements of the Army, were based on a rather flimsy footing. In order to have proper collection, in order to guide your collection effort in the proper direction, you should know what you need. Well, going through the vast amounts of materials from the training commands, the Army commands, the strategic planners, the war plans types, we found a great paucity of clear-cut directives which
could be translated into collection guides and which could be monitored as to the progress that was being made in fulfilling these requirements. I don't know whether this situation has changed or not. I think that probably you will find, when you go to the reference materials in order to flesh out a war plan, there will be great gaps. And filling those gaps often takes quite a long time. With regard to Vietnam, of course, as I indicated to you, Vietnam was pretty self sufficient with the intelligence operations going on out there who didn't really want ACSI interference or help. I think one of the things that concerned me most was the, as I mentioned before, the failure to comprehend the scope, the nature, and the importance of the infrastructure. This deficiency was not only on the part of the U.S. Army but on the part of the CIA as well. And I think the record will show, that it was fairly late in the game when the agency, as well as the military, began to recognize that the destruction of that infrastructure was of utmost importance but you had to know what it looked like first in order to do it.

Intelligence on personality sketches which we have always been a little bit short on -- I went through reams and reams and reams of personality sketches and then -- compiled by military attache, by casual observers, and whatever, and found very little that was really of use across the board. Things would be reported like a man takes two cups of coffee after dinner, parts his hair on the right side, loves golf, has a ruddy complexion. And yet many of these people had been under observation in U.S. schools, colleges socially, and from the tender ranks of colonels and lieutenant colonels had become brigadiers, general officers
and chiefs of state. There was a great void in the collection apparatus. I think I tried to reinstitute this in the schools and in the places like Bragg, where a great many people came through, and Leavenworth and so on. But here as always in the American system when one runs up against the antipathy towards anything that smacks of gathering materials that bear on the guys private life. This even extends to foreigners. Again in the case of Vietnam, I found a preoccupation within ACSI with description of order of battle of units and I tried to explain in our first session that, since the Communist aggression was multi-dimensional and the combat forces wrestling on the surface were only part of that, that to chart the movements of combat units was only part of the game and yet this was the name of the game in the order of battle, among the order of battle people. Furthermore, to show too much identification with the past, the symbols for-the-Vietnamese-Vietcong-and-NVA-units, were the same as normal symbols for divisions and companies. And yet a VC"division"was a completely different commodity, no mistake about that. I felt that to impress on our people that this is a different commodity, you don't look on it like an ordinary division, you ought to have a different symbol. But moving mountains like that in one stand at the Pentagon is not always possible. I've mentioned the estimates on the nature of future combat which, under the aegis of ACSI, were taking place. There was an element that was attempting to determine what future combat should look like. And I said and say now that these were largely uninspired because they were projections of more of the same. Technological intelligence became a big stumbling block mainly because the technological intelligence was not under the
control of ACSI. What's the hell is the name of that, that big commodity command?

INTERVIEWER: Materiel Command.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Materiel Command. Materiel Command had technological intelligence as its job. This meant that items that were gathered in Vietnam, pieces of equipment and whatever went back to, didn't come back to ACSI. They came back there. Now, another problem was, was medical intelligence. Extremely important in Vietnam, cause you know among other things, one could detect infiltration groups by incidents of things like malaria that came down. And the preparation of American troops before they went had to be a function of medical intelligence. This was handled by the office of the surgeon general, not under ACSI. Well, these were some of the problems, but I don't think you are interested in all that minutia. You wanted to know about civil disturbance. You recall the facts that led up to the burning of Washington, the siege of the Pentagon -- what some people don't remember was the terror that all this struck into the hearts of the people that thought the empire was coming apart at the seams. I stood on the roof of the Pentagon when the place was under seige. It looked like a castle where the Huns had gathered around; as far as the eye could reach, there they were shaking their bony fists. There were American Nazi's. There were Communists. There were hippies. There were types that were there just to see what was happening, like at the first Battle of Bull Run. But I can assure you it was a sight to make you stop to think. And I was joined on the roof of the Pentagon by the Chief of Staff of the Army and then by Mr. McNamara who was the Minister of Defense-
Secretary of Defense -- As we looked at this great horde below us, waving their battering rams, so to speak, and getting ready, we thought, to take this place apart at the seams, Secretary of Defense turned to the Chief of Staff of the Army and said, "Johnny, what are we going to do about this?" Johnny said, "I'm damned if I know." He turned to me as ACSI and said, "Who are the ring leaders of this operation?" I said, "Well, from where I stand, it looks like that guy out there is one of them." "Don't you know?" "No, I have no idea." It wasn't part of my job. That confrontation of the Pentagon was one of the most shameful things in a sense because the troops who were lined up around the Pentagon had no orders -- no orders. I know this because I was in the command post. They stood there, took the insults, the spit, the people sticking flowers in the barrels of their guns and so on, their rifles. On one occasion, the people attacking the Pentagon broke through this line and got into the hall itself, into the E ring and were ejected, not too forcibly. Had it not been for the U.S. Marshals, the situation would have become a lot worse. The U.S. Marshals, with their cudgels, would tap somebody on the head who got too far out of line and drag him away, to the jeers of the multitude. But the military performed no function, really, other than a wall. There was no order to move people back to a line and then to ask or direct people to not cross the line. And it gave everybody a very bad feeling because you didn't know who was doing it or what extent they would go to or what their objectives were and it looked like a real bad, a bad scene. Well, as this phenomenon was repeated in other parts of the country, the natural requirements arose for getting information about people against whom
military forces might be -- might have to be turned out. It seemed only logical that, if you were going to send the 82nd Airborne Division somewhere, you should know why and against what. The Washington police had not only very little information but their organization for handling this kind of thing was pitiful; completely incompetent to handle this kind of phenomenon. We found that the FBI was overloaded in its caseloads and its balance of agents was wrong from an ethnic point of view. Consequently, there were areas where they could not operate. Well, it was, I guess the judgment of the office of the attorney general that the military should supplement and compliment the FBI and the police forces in maintaining order. So in due course the instructions were transmitted to me to organize a counterintelligence system which would provide information and warning, if possible, on civil disorders. I had a liaison officer from the FBI, a fellow named Pat Putnam. I first discussed this with Pat Putnam, indicating that military intelligence or counterintelligence types are not competent to determine subversion on the part of American citizens. We can do this in overseas areas against alien infiltration into the U.S. system. We've shown that we can handle that as in the case of Lodge Act, where we detected types of the Hungarian intelligence service that it infiltrated the U.S. Army through Lodge Act, but to separate a legitimate protestor, American protestor, from an American subversive when even the list of subversive organizations on the loyalty oath was not up to date nor were they about to bring it up to date. I'd requested this repeatedly that we excise the things that were no longer applicable, and indicate which are subversive organizations -- they wouldn't do that.
So I said, "It's not possible. I don't want this mission." Whereupon I received a letter, as I recall, signed by Mr. Christopher who was the assistant attorney general, which was presented to me I guess through channels, through the Secretary of the Army and through the Army General Counsel, directing that I go to work on this scheme. Well, you can say, yes, I should have gotten up and resigned. I should have said, "Here, you can take my commission and I'm not going to do any such damn thing," but I felt that my orders were clear and I went ahead and proceeded to organize, as best I could, a counterintelligence structure which could support the deployment of the Army in cases where it came to that. I'd seen Washington burning. I'd been out in the areas where looting was going on openly. I saw it. The police were not able to stop it or wouldn't stop it. And again the troops that had been deployed to Washington sat on their butts on the street corner because there was no order to do anything; to stop anybody; to shoot anybody; to impede anybody's progress. And from every point of view, it was an ineffectual effort. As an aside, I was also over in Anacostia where a great hurrah was going on, and I can say to you that my sympathies were there with the guys that were rioting. I've never seen a crummier area in which children were being brought up -- under the shadow practically of the capitol. The city planners or the city zoning had allowed things to go to seed to the degree that, had I been sentenced to live in that area, I'd have wanted to burn it down too. So the causes of these things were not the kind of thing that counterintelligence was going to stop. They were sociologically implanted and deep and complex. At the same time the specter of another Army being deployed,
sitting on its ass in the gutters, not knowing who was doing what to whom, was not acceptable either. These are the facts surrounding the formulation of the system and I then put the heat on people like Merle Kelley, whom you know, I think, an outstanding counterintelligence guy in every sense, to begin to get for me the shape of the subversive organizations in the United States. We ran into the SDS, the Weatherman, the Black Panthers, a whole row of types that were, had declared themselves against everything that the United States stood for. To me that looked a little like sedition but, not being a lawyer, of course, I couldn't tag it as that. We found that the SDS, the militant SDS, was beginning to establish communications networks throughout the United States to knit together the strength of the dissidents. Well, I've been accused of calling people together and saying, "We've got insurrection on our hands. Let's go to the counter insurgency textbooks." Well, I did pull out the counter insurgency textbooks because all of the indicators that we had gathered from other parts of the world, where you begin to plot the curves of what things are going to happen, some of these were beginning to appear and to have a credible matrix for trying to estimate the situation, I thought this kind of thing was applicable. I was misinterpreted by one young officer who had been a counterintelligence officer and had become a journalist thereafter and felt very little loyalty to the intelligence bit, as saying, we've got an insurrection on our hands. I didn't feel that the underground auxiliary growth in U.S. was by any means on the order that would cause insurrection in the country, but I wanted people to look at the mechanics of determining this sort of thing, if you will, the kind of estimate of the situation out-
line. This fellow's name was Crane incidentally. I think that he wrote in the Washington Weekly saying that I called people together and said, "Fellows, we got an insurgency on our hands here. Get out your insurgency manual." Well, a little truth is a dangerous thing. Well, this whole exercise resulted ultimately in the big civil disturbance headquarters in the basement of the Pentagon where they were really prepared for big things which, thank God, never came. Then the witch hunt began about who was spying on civilians. Well, I have the same reservations now that I had then about the military getting into this kind of thing. But I think the public as a whole would have been shocked to know how inadequate at that time, both the civilian police and the FBI were for internal security. The International Police Academy was in operation at that time. Incidentally, this has been discontinued and it would be interesting for you to find out why that has been discontinued, again, it is part of this pressure, it seems to me, to reduce anything that has to do with law and order, if it pinches anybody at all, you see. The International Police Academy provided, during these riots, the kind of command post set up that police and military needed to coordinate their effort. Taking a leaf from the notebook of Malaya where all their civil agencies and police got together and decided on courses of action. This the International Police Academy gave us, at my request. Well, that's enough of the that unless there's some specific question that you want to ask about that situation.

SIDE 2, TAPE 4

LTG YARBOROUGH: One of the persistent allocations on the part of Pak Chung Kuk at Panmunjom was that American soldiers were bums, rapists,
robbers, no-goods. He, on several occasions, presented materials that had come from our own press to corroborate his accusations, his statements.

I had noticed, as you all have, I'm sure, that Stars and Stripes, the soldier publication, military publication, trying to be representative of the American press, gave wide coverage to everything regardless of its impact on morale. It played up rapes and murders in the same way that any American newspaper would and it was from this soldier organ that Pak Chung Kuk was getting a lot of his material. Now, there was an anomaly there that I felt sooner or later I had to face because this kind of material was deleterious to the morale of the troops, for one thing. It was news, there's no question about that, but it was also... it was at cross-purposes with the kind of psychological combat that was going on in this area. So having, as I've mentioned to you earlier, worked with the Army Information School on training soldier newspaper editors, and having been imbued then with the official view that a soldier newspaper was supposed to build morale and cultivate a feeling of support for one's country and its ideals, that the Stars and Stripes was not performing this function. So I made a trip back to Japan to talk to the editors of Stars and Stripes, after I had been in contact with Pak Chung Kuk for a while and had his foot marks all over my rear-end. I was received in an extremely hostile way to begin with because the spector of an Army general coming back to tell a bunch of journalists how to run a newspaper just wasn't part of the American system. However, after I had talked to them for some time about the use that the enemy was making of that material and, quoting my good friend and a psychological warrior, Ruben Nathan, who said that
the press in explaining or rationalizing what they do frequently say, well, it's all true. He said, Pontius Pilot asked that question and never got an answer really, what is true. He said that out of 10,000 items that may come off the UPI, the AP presses everyday, to pick those things that show a country in a bad light, whether they're true or not, is really fixing the news in as bad a way as though one has actually pulled something out that might not stand scrutiny. And they seemed to agree that this was probably the case, that there was other news equally as valid that wouldn't have the same impact on the psychological combat that was going on and, to my surprise, agreed temporarily to kind of hold up on that kind of information. Well, it was very gratifying. However, I think even this news, that I'd come back there, got into the *Stars and Stripes* and the opposition tackled me on it at Panmunjom; used it to good advantage. And in due course the *Stars and Stripes* was right back in its old game again of -- officer shoots GI who is accosting his wife and things of that nature. The Armed Forces Radio Service in a similar way belted out a steady stream of materials that certainly didn't show our social system to best advantage. And the answer to any criticism was, well, this is what the GI's want. Even though the GI's were in a foreign land, presumably for the purpose of upholding a political strategy, implementing it and part of that strategy, an extremely important part of that strategy, was psychological. But they could not see fit to temper the AFRS Programs to show anything like the depth of American culture but catered to what they thought the GI taste was, which I question to this day. The same things happened with the TV. Across the board entertainment, no matter
how it showed the crime situation in the country or the deterioration of values, all of which are fair game to the playwright and the journalist who seek sensationalism and is articulate in putting it across, ran contrary to what I thought the theatre there, the nature of the confrontation demanded. But what is the answer on Stars and Stripes? I feel very strongly that a soldier in a foreign land needs news. If the great American system wants to provide him with the New York Times, The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune, well and good. Let the agencies that demand press freedom and freedom of expression deliver these things to their citizens in far lands. But any newspaper that is put out by the United States Army, whose job it is to field motivated, patriotic, steadfast and loyal troops, the organs that they produce ought to reflect that. And if they don't have the skill to put this material across so that a GI will read it, then the kind of management that can muster that sort of skill ought to take over. I found a real thirst for the kind of inspiration that would give a soldier the feeling in his heart that he was in a trench in Korea, in the snow and the mud, for a damn good reason. And I didn't find that in Stars and Stripes, then or ever. I've talked to the editor of Stars and Stripes subsequently. A very fine individual who was between the two fires of the tradition of the American press and the traditions of the U.S. Army in the field and trying to steer middle course with no real help from the high command who didn't want in any way to get mixed up in anything like what could come out of accusations that they were inhibiting freedom of the press. So again it's another indication of how little value we really place on psychology even though the greatest soldiers of
all times have said that the morale, moral is to the physical as 3 to 1. We seem to reject it by action -- accept it by word but reject it by action.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, I thought now that we might identify these papers because they may be things that you want to talk about later or the name themselves indicate something that might be of value, I don’t know. The first one is called Limited Wars, Strategic Concept. It’s a lecture that I gave to the National Defense College in Ontario, Kingston, Ontario, in 1972; because it has a bearing on the, my feelings about the Vietnam confrontation. The next one is called, If We Really Want a Volunteer Army, I don’t know whether you’ve seen this or not.

INTERVIEWER: I have not.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, I have in addition to that some of the comments that came back from people who rejected, for a variety of reasons, and in rejecting it you can see the diverse nature of the corps of officers which means there are many points of view on what constitute morale and there is no uniformity in our approach. I don’t know whether this is a strength or weakness. In some of the older countries of the world, there’s sort of a genuine overall feeling about what the corps of officers ought to constitute. We’re a heterogenous country. We come from many backgrounds and many sources and our views on this reflect that. Here’s a letter from Secretary Callaway on that Volunteer Army. Here’s a letter to General Westmoreland about the Modern Volunteer Army that relates to that paper. Here’s one from Willard Pearson who had read that Volunteer Army. I’m referring especially to this because I feel so deeply and so strongly that if we get the
intangibles in shape in the Army, we can address all kinds of problems
with a flexibility and the capability to react that will make these
things feasible. Whereas we can't foresee all of the problems, we can
see the kind of instrument that is going to have to react to those things
and I think it's bound up to some degree in the things I've mentioned
here. This is my letter to Secretary Callaway in reply to a report that
he sent to me, as he sent to a number of retired general officers, I guess,
on the progress that the Modern Volunteer Army had made. And my answer
to him was to send him my paper and say that I think maybe there are
some things that perhaps were overlooked and I want to bring them to your
idea. This one is the paper that I indicated showing the reactions of
some of the people in the USARPAC area to my paper, and I'll put the two
together. This one is from Rod Paschall in Cambodia that refers to the
FARSEA study that I indicated to you and if you can get a hold of that,
the critique of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper is in the back part of
that. It is the last element in it where I take the JCS paper item by
item to show how, in connection with irregular warfare, it is, it needs
to be redone, you see. Here's an interesting paper, well, it's interesting
to me because it describes an action along the DMZ while I was Corps Com-
mander. To show you that shooting is still going on up there, quite a
lot of it, and how it is handled and the nature of the exercise. Here's
one that I did for a research agency indicating considerations bearing
upon national control of unconventional warfare mechanisms where I point
out the intracacies of handling of UW units and the command relationships
that I think ought to be brought to bear and, this is a fall-out from
my Cambodian paper. It is a sterilized view of what I indicated there as an organizational and functional concept.

INTERVIEWER: That relates back to... you talked to that point yesterday, I believe.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, yes.

INTERVIEWER: It shouldn't be under Corps and that sort of thing.

LTG YARBOROUGH: This is one that has to do with the use of Special Forces in psychological operations in Vietnam and other places. Their role in psychological in the conduct of psychological operations. Here is one, "The Republic of Korea in the International Situation," in which... I wrote this for Korean publication. But it gives my views on the nature of the Communist threat there, the activities of Kim II Sung and the propaganda attacks; our stake in the whole thing. It's, I think, still germane. Here's another one: Unconventional Warfare -- the Psychological Role of Special Forces. Here's one, Special Forces Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia. Here's one that I delivered to the protestant men of the chapel at the Eighth U.S. Army that has to do with the media, with morals and morality, and things that are germane to soldiers in foreign lands. Here is one which is a precursor to the conference that we held in USARPAC with Pissoni and Dr. Cramer and others to try to develop a Far East strategy which we would then ask the military to consider. These were political experts, civilian type, who I thought perhaps could give some guidance to the military. Here's a lecture that I delivered to the International Association of Insurance Counsel in Greenbrier on "The Shifting Balance of Military Power". And here is the outline of the
paper to examine the—well, I don't think I'll give that one to you. Now here is the raw material on the start of a book that, during my spare time in Korea, I began to put together. It gives some information that I haven't given you thus far. Some of it in here you'll recognize, but it may be of interest to you; and I would like to have all of these back.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Finally, I got this translation from Agonie de L'Indochine, you know. I put a great stock on what Andre Navarre said. I don't know whether you've read his book or not. I don't know if there's an English translation or not. It followed the course of the French Armies in Indochina in a way that if you changed the titles and the dates and everything, well you might think they were yanks, you know; the lack of political guidance; the ambivalence of the political directions; the heavy organization of the troops; the inordinate numbers of people that were placed on security duties to guard everything, to keep it from being blown up; and this piece here, which I think you will be interested in, about the press. He said, "The press has been allowed to adopt deplorable practices. The benevolence accorded the press by Marshal de L'attre is well known. But this benevolence did not exclude strictness when it was appropriate. Unfortunately, when Marshal de L'attre de Tassigny departed, a certain number of those who purported to be his followers wished the benevolence to continue but without the strictness. Also a certain number of journalists, who said of themselves quite openly to be capable of 'making or breaking generals', operated, as a means of securing for themselves both facilities and information, a kind of extortion racket into which fell
certain figures in authority who were overly concerned with their personal image. We had inherited, moreover, a group -- certainly not the best element -- of American press correspondents who had followed operations in Korea, and which the end of the war put in want of copy. They had brought to Indochina American practices but without believing themselves bound to respect our regulations which were of the same type known to be imposed on them by the U.S. Command in Korea. The result was, the existence in Indochina of a large number of journalists who, except for some rare and thus all the more estimable exceptions, were interested only in superficial matters, not in depth, above all preoccupied with chasing sensationalism, without regard whether it be true or false. Certain members of this group exposed themselves for what they were, unfortunately, by their lack of professional conscience and a lack of sense of responsibility.

With almost all of this group completely ignorant of military matters, they pretended to the title of "war correspondent", above all for the material advantages which it carried; press camp, free air transport, access to military environment, etc., but understanding nothing of the duties of this function, war correspondent, they sought only to avoid hampering restrictions. They considered that the military command owed them information but felt no commitment obligation to observe a certain discipline and discretion. They believed themselves to enjoy the right of knowing everything and to say everything without being willing to take into consideration the impact of what they divulged on the morale of our country, on the Army, or on the information of benefit available to the enemy. Their dispatches and articles contain, fortunately, most often
such a quantity of inaccuracies born of their imagination or ignorance, that the truth was difficult to perceive. But G-2 types are trained to distinguish wheat from chaff and the G-2 types of the Vietminh certainly were able to do this readily because -- and we know from sure sources that this was true -- the Vietminh considered press representatives in Indochina to be valuable informants. As an example of this, I cite the following which happened some time after I took command. A very secret French-Vietnamese meeting (attended only by his majesty, Bao Dai, Monsieur Dejean, myself and five or six ministers, general officers and high government officials took place. The agenda and the discussions had been held absolutely secret. After the meeting terminated, two press cables were sent by correspondents of two newspapers. They, the cables, gave an account of what transpired in these meetings which had no basis in truth, but rather was the product of the imagination of the authors and, certainly, of an "explosive" character. Further, the inquiry into this leak established that they, the cables, had been filed in order to gain time, at least a half an hour after the meeting had begun and all doors closed. The cables were stopped but I was not able to assign any penalties against the offending journalists."

INTERVIEWER: What was the date on it?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, this was right after Navarre took over from De Lattre de Tassigny. I would say, when, 1954. Something like that. But you could change, you know, change the names and places. . .

INTERVIEWER: And add to that not only the problems of the individual correspondent and there were a few good ones. Some of the reports later
on that came out of my Province, for instance, was in *Newsweek* and this sort of thing and I found that the releases were all right, but the editorializing by *Newsweek* staff back here...completely emasculated.

**INTERVIEWER:** Well, George Jacobson, George was going to relieve me because of an article in *Newsweek*.

**LTG YARBOROUGH:** Oh, boy! Well, I did have one other that I was going to give you but where the hell it is. I'll find it next time. It was an address I gave to the 86th or 96th Division about the Vietnam War and the methods of fighting and the characteristics of their combat. This was in 1967 which I would change not a word of it, you see, today. I'll get it for you if you want it.

**INTERVIEWER:** Yes, sir. We'd like to have it. Now, sir, you told us you want these back. We understand that. Would you object to us establishing a file of yours and making copies of these up there at the War College as back-up to this material?

**LTG YARBOROUGH:** No, none whatever. I'd just wish the War College had had that system in effect before Boston. I'd much rather have sent them there but both West Point and the War College was pretty damn late in getting these things in shape, you know. In the meantime, I'd thrown out masses of stuff and I was just delighted to have someplace to empty out my bottom drawer.

**INTERVIEWER:** Colonel Agnew is doing a real fine job.

**LTG YARBOROUGH:** Yes.

**INTERVIEWER:** OK.
LTC HOUSER: I thought we'd begin today going back to a subject which you had mentioned earlier after you did tape number three where you spoke of special forces involvement in Cuba, and you mentioned the U.W. involvement in Cuba, and you mentioned the Bay of Pigs operation as something you'd like to come back to and make some more comments on, and if we could I'd like to do that at this time.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, when I took command of the Special Warfare Center in early 1961 there were already some members of the Special Forces who were absent. They had departed for Guatemala prior to the time I arrived and their records apparently were taken with them. This phenomenon came to my attention in a roundabout way as a result of inquiries on the part of families of some of these men as to where they were and I think one or two came back injured or wounded, and it raised a question to my mind as to by what authority were these people from my organization absent and where were they and what were they doing. I didn't know they were in Guatemala when I began the inquiries. By putting pressure on DCSOPS in the Pentagon I learned that in Guatemala they were in fact there and because of the personnel implications and the fact that they were really still on my books, I demanded that I be allowed to go down to see what they were doing. I was on the verge of leaving for Guatemala with a "black" passport which was being arranged,
when the Bay of Pigs operation took place. I was in the Pentagon when
the thing broke. I was in the Office of DCSOPS when the great, oh, if
you will, argument arose as to whether the operation which appeared to
be headed for a disastrous conclusion was going to be bolstered by air
support, whether the Navy was going to get in and retrieve what had happened
or what. I was there when the decision was made not to do anything
about it. Well, I came back to Fort Bragg and in due course individuals
who had been assigned to the training mission in Guatemala began to
come back to the Special Warfare Center, whereupon I instructed that
they be debriefed and that their personal experiences be kept in
our files for purposes of training and historic reasons and whatever.
It soon became very clear to me that the Special Forces had been very
badly misused. Their main gripe was about the civilian chain of command
which was not clued in as far as training practices were concerned but had
mechanical problems such as trying to find the guy who had the key to the
arms locker when they wanted to get out the weapons for training. All
of their talents and all of their skills which lay predominantly in the
unconventional warfare area were being used for conventional instruction
in conventional weapons under civilian types who didn't know either
tactics or weaponry or anything really about the essence of the arms
game. There were other problems as well that surfaced through the
Special Forces debriefing program. One was the incredible infiltration
of the expeditionary forces by agents of Castro. One would have thought
that an intelligence organization conducting an "Action" operation
would certainly have an active counterintelligence program. Well,
this was not the case. As information reached me just prior to the
action—Castro's agents were discovered among some of the expeditionary forces and then because the counterintelligence program was heavy-handed, and inexpert a lot of friend and foe alike were placed in the clink. In other words, a lot of innocent people along with guys that were really suspect were put in detention camps or they were put under guard and taken out of the combat stream. So I had been all along convinced that the close tie in of the central intelligence agency was absolutely essential for unconventional warfare purposes. I think I've explained elsewhere that undergrads and auxillaries must rise to meet Green Beret trainers. (In other words the underground producing the guerrilla and the Green Berets coming in thereafter to train the guerrillas). . . There are strong intelligence overtones which lead directly to the Central Intelligence Agency because the Armed Forces are not allowed to (by charter, I guess, it's by law) to engage in clandestine or covert contacts with underground agencies in a foreign country. I've said that in a very roundabout and very clumsy way but for unconventional warfare the close coordination and contact with the Central Intelligence Agency in the military forces is essential and the Guatemala experience showed that there was a tremendous amount to be done along this line if we were ever going to hack it because that was a fairly simple operation from an intelligence point of view. Others could have been much more complex. So using the materials that had come back to me first hand from the people that had been involved I made a series of presentations from the platform at Fort Bragg showing that we had a long way to go if we were talking UW. We were whistling Dixie until we got a lot of these things straightened
out. I must have talked to four of five different classes until finally
the agency sent a couple of people down to beg me to cut it out and to
get off their back. They admitted that they could have done wrong but there was
no use rubbing their noses in it. Well, I wasn't doing it from punitive point
of view; I was doing it actually from an instructional point of view to
see whether or not we couldn't make things better. Well, we never did
really make things all that much better and to this very day I would
stake whatever shreds of reputation I have on the fact that a UW action
on a part of this country is highly unlikely in the light of the continued
lack of real rapport between the agency and the special warfare forces of
the country. Well, that's about it.

LTC Houser: Well, sir, to turn to Korea now. I know that you took
command of the I Corps in Korea in, I believe, July of '68 and stay until
August of '69. I wish you would give us your observations on the Corps,
status of the Corps and what you did about it.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, as you know, the Corps there was unique. It was
actually a Corps Group or was a Corps Group. The only Corps Group I
guess, on anybody's books anywhere. Totaled about almost 100,000 men
and it was predominantly Korean. The Korea staff was separate from the
American staff which in itself was a weakness. Certainly one that we
found out in Vietnam to have the Vietnamese staff operating separately.
Although we had a lot of coordination and activities, we were very close
and cordial, that is the Korean Corps commander of VI ROK Corps and myself. (That
goes for both of them that were there when I was there.) It was, I think, perhaps
too large to really fit the classical definition of a corps. Prior to

the time I went over there, I searched through the Army archives to

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find out what data we had on corps and I found that it was damn little. There wasn't anything really there that described the functions of a corps in a way that a new corps commander would gain anything from it. The history of the corps, of course, intrigued me and this was of French origin. I didn't find it in our regulations, but I found it elsewhere. The idea of the corps revolved around having a kind of a mobile malleable task force that could be freed to a great degree from logistic responsibilities and could operate with efficiency in a tactical sense. The size of the corps depended on the terrain, the situation, the capability of the commander to exercise control and was variable. The Corps Group in Korea was a pretty heavy operation, let's put it that way. The defensive situation in Korea well known to everybody that's been over there contemplated defense in place, along the demilitarized zone, and if the enemy made a penetration, to throw him back to the line of contact. One of the things that struck me was that there was some very defensible terrain and good tactical terrain inside the enemy's area. In other words, where the DMZ was placed had nothing to do with tactical good sense. It was a political line and consequently it seemed to me that a smart counter-attack policy would have involved launching some kind of an offensive to seize those elements of terrain that would have made the enemies further advance very costly and this would mean even a tactical offensive in an overall defensive situation. We worked this out on a couple of command post exercises and it seemed very feasible and very logical. Well, before I talk about tactics and strategy through further, let me say that the state of discipline of the US part of that command in which we had two divisions; of course, the 2d Division and the 7th. (The 1st Cavalry
Division when I first arrived over there was replaced by the 2d Division.)
The colors of course changed over night and the individuals wondered who struck John, where did the 1st Cav Division go? But being born in the army and raised in it, I recognized that whereas we stand up and talk about loyalty to units and we break our backs to try to make a man proud to be in a certain outfit, we have repeatedly, historically pulled the outfit right out from under individuals and given them a new name and a new number and expected that this would hold. Well, we did that in the--in Korea. But the 2d Division was on the line in the US defensive sector, and my first inspections of the defensive system made me extremely unhappy. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the discipline of the troops was poor. Absolutely, well very poor, let's put it that way. The appearance of the soldiers in the front line was not nearly as good as--as the troops were at Anzio under constant attack. The conditions of the equipment were universally--almost universally, poor. Men would go on patrols and not clean up after they came back. Wire that should have been repaired was often left for days or weeks without being put into shape. The outposts inside the demilitarized zone which were supposed to be the listening posts and the forward intelligence acquisition elements of our line were manned by people who didn't even know what outfit was opposite them. All fortifications were fully visible from the enemy's side, weapons emplacement of automatic weapons and other weapons. . .amateurish, not reflecting anything really professional of the kind that one would think would mark our presence in a contested area. So I felt that I had a tremendous job to do. To try to buck up the 2d Division. The 7th Division was--seemed to be a
little better. Of course, the 7th Division was not on the line but it rotated a battalion unto the line I believe. But it, too, needed an awful lot of work. Now, the problem wasn’t so much with the forces there in Korea as it was with the whole production and training and indoctrination system that provided people to the Korea scene. There was evidence in the barracks, in the mess halls, in the American installations that the rot was of long standing. I have never seen poorer accommodations for troops, more dingy, rundown, uninspiring, drab, and in some cases, even unsanitary, conditions for American troops to live in and this was many, many years after the war had stopped. I could only surmise that the commanders who had allowed this to happen had considered their tour over there to be one of short duration, a hardship tour that they would do and then get out and then the next guy could handle it. This is a very uncharitable way to look at it but I couldn’t figure out any other explanation for the complete deterioration in the way that I found it. Another phenomenon when I set about to try to clean things up and straighten things out, I found again this artificial American yardstick of money which stood in the way. We don’t have money for maintenance; we don’t have money for clearing things up. Now when I asked about troop labor, I was told that it was not possible. It was against Army regulations to use troop labor even to rebuild the parts of the barracks that had fallen in or to reinstall wash basins, toilets, things that the troops needed. Incredible to me. Well, I was approached by a member of President Park Chung Hee’s personal staff. A brigadier whom I had known when I’d been on the Armistice Commission, and he was a close friend and could speak to me frankly. As a matter of fact some of
the things he shared with me about the inter-workings of the Blue House
could have had him removed from his position and very severely disciplined
but as I said we're on a very cordial basis and therefore he transmitted
to me the President's deep concern about the discipline area and profes-
sional posture of the 2d Infantry Division. Saying that President Park /
Chung Hee was looking for some easy way or some practical way to have
this division removed from the line and to allow the Korean forces to
take over. Because the--as you recall, the commando attack which almost
reached the Blue House and which had as its mission the assassination of
Park Chung Hee came through the 2d Division area through the wire there.
Well, I convinced this general officer that I was as concerned about the
situation as he was and that I would do everything within my power to
tighten it up and to straighten it up and to get it to shape up because
the basic material was good. It was just a question of the leadership
and I thought I could get on to that and sort it out. To this end I
made numerous tough inspections of the front line and I would follow each
one with a detailed letter to the commander pointing out the things that
were wrong and what I thought might be done to straighten them out. Well,
one year is not really enough time to remake a situation and I'm not
saying that my impact was all that great, but things became a little
better. We redid the fortifications inside the DMZ and tightened them
down, and well, this is a very delicate subject to talk about as you
know. I don't--for me to indict my fellow officers and brother officers
for dereliction of duty or for not sorting out the element of the army
in contact with the enemy. This would make it appear that I would have
done a hell of a lot better job if I'd been in that situation. I don't
know all of the problems that preceded my arrival there about the paucity of funds, the fact that Korea was on the "hind" seat," that everybody had forgotten about it. I'd turned that over in my mind so many times but when I came back to reality I could see an American force in the field that I would not have banked on in combat. Not that they were yellow or not that they were craven in any way but they were not professional in any sense of the word with few exceptions. And this was evident in the fortifications, in the command posts and the appearance of the troops and the whole thing. Either that was the case or over my 35 years of service I'd gotten a completely different and aberrated view as to what a front line unit ought to look like. The command post of the Corps which I inherited was one of the--was the antithesis of the mobile kind of command post that one would connect with the corps, with a maneuvering corps. Heavy, turgid, makeshift, huge steel vans which loomed wherever they were put. Impossible to hide and in such a state of repair that one would take a hold of the iron door and the handle would come off. Air conditioned and heated on the inside with devices that raised such a roar that you couldn't talk. The communications system of the Corps so heavy and ponderous that the communicators unusually went out a day or two in advance before the Corps moved. The tie-in with the Korean elements, that is the tie-in between the I Corps Group and the Korean VI Corps. . . Inadequate really for close coordination in combat. I felt that the corps headquarters (that one and I don't know about the others at this point) but I felt that there needed to be a house-cleaning and the equipment needed to be made streamlined, modern. This business of every command post being a
makeshift kind of an affair with somebody cutting out templates out of colored paper and arrows out of materials at hand; it just didn't seem adequate to me, nor was the training of the corps personnel. This--that is the command post personnel. That extends everywhere or spans the gap from the draftsman to the types that were supposed to plot and plan movements--troop movements. I'm getting a lot of this off my chest because I was extremely concerned the whole time I commanded that corps that if it ever came to a showdown, there would be a chaotic situation that could be solved only after mass reliefs were made and maybe a lot of people killed. Our strategy over there had nuclear overtones to it and in the big exercises we played nuclears. Here it became evident to me that the road nets which were required to support this Corps in action were extremely vulnerable to nuclear--enemy nuclear attack or enemy interruption from by other means and that the framework and the mechanisms for keeping a road net viable, the vast military police structure that we had finally developed at long last in Europe after all kinds of heartaches, things that could keep columns moving under adverse circumstances reroute when disaster struck in one area and moved something to another area and still keep the tactical pattern intact. These things did not exist in Korea and although the name of the game over there since the end of the war had been war gaming and plotting and planning so that efficiency could result in a--from a new--new exercise of military force. It just didn't happen. I say this in full knowledge that the road nets which were essential to tactical movement had still not been completed in my time. I'm talking about even some of the road nets that came
out of the posts camps and stations we had over there. One would get just outside the post camp and station and find the road net inadequate to take the heavy traffic that would result if an actual operation arose. So I think what Korea needed was a couple of American Von Steuben’s with a lot of power to come over there like General Ridgway did and kick asses and take names and move things and move commanders and streamline and then go back to the Army War College and the Infantry School and the Artillery School and the Officer Candidate School and Fort Leavenworth and ask them what in the hell they were doing to provide both the soldiers and the leaders in an environment like that. I know that subsequent commanders over there did a lot to sort things out. I had the highest praise for General Michaelis because he’s always been sort of an iconoclast. A guy who moves things around and he did over there. After I was in Honolulu as the chief of staff of the US Army Pacific I was in contact with him and I made a couple of trips over there and I was astounded to see what a change had come across the face of Korea. My belief is that maybe it was because Michaelis was a combat man himself. That he knew what the earmarks of soldiers were. He was not of the administrative nature of some of his predecessors. Now, of course, everything I’ve said now can be pulled apart in specifics. One can say, “Yes, but this was first class or you’re talking about commanders and yet this guy was tremendous in his own way.” Well, true, but this is one man’s assessment of the situation.

LTC HOUSER: Did you get the corps headquarters down in strength and streamline in modernized equipment, sir?

LTC YARBOROUGH: I got the procedures down to some degree and put
some realism into the corps structure. We had nightly critique in the field of what was wrong with the communication system, what was wrong with the liaison structure, the artillery coordination and planning, the coordination with the ROK units, the after-strike reconnaissance of the Air Force. We went into each of these things in greatest detail and I published a critique sheet after everyone of these. As far as changing the equipment was concerned, it just wasn't possible at that point. In any--in a one year stand. Get rid of the bloody vans and get rid of the miles and miles and miles of heavy, heavy cable that often carried inconsequential crap that had nothing to do with the exercise of command and maneuver. We did institute an exercise which was designed to stop periodically and look at what had happened to see what would be the logical results of continuing the actions and the orders that had been taken under stress. My assessment of the defensive situation north of the Imjin River indicated to me that a surprise attack coming down the road from the KAESON could catch us flat-footed. Key pieces of terrain were not defended nor were there any plans to defend them. The crossings over the river which were well known to the enemy, that is the fiords and the, of course, I've felt that the bridges would go out immediately and our troops trying to withdraw unless they knew where the fiords were or unless it was in the middle of winter when the thing was frozen, would be caught on the other side. So in one of these scenarios we played this with the bridges going out. Our people were forced to use the fiords and had they been smart enough in the tactical sense to take up the defensive terrain that protected the crossings, they could have withdrawn under pressure but
probably would have made it. But failing to do these things then, instead of letting the maneuver go until its end, we stopped, like stopping a film, and talked it over on the ground and pointed it out here and there and then took the next step for the operation. Here it was that I discovered that incredibly no terrain analysis had been made of the American sector in Korea (even with the war over that long). To the point where there were "going" maps for armor and you know what I mean, where the places that armor couldn't go were "X'ed from the maps. And oh, actually there were two or three conditions that should have been in the books for the geometry of tactical maneuver. In the dead of winter most of the areas could be traversed, one didn't have to stick to the roads, in the flood season only the high crowns of the roads were available, and then in the temperate weather zone there were other areas that could be traversed. It seemed to me that this was the first essential for configuring a defensive posture. Well, this hadn't been done. Necessary both for tank delaying positions, for in placement of antitank weapons, or in placement of mines, for delaying positions of infantry. When I made a strong point of it, I was told that a civilian contract would be launched to make a terrain study. I said, "For Christ's sake, what has happened to the Corps of Engineers that we no longer know how?". Every officer is supposed to be able to do that you see. Well, we later before I left there went into a strong fortification program building Maginot Line type fortifications. A whole series of forts. I remember being present some years earlier when Ham Howze was over there and the Korea high command wanted at that time to fortify. Howze's view was that mobile defense was the thing. That
if you sat in a fortification you were going to be vulnerable and it wasn't the way to do it. Well, the Korean's view was that because Seoul was so close to the DMZ they didn't have ground to trade and therefore they wanted to fortify even knowing that fortifications are vulnerable. My feeling was that a fortification can be a dynamic thing if the plans aren't to sit inside the fort the whole time but to have counterattacking forces that can in fact engage the enemy that are tied down by the fortifications. But fortifications themselves have to be fitted so neatly into the ground. I'm thinking now of the line of forts between Italy and France in the Maritime Alps where everything on the ground is covered by something. Well, in any case, we finally went into the fortification program and found then that the forts that had been finished were under nobody's surveillance and consequently they would get overgrown or they would be vandalized. It was necessary when an overall fortification program is developed in country to have something for the maintenance of it and continued viability of it. The forts needed to be occupied regularly. The vandalism in our area was cured by my going to the governors of the provinces and pointing out to them that anybody that would steal wire or equipment from the fortifications was working, in fact, for Kim Il Sung. It was no longer just a "slicky" operation but it was now subversive and this resulted in stopping of vandalism. Well, again let me get back to my view on this disciplinary business over there. I felt that everything was tawdry. The abandonment of the ceremonial formations I felt that to bring the flag down in the evening in a foreign land to the sound of a band, to have an evening parade on a Sunday, to have band concerts in the
villages, to require soldiers to be dressed up when they go to town is part of the price you pay for being in an occupation role in a foreign country. When our garrisons become so seedy that men live in fatigue clothes around the clock, there's never anything inspirational. The officers messes are feeding places where there's no onus put on an individual who goes out and sleeps in the village with a Korean whore. Then your whole structure begins to go down hill and it reflects itself into the chain of command and into your professionalism. The lieutenant loses respect for the captain, the major, the colonel and so on all the way up. There's a very deep rationale, why the British used to dress for dinner in the tropics. We used to laugh about that, you know, in our younger years thinking that this was stupid. Why should a man in the middle of the Congo put on his mess jacket and his medals to go to dinner? Well, the environment of an officers mess and all of the military heraldry that's been built up since Caesar's time has a very good reason which the part-time soldier doesn't understand. The naive young fellow that thinks it's Mickey Mouse doesn't realize that building a standard keeps people in a framework where departure from the norm is noticed by one's peers and there is pressure to remain adequate in all senses. This was not the case in Korea at all. I mentioned the fact that there was a Post Exchange system over there that was very good but the chapels were lousy. Yet a man had a lot of time over there to go to chapel. During the religious periods when in Europe, for instance, they have music festivals that mark the start of the Christmas session. It was not an adequate place to have them there. Well, we did something about that and the troops were grateful. It was
looked upon by them with great favor that the commanders put emphasis in this direction. Nobody felt pressed or put upon as a result of it.

But again—as I've mentioned many times the intangibles of a soldier's life in a foreign land were put to one side in favor of the visible and tangible things. All of the Korean lessons learned. Now one would have thought that the Korean War, the lessons of the Korean War would be very high on the agenda for new officers coming over there. That one would walk over the land and look at where it happened and discussed why it happened and talk those things over. There is no real program for doing that. I tried to institute something along that line but it wasn't, it wasn't the norm for the theater and I felt perhaps it should have been.

LTC HOUSER: You mean in a form of a published book or something like?

LTG YARBOROUGH: No, that when people came—arrived in the theater there should have been an indoctrination program especially for the junior leaders on what the Korean War was all about, where the combat action took place, what the tactical programs were developed were, and where we took a shellacking and where we predominanted and why. Because it was—there was living history all over the place but it just wasn't used in a proper way—in the right way. Well, what do we want to talk about now. I've shellacked Korea considerably and because I found that I should but there are a tremendous number of good things over there to which somebody else can talk about.

LTC HOUSER: Did you get all the points on your notes, sir?

LTC YARBOROUGH: I think most of them on Korea.

LTC HOUSER: Alright then you might shift to the Pueblo a little bit,
then. Some of the very basics. I know that before you arrived, 23 January the Pueblo occurred, 25 January we did call up about 28 air units, total about 14,000--air force personnel and some navy personnel, no army. Supposedly they did send over some more devices for tightening up the DMZ, electronic or technical type devices that you could add to what you already had. I suppose about 8 February there was about 100 million dollars in increased military assistance funds that were granted for Korea. But I never could see indications, other than a lot of negotiations going on, trying to get it back. I didn’t see any indications of where we were taking a look at our plans. Do we have any plans? I know that you developed a series of OPLANs, 5020 series, that deal with various contingencies in Korea, but I didn’t know if there were any type plans that existed to take care of situations like that and what we did about that?

LTG YARBOROUGH: I don’t think there was a contingency plan for that particular thing. If there was, I didn’t know anything about it. Of course, I wasn’t in Korea when the Pueblo was taken. I was back in--as an Assistant DCSOPS. But I had been at Panmunjom when our EC-121 was shot down and I negotiated on that and got no where as reams and reams and reams of material will show you and this was outside the--it was over a--flying over international waters. I also negotiated the return of a body of one Korean pilot that was shot down inside the DMZ--as I indicated to you previously and I had ample experience both directly and vicariously through the files to know that the reaction of the North Koreans toward negotiating of anything was not going to change. Their
view on negotiation was that you give up. There's no give and take with the North Korean and to assume that they were going to do this after the Pueblo was taken to me was to misunderstand the nature of our contact with the North Koreans. I told the Chief of Staff of the Army that--of my views on this and as a matter of fact I put a lengthy memo in writing to him saying that these negotiations were going for months and months and months. They would be used to--for maximum propaganda advantage against the United States and that we should demand that all negotiations be in public because then the nature of their propaganda effort would become apparent. In private one would assume, the American press and the American people would assume, that maybe we're making headway with the other side, but I knew that this was not going to happen. At least all of my experience indicated that. Prior to this time however, when the Pueblo was first taken, I went to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Fluckey, who was a medal of honor man and proposed that we together work out a plan for retaking the Pueblo or sinking the Pueblo and retrieving our crew. I felt with a specially selected special forces team, introduced by helicopter and retrieved the same way to carriers or otherwise to South Korea. I'm not talking now completely now about the logistics of the thing because I'm not prepared to go into that detail at this point but it's--it appeared to me that there was a mechanical feasibility as far as time, space, factors are concerned and that the essence of the whole job would be to broadcast to the entire world so that there would be no mistake and no presumption of doubt that this was not
World War III. We were not after North Korea. We were only going to take back what belonged to us, and that the rest of the world had better stand clear because that's what we intended to do and our objective was limited, no doubt about it. This could have been done it seemed to me through all of the means of mass communication in addition to leaflets and turning loose the entire psychological operation system to make it quite clear that this was limited and to take what was ours. Fluckey agreed in principle because of the tremendous value of the Pueblo. My gosh, the stuff that was on it, of course was of such importance. If it were lost, grievous damage would be done to the United States intelligence and security, and therefore it merited extraordinary action. Well, I went to General Lemley, the DCSOPS of the Army, who gave a very--took a very dim view of the suggestion. I prefixed my proposal to him with a reference to the fact that history has recorded many cases where audacious actions have succeeded, and that the British had done many of these behind the lines in North Africa to try to seize Rommel. They'd gone into the Colossus affair in Italy there to blow out an aqueduct. They had gone after a vital radar system in Normandy. As ACSI I had worked on a super top secret assessment of some of the most sensitive missile control insulations in the Soviet Union with a view to seeing whether or not people could do better than bombs under circumstances which would merit their attention. To me this didn't seem anymore hair-brained than going after the Pueblo and yet those plans were on the books. I'd also--I pulled--turned back the clock to the days of the Congo when our people were being held in Stanleyville and there was a great
pressure to try to mount some kind of an operation that could get them out of there. At this time Ed Meyer, who commanded the 5th Special Forces Group and General Paul Adams and I—lying on our bellies on the floor out here at Fort Bragg and poring over the maps of the Congo, worked out a tentative plan for the use of S-61 Sykorski helicopters staging through Rwanda Burundi, dropping inflated rafts into the Congo, and retrieving these hostages, and picking them up by means that we felt were completely feasible. So in proposing this, for the Pueblo, it wasn’t just off the top of my head. Well, it was not the intention of the Army to go along with this scheme. Perhaps their judgments on the political situation stemmed from better sources than I had. But I returned to Korea while the Pueblo was still in North Korean hands—returned to take the corps command and had the unhappy misfortune to sit in my command post at Uijongbu and hear the voice of Commander Bucher coming from Pyongyang loud and clear telling all the soldiers, Americans who were listening, that the United States had been in the wrong, that the North Koreans had been correct in seizing the Pueblo, that he was sorry for what he did and vowed never to do it again. So the damage that was done due to our morale I think was quite great.

LTC HOUSER: You were commenting on the Mayaguez situation then. You started...

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, yea. I can comment on things best if I haven’t had any responsibility and therefore, you know, I can speak with impunity but the Mayaguez affair seems to me to have the earmarks of something that we in the professional military have got to look at very carefully, very closely. I believe the Press of the United States and the
means of mass communication have convinced Americans that fighting of any kind is bad, that war is a miserable thing that--that killing is--even though it appears justified is a bad thing. I think the reaction against our combat troops is something that is measurable.

I have seen our patrols in Korea engaged in fire fights with the North Korean infiltrators more preoccupied with the wounded that they received than with prosecuting the action which had to be pursued--more impressed with the flares and the noise and the sound of the guns than the development of a tactical plan. I can't imagine combat forces that are geared to professional actions leaving their dead behind under any circumstances.

I can't understand how a platoon leader doesn't know at the end of a combat action what has happened to everyone of his men. I'm at a loss to understand why the entire Defense Department had to wait several days after giving several accounts of the casualties and there's still a lack of clarity as to what occurred and what happened. This was against a minor enemy in a small location and I'm not happy--I'm not happy with the professional fallout. This is nothing to say against the valor of the guys that went in there. They're products of our system and there is absolutely nothing to say against the decision to do it which I applaud whole-heartedly. But I think if I were an Inspector General looking at that operation, I would ask the questions that I have just posed. One of the professionals that I had really felt deserved the name from any angle was Rommel. It's a matter of history that this guy was as popular on our side as he was on his side. One reason was he was a technician of the first order, he was a dispassionate soldier. Didn't get his feelings mixed into the conflict of the degree
where he hated you and if he caught you, you were going to really catch hell from him. But his book, *Infantry Attacks*, shows him as a young officer dedicated to the degree that sometimes he would go for three and four days without eating. He'd grab a handful of wheat as he went by a wheat field and chewed the wheat and everything that happened to his platoon or his company later was a matter of record in his notebook. When he dispatched Private Meyer around the right flank with an automatic rifle or grenade, he noted that, he drew a rough sketch map of the area of conflict, analyzed it from a tactical point of view and he was just a young officer. It seems to me that this kind of a goal is the thing that we seek, and to be preoccupied with the sights, the sounds, the noise is amateur.

**LTC HOUSER:** Alright sir. Well, we were going to talk a little about the modern volunteer army.

**LTC YARBROROUGH:** I've written a paper on it in which I've indicated that I felt some of the intangibles should be emphasized in a way that we were not always noted for doing. I feel regimental associations and affiliations become very strong morale factors. We're ambivalent about regimental associations and I would like to see the regiment come back. There isn't a "regimental colonel" or isn't anybody keeping the colors or keeping the traditions unless it's the Office of the Chief of Military History which is pretty damned sterile and impersonal. But we need the association that goes along with being part of an outfit that can provide a background for a man throughout
his career in the Service. It's possible. In earlier days our regiments were associated with various parts of the country. We abandoned that as a result of our feeling that we didn't want any one area to take all the casualties. But there were very strong ties and very strong pressures for outstanding performance among people who would have to account to each other and their home folks later on if they didn't do a really good job. But I've outlined this in some detail in my paper, but what I wanted to say here was the military credibility of the so-called "volunteer army" needs to be examined. The logic of it needs to be examined. It's all well and good for the Secretary of the Army to say we were given a challenge to provide a volunteer army, we made it. It is now necessary to explain to the American people under what circumstances would this army be able to go into what kind of action, and carry out what missions in behalf of the United States of America. It would have to be very extraordinary and unorthodox military action for which the standing forces that are in being now would be adequate in any sense, both from the point of view of replacement of combat losses and logistic support. I just can't visualize what that sort of contingency might be, for which this force, the modern volunteer force, would be adequate. On the other hand I can see every reason why in peacetime the bulk of the military--the bulk of the Army ought to be volunteer, but I believe the volunteers ought to be cadre men in every sense. I think everyone, that is with few exceptions, with some of the perhaps, specialist exceptions or administrative exceptions ought to be capable of assuming ranks or grades two or three times above what they have now. I
would think that a viable wartime or emergency situation would contemplate moving into the filler ranks, Reserves, National Guard or even citizens who would have the most outstanding leadership that any country has ever produced from the cadre, that is in fact the Regular Army. That would go everywhere from squad leaders right on up through the higher commanders. I say this from some experience in World War II where I had observed those soldiers who were citizens in fact confronted with combat for the first time not having listened too well during training in some instances or being a little fractious about being in the military but when confronted with a lethal situation, throwing themselves on the mercy of the old time sergeant or the corporal at that time and saying, "Sergeant, corporal, you just tell me what to do and I'll do it." And having feeling of great security through having professionals at the key leadership places. So, I know a little bit about strategy and about national organization but I wish somebody would explain to me what kind of role this volunteer army is supposed to play in the naughty world that we're part of here and how this volunteer army would perform its role if mobilization of the citizenry were necessary in order to confront a world conflagration. It's not clear to me and therefore the continued statements on the part of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Army that we've done fine; we've met our goal. It seems to me to the citizen, that we've got all of these bids covered and there's nothing to worry about because the Army has made its goal. There's a requirement to explain. Now, let's see what else were we going to talk about.

LTC HOUSER: You mentioned Guam, sir.
LTG YARBOROUGH: Yea, this is a little bit far field but in my job there in Honolulu we did a lot to look at the Trust Territories in Marianas and the various islands which now are becoming a fallback position for the United States as we've abandoned Okinawa to a great extent where our military--where our diplomatic offensives in the Philippines haven't produced what we want and we're coming back.

I made a number of trips to Guam to see development in an economic sense there going on around the clock. Japanese interests are in Guam. Some of the hotels in Guam are observed to be flying Japanese flag and on one occasion when I tried to get a reservation in Japanese hotel in Guam, American Guam, I found that this was not possible because it was all booked from Tokyo. All that to one side, there are vast amounts of that island that are used now for weapons storage of naval facilities, air facilities. Guam will assume more importance as time goes on. There will be pressures for abandoning of some of the military structure on Guam in order to make the economy of Guam viable. It would seem to me to be a smart thing and a good thing for the military to do now; to figure out those areas of the island which lend themselves to tourism; to try to readjust the map before it is done under duress; and to try and aid and abet the process which would result in making Guam as viable as possible so tax dollars wouldn't have to continue to go in to support it because there are thousands of acres being used ammunition storage and whatever in some of the finest parts of the island. I would say that the same thought should apply to the Trust Territories when our military bases begin to develop there; that the needs and the requirements of a
The military would get great credit for having the foresight to do that. I was going to talk a little bit about the esthetics again of the military profession because I believe so implicitly that "man does not live by bread alone" and the guy in uniform is an outstanding example of that. We've always had problems with quarters and the situation in Korea brought it to my mind most starkly because of the miserable hovels that our troops were living in over there. When confronted with the plans for building new barracks, I found that first, they were over-priced in a shocking way and secondly designed in the most myopic way. The barracks that were planned for easing the situation in Korea were more of the same and yet the cost of them was fantastic. I went to the trouble of cutting out of various architecture magazines dozens and dozens of models of prefab homes on the civilian market which could be made available for much, much less than the Army Corps of Engineers was paying or accepting bids on for the standard old barracks which has nothing to offer. So I put the heat on the Corps of Engineers through channels, through CINCPAC and USARPAC. My feeling was that places like the post at Uijongbu using the native type architecture which is designed for the country which could be bucked up with proper kitchens and proper bathrooms and for which native artisans would be available. It would be so much better than the 40-man barracks or whatever it is and the cost would be so much less. I felt that imagination in the use of military building money has been lacking. We have a tendency to line things up and dress them to the right and then turn in a fantastic bill for services. When our quarters building program began in Honolulu
after I was back on USARPAC staff, I again put the pressures on the Corps of Engineers to, I said, "Why don't the engineers (these very capable young designers) officers look for the kinds of designs that would gain them international or national prestige for developing the finest accommodations for the least money, showing the greatest imagination and especially in a place like Honolulu where you can use lanai and outdoor living even though it constrained on the numbers of square feet that one is given by regulation or by law. You can still with courtyards and open space, make the place eminently livable and aesthetically acceptable." I hope that there has been some progress along that line.

Now let's see, what the hell else do I have here. I turned in a long paper on that with the samples and the models of civilian type construction that would cost half as much, you know. I don't want you to get the idea that I think I'm the smartest son of a bitch in the Army. No, you see, because for all of the--for all of the things that I find wrong with others and with the system, they can pull me apart on plenty of ways to. But I guess when you get to be an old soldier you can speak more frankly and with impunity then we could previously. My great desire is not to hurt someone inordinately for no good reason. If I have done that anywhere along here, it would be a source of great pain to me. Furthermore, I don't even need the therapy at this point. I'm not angry at anybody, anymore, but if there's some way that I can add to the fund of knowledge. I'd love to hear something like this on the Civil War. I'd like to Grant take somebody apart. Or Hooker, or one of these guys you know, because there you know what the real scoop is. There you know what his hang-up is. That's more like it.

LTC HOUSE: Alright, that's fine sir. Alright.
INTERVIEW WITH LTG WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH (RET.)
by
LTC Houston P. Houser

INTERVIEWER: Well, sir, this is the 6th tape starting on the morning of the 22nd of May. We'll pick up where we left off in discussing Korea and go back to add a few more points there, if you'd like to.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, I am very interested in not giving an inaccurate view; not leaving to posterity an aberrated view of the situation in Korea while I was there. I mentioned discipline and a lack of professionalism and I want to make it quite clear that it wasn't just the fault of the troops in Korea. They were products of a system, a training system. They inherited a lot of deficiencies that had built up over a long period of time and some of the things that happened were understandable, especially in the light of the history of development of American troops. We are all aware of the problems we had in the beginning of the Korean War where for reasons that are still not satisfactorily explained, our military posture in the Far East was flacid. Our divisions were divisions in name only. They were not trained, not motivated and the first part of the Korean War was a disaster for the United States Army. The history of our troops getting up and leaving their positions, taking off and abandoning their equipment, does us no real credit. And in no case was it a reflection of the courage of our men. It was a reflection on the training of our men, the training of our officers and men. As always, we went into that or as I said too often we went into that operation apparently having forgotten the lessons of previous combat and paid in blood for relearning these
things. We saw in Korea the requirement for strong commanders during the Korean War. We saw an entire theatre degenerate to a morale and disciplinary level that required drastic action on the part of a commander, namely General Ridgway, who relieved people and who used the most direct and forceful methods to try to cure something that should have never have happened in the first place. I saw a parallel to this kind of thing also in Vietnam, and many of us saw that deterioration of chain of command, of discipline of morale, and consequently a fighting capability. So we Americans have lots in the history of our military posture in preparation to recognize as endemic deficiencies, and we've got to recognize that these things will happen if we don't lay hands on them. I wanted to state in more specific terms a few of the things that were wrong with the Corps posture in Korea. First, the Signal. The Corps Signal structure was inadequate to handle the tie-in with the Korean VI Corps. As I had mentioned, the Corps Group, (it was a Corps Group, you know, it wasn't just a corps) and therefore the ROK VI Corps had to be tied in very closely with operations, corps operations with the I Corps Group. The Corps Signal was not mechanically equipped to do this. That, in addition to the morale of the Corps Signal units which stemmed from very, very bad accommodations, living accommodations which had deteriorated over a long period of time under a number of commanders, reflected in combat efficiency and capability. The next thing was the Corps Engineers. Again, absolutely inadequate from an organizational point of view, to handle the vast road net that was supposed to support the life's blood for the operations of the Corps. The Corps itself supposedly being a fast moving tactical organization that could transfer
troops from one side to the Corps area to the other under combat conditions. I found that the engineers were inadequate even in peacetime to maintain the road nets for normal flow of traffic, especially during the inclement weather which dogs the Korean scene. This condition has been in being over a long period of time and was well-known to each commander that had come through the command or should have been well-known. Let's put it that way. Again, the military police, inadequate for handling the traffic control. I emphasize traffic control because under fast moving conditions of tactical execution, traffic control can be the determinant of success or failure, traffic control and maneuver ability of the road net or viability of the road net. Now from the tactical point of view, if one flew by helicopter over the front line areas in the American sector, you could see foxholes in placements that had been there for years. Some occupied; some not unoccupied. But a mishmash of excavations which added up to nothing in the way of a hard-headed coherent defensive system. By contrast, the ROK areas appeared to have been developed under the hands of people who knew a little more about field fortification or at least they applied the ordinary principles of field fortification. It has always been a tenent of the infantry in as far back as I can remember, that an infantryman improves his foxhole as long as he's in it. If he's in it for a year, it looks like he's been in it for a year because it becomes that much better. But I can insure you that the placements in the American sector of Korea reflected no credit on any engineering background that anybody might have had or certainly not on the infantry who occupied them and were a very flimsy defensive lay-out
indeed. Year after year, little camouflage or no camouflage, weapons not in place so that they could take full advantage of the terrain. In fact, no real terrain study made as I've indicated to you, except in some cases very locally and in a very constrained manner. The state of training, the discipline, the neglect of the physical plant, the conduct of the soldiers with the populous, and absolutely phenomenal VD rate. All should have told commanders something about the situation and there should have been a warning flag that maybe another "Pusan perimeter" could stem from that kind of a layout. Now, if I'm painting it in pretty stark terms, it's because that's the way I saw it at the time, for good or for bad. And it was that situation that I set about to try to improve. At this point, I'd like to mention a little something about the relationships with the Korean commanders which were pretty good as far as I was concerned. I respected the Korean commanders because they were hard-boiled, disciplined, and hardworking. One of my good friends, close friends, was General Lee Sae Ho, who commanded the VI Corps and later became the commander of the ROK Expeditionary Forces in Vietnam where I visited him a couple of times. General Lee Sae Ho had no sympathy with the North Koreans. He felt that diplomacy was not the way to get along with them. And when they fired on his positions, he normally fired back, usually with interest. On several occasions, I went out during the course of the fire fight to observe what was happening and to hear what General Lee Sae Ho's philosophy about how to handle the aggressors. In each instance, of course, I had to go back and report to General Bonesteel, the Commander in Chief, who in his position as the United Nations Commander, had to insist that military
operations be held to a minimum. Every time somebody else would fire, he was deathly afraid and worried that World War III was going to start and therefore his view was, don't fire. Hold it down. Very frequently I had to come back and tear a strip off General Lee Sae Ho at the behest of General Bonesteel. I would usually start off by saying, "General Lee, I'm going to give you hell for firing on outpost so and so last week, but after that we're going to go out and have a drink. Here's what I have to say about what you did there in violation or in violation of the spirit at least of the United Nations Commander's edicts and orders." I was out in General Lee Sae Ho's area one day when six infiltrators were caught by daylight inside his lines and I watched the fire-fight from one of the outposts, as each of these six was rounded up by a maneuvering element and killed one by one and dragged out like trussed hog layed out with great glee in front of me. And during this process, the DMZ was sealed off by fire from the guard post inside the DMZ. To me it was a beautiful operation. The guys were obviously caught with their hands in the cookie jar and they deserved exactly what they got. But here again I had to go back and stand like a school boy in front of the Commander-in-Chief with a conical paper hat on my head to explain to him why, in violation of orders, were we conducting a fire fight along the DMZ. Well, I'm sure that he racked me up for the same reasons that I racked Lee Sae Ho up and secretly was happy that we presented that kind of a hard front against the North Koreans who never learned their lesson, and continued to probe our lines as long as I was there, and I presume they're still doing it. The last reports: they were trying to dig under. They've tried everything else...
They've flown over. They've slithered through. They came down the Han River in a submarine as I indicated to you one previous encounter here. And they're the aggressors. No question about it.

I felt from my experiences with the Corps that the Corps Commander should be an infantryman. A combat infantryman, that understood the nature of the ground, understood fire and movement, . . . a combat type of necessity. Not someone who for the sake of his career is placed in that position of high command.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, at this point, we wanted to discuss the senior service college curriculum and the contribution they made to the development of senior officers and I thought that before we launched into our own system, it would be good to back up and give a good perspective by taking a look at the British system. I know that you attended a staff college at Camberly and I thought you might start off by talking about that, and then we'd lead into U.S. senior service college curriculums. Go ahead.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, in 1950, I was looking around really for a billet with the French Ecole De Guerre. Since I had learned how to speak French in North Africa and had kept up with it fairly well, I made an application for French training but I was told that there was no vacancy. But there was a vacancy at Camberly, which I didn't really know anything about . . . the British Staff College at Camberly. However, upon reflection, it seemed to me thereafter that this was even more appropriate than the French college, the French Ecole De Guerre, and I accepted with great pleasure the assignment to Camberly. It won't be my purpose here to go
through a complete explanation of the curriculum, and environment, and the whole thing at Camberly because a number of our officers have gone to the British Staff College. However, I wanted to point out that in my particular case, I learned so much that stayed with me for so long and I think and I'm so grateful for having had that experience, that I wanted to make special point of it. To begin with, I found the British system of teaching completely different than it was and had been at Leavenworth in my time. I had gone to the short nine weeks' course after the landing in the south of France as my parachute battalion was bogged down in the Maritime Alps. I took nine weeks' off and came back to the short course at Leavenworth. There I found that the system of marks and the examinations and mass lectures contrasted very sharply with Camberly where the instruction was carried out in seminars of nine or ten people with an instructor who wasn't really an instructor. He was called directing staff, DS, and he was more or less a discussion leader. Each individual was supposed to know a lot about his own service and about various elements of the military structure and together they learned from each other with leading questions by the DS, with suggestions for reading and background and whatever. There were no marks, ever, and I found that at the end of the course the only thing that appeared as an academic record was a paragraph or two written by the hands of the Commandant sizing you up as an individual. Now this size-up was a product of both the logic with which you addressed the questions, the background that you showed, the human characteristics that you displayed, your appreciation of the militaries of life, and the evaluation of the individual didn't end with the classroom. It was around
the clock. One of the major artifices for looking for the student body was the dining-in formation where the regimental airs preceded the formal dinner, where the trophies of combat and far places were laid down in the middle of the table, center of the middle of the table, beautifully catered. Lavish multi course dinner served with the appropriate wines with each course. The toasting of the king or the queen in vintage port. And then the period where drinks flowed and tongues were loosened and all his inhibitions came out. An individual could quite properly go up to his commanding officer and say, "Listen, you son-of-a-bitch, you haven't been running this outfit correctly and I want to tell you why." And if your logic was good, you could get away with it. If you were gross or stupid, then this also became a matter of record, in the minds of the people who were evaluating you for command positions or for positions of responsibility or authority. Everything from your manners, the capability of holding your liquor, your good taste, even your physical prowess in some instances in the post-dining actions in a British mess...sometimes they get very athletic. As a matter of fact, people have had broken arms and legs, and all inside the four walls of the mess, it was considered ok, as long as I said, it wasn't gross, stupid or just plain crass. So this opened up a new kind of vista for me on evaluation of people and collective education in this fraternity that we called the Army, the military. We had students from a number of areas which had formerly been British colonies and other areas. Ali Nuwar of the Arab Legion was a classmate of mine. Naji Talib, who later became, I think Prime Minister of Iraq, was a classmate of mine. We had Indians and Pakistanis operating together
in the class and in the class. All of them, I think, recognized that the

gentlemanly characteristics of the British were among the major exports
and those that had been under British colonial rule continued to exhibit
the noblesse that the British had left in that respect. And it was cer-
tainly the mark of the officer in the Camborly environment. Now the
operation that I thought was extremely helpful to our understanding of
tactics and strategy was the trip that the staff college made to Normandy
each year. It was initiated the year that I was there in 1950. On a couple
of British destroyers, we went to Normandy and spent several days walking
over the battlefields and the exercise would go something like this. A
DS, a member of the DS staff, would pass out maps and indicate what the
enemy situation was and what the allied situation was. And then after we
had walked over and reconnoitered the terrain, they would ask individuals
in the group, "How would you handle this situation?" Now, here's what
the score is. What are you going to do about it? And it was extremely
interesting to hear the various views on what they proposed. At the end
of that interrogation period, an officer who had been actually there,
combat officer, would get up and say, "Now chaps, I'll tell you exactly
what did happen." One could compare his own prognosis and so on with
the way the thing developed. Well, extremely interesting and also im-
portant from the point of view of the comraderie that developed and the
sizing up of each other in a tactical sense on a tactical battlefield.
One of my close friends at this time was the current commander of the
British Forces in Ireland, Lieutenant General Sir Frank King, who has
a bull by the tail in that area. I've corresponded with him a couple of
times. Well, I know Frank very well. I have lifted many a pint of beer with him together in the British pub between classes in Camberly. And I felt that, of course, the stay there has given me the same feeling for a number of other both British officers and allied officers who I know on a first name basis. I think in Camberly, one of the main guiding principles is a fetish for accuracy. I remember writing staff studies and estimates, not being too careful about use of words or ambiguity and having work torn apart by directing staff who indicated to me that this double- antandra could result in deaths on the part of troops because it could be misinterpreted or interpreted a couple of ways. And he pulled out occasiona- tionally examples of our own American orders to prove his point. We were sort of a different sort of a breed of cat, anxious to get something done in a dynamite way. We would frequently override the meticulous require- ment for absolute accuracy. Toward the end of my stay at Camberly I began to develop the feeling that a happy combination between the British exacti- tude, British accuracy and the American dynamism was the ultimate solution to military operations. We needed both. In the case of planning amphibious operations, the British planning was so meticulous that every phase line upon reaching the beach and moving inland was catalogued in the greatest and most minute detail. Well, no matter how much I admired their system, I couldn't buy that kind of an approach. I felt that capitalizing on break-throughs should be certainly part of the philosophy of a forward, dynamatic combat action. But I couldn't fault them for the logic that went behind planning military operations in that great detail. One of the books that I kept with me throughout the rest of my career was a
The guiding principles, for instance, for setting up a command post was absolutely usable in almost every sense. For instance, what should the Sergeant Major do in setting up a meeting for commanders or for a staff? The British exercise tells you that there are several ordered groups, order group A, B, or C and the commander. All he has to say is, "Group A," and that means key commanders and key staff officers, and the sergeant major knows and they get an invitation. They are checked off by name as they come into command or the briefing tent. The briefing tent or the briefing area is always separate in the British structure from the operational area so that operations are not disrupted. The exact responsibility for everything from setting up the chairs to providing maps, providing transcripts and putting the transcripts out are catalogued and codified to a degree that I have seldom seen in our Army. We rely on SOP's peculiar to an organization, and some of these aren't always known. What I'm saying is that I use that with great success. And another was the training and the indoctrination of the liaison officers. Now, I had crawled aboard a British ship in the harbor of Naples as an emissary for Mark Clark and I confronted General McCreary, who was the British Commander at that time. Not the bay of Naples, Salerno, that's the harbor at Salerno. General McCreary was the Commander of the British Forces there. And I said to General McCreary, "I'm a liaison officer from General Clark," and he said to me, "Well, Colonel, give me the situation with General Clark's headquarters." And I said, "General McCreary, I'm not current on that." He
said, "Well, get the hell off my ship. If you're a liaison officer and you're not any more good to me than that, I don't want you even on board."

I felt very put out until I learned over a period of time that he was absolutely right. That the British make a real fetish of the training of a liaison officer. The individual is supposed to be self-sufficient in everything from rations to communications. He's supposed to have his marked maps to bring information and to take information back and it's all outlined. It's not left to chance. So I felt that not only from the personal point of view of getting to know people who later became high commanders in their armies all over the world in the British Army, but in sharpening up my view of the mechanics of the Art of War. Camberly was a great investment for me. Well, what do we want to talk about?

INTERVIEWER: Well, after that experience, you came back and became an instructor at the Army War College, I believe immediately following that tour.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And were you able to notice the contrast in the different instructional techniques or was the Army War College anywhere all similar to that?

LTG YARBOROUGH: The Army War College was in the process of transition toward that very system, the rather relaxed seminar. We called it syndicates at Camberly, the smaller group where the instructor wasn't really an instructor but a coordinator. I was not displeased at all with the environment at the Army War College when I arrived. As a matter of fact, there
was at that time the philosophy that grade were not really the thing that we were after. It was supposed to be a learning process among mature people who had long since passed through the business of critical examination to see whether or not they deserved to keep their commissions or to try to find out what kind of people they really were by tests. And I think subsequent to my time, the pendulum swung the other way for some reason or another. Perhaps the environment was not all that relaxed. I spent the last part of my time at the War College, the last year on a study group which was rather a small affair. Brigadier General Lynn Smith was a member of it. And we tried to think about the unthinkable, addressed the problems of strategy of the future. As a matter of fact, it was this study group, Advance Study Group we called it, that produced the study called Benical, which we then took around to the Continental Army Command, gave it wide distribution. We delivered instructional talks on our concepts to all kinds of staffs and commanders. Being on the Advanced Study Group, of course, gave me a great deal of study time and a great deal of freedom of thinking and personal logistics and everything else. Together with Lynn Smith and Ben Pickett, Pickett was the other member of the study group. We visited numbers of military installations to find out what the latest developments were in hardware. For instance, the optimum fragmentation weapon was coming into being at that time and we had the feeling that this could revolutionalize some of the tactics on the battlefield in a sub-nuclear sense. That rather than go for nuclears, that the OPFRAG might give us some kind of an advantage. We were interested in articulated cross-country vehicles. There was one in the being in the
mill at that time which worked \ldots, ideally worked like a train. One could hook each of the articulated sections together, and each one hooked on to the power train, and the whole thing looked like a contineed, and would crawl across the earth giving tremendous cross-country mobility. We were intrigued with the idea of preempting combat by strategic placement of fighting forces in areas that were unacceptable to a forward moving enemy. In other words, examining a group of Russian fronts moving in conventional form against Western Europe. We felt it much better than to stand and try to deliver in front of that kind of a movement would be to implant a cancer somewhere in the rear that would require the forward edges of the column to falter and perhaps then turn around to go back to see what was chewing on it and when fully deployed and reversed in direction, to remove that logiment and place it somewhere else. The theory was not all that fragile in that there was development of compound aircraft in the mill at that point, both for troop movement, fire support, and logistics. We foresaw the development of the compound airplane and used the theory in our development of that kind of strategy. It was also the sea master and sea mistress airplane which could land on water, anywhere, and we felt that inside the Soviet Union there were so many waterways that logiment by this means would be feasible. Well, in any case, I'm just trying to give you some of the surrounding philosophy within which we were trying to develop forward thinking about strategy and military posture for future operations. It was a delightful year, I can assure you of that. We talked to people like Bernard Brody, well, George Tan-tun, a wide range of people who later made marks for themselves.
I wanted to also say that now, Smith and Pickett and I were concerned over the failure to recognize the development of generals as being part of the War College's mission. I don't mean generals from a rank point of view. I mean developing the art of generalship. In our studies of history, Lynn Smith was a great devotee of Belisarius and he felt that the modern Army officer knew only that part of military history that he'd been confronted with either as a cadet, or as a by-product of some other activity in school, and that we needed to get back to the real study of military history and military campaigns, again and again and again to try to get the pattern and the rhythm of military strategy as far as the development of high commander. We didn't see this in the Army War College curriculum at that time, but we saw it in the curricula of the Soviet developmental system. We didn't see how an academition faced with the realities of the battlefield, the modern battlefield, against an enemy that had been trained in fire and movement, was going to cope. Intellect was only part of the requirement of, familiarity with the tools of the trade on a higher and higher echelon with another part.

INTERVIEWER: Well, for now, I was wondering who do you think should go to the Army War College? As it is right now, unofficially, branches all have quotas and so there are people from every branch represented there, as well as other types of civilians. I think the current statistics show about 20% of a class goes on to General. It's gone up and down... as... as... as... as low as 14%, but somewhere in that range.

GEN YARBOROUGH: Well, it's hard to give a glib answer to that. I know the finest Personnel people are wrestling with this across the board over
long periods of time, but I think, really the emphasis ought to be on pro-
duction of commanders, that those people that have potential, and we have
certainly, if we hadn’t got a system now for picking people who have
potential over all these years, we’ll never have it. But I think the
fellow who has the qualifications for high command ought to be given the
number one billet and if there are billets left over for other branches,
other endeavors, other pursuits; fine, but the emphasis ought to be on
the commander. This is the thing that wins wars. It’s the area in which
we’ve always, . . . I won’t say had difficulty, but it’s an area that
ought to be emphasized above all else. A man who doesn’t ultimately rise
to high command for reasons that are good and sufficient, is universal and
very frequently make very fine Chief of Staff or operations officer or
whatever. But he ought to aspire to command it seems to me. I’m not
casting off on the services, the requirement for logistics, for adminis-
tration, for all of the things that go into the making of a fighting force,
and these have to be of the highest order. There’s not any question about
it, but I wonder if the Army War College is the place where these skills
and this kind of training should reach its apogee. I think the Industrial
College for one thing addresses those things that are in the non-combat
sphere, probably more adequately than a watered down kind of an approach
to, or a shot-gun approach to the whole spectrum of upper echelon managers
and leaders. I haven’t said that too well, but I believe the emphasis
ought to be on Command, because this is where we have had in the past
some notable deficiencies and where, when one arises that is outstanding,
the whole strategic format of the nation’s activity begins to change. We
can pick out our great commanders of modern times on the fingers of one
hand just about, and surely out of a nation of 230 million people, or
213 million people, there are more that should be found and sharpened
up in a place like the Army War College and if that commander, those
commanders, that essence of fine gold, have to stand in line and lock-
step beside the fellow whose going to be the director of services of
supply and evacuation and procurement and rehabilitation, things of
that nature. We're not putting emphasis in the proper place.

INTERVIEWER: When you say command, then you mean tactical command.

LTG YARBOROUGH: I mean tactical command.

INTERVIEWER: As opposed to installation commanders or project commanders?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Yes, yes.

INTERVIEWER: One problem about the Industrial War College that appears
to me is the Army's quota. There are about 35 Army people there and that
might not be enough. Likewise, if you're just talking about using the
Army War College for development of tactical commanders, maybe the 185
folks we have up there would be too many in a year.

LTG YARBOROUGH: I don't think so. As I said, if one aims at tactical
command and tactical is not quite as adequate as it ought to be. I don't
mean just tactics, but I mean theatre command, for instance. I think if
one aims at that level, then those that are not to be accommodated because
of the spaces and whatever become those other outstanding operational
staff officers. Now as far as the quotas are concerned at the Industrial
College, what is wrong with having branches of the Industrial College
serviced administratively and logistically somewhere else, but subsisting
on the kinds of fare that the Industrial College deals in, goods and services, instead of the Art of War, see, the Art of War! You know, I feel very strongly that we need a Chief of Infantry. We need a guy who knows infantry from the ground up, who knows the training of soldiers. A fellow who's like the Inspector General, who can go into any training installation and say, "As far as Infantry is concerned, you guys are not cutting it," or, "This is where the weight of your effort ought to be." The Artillery needs the same thing. The Armor needs the same thing.

INTERVIEWER: Yet, in some regards, we're going the opposite kind of direction. You've heard that in officer's personnel management, as an example, Infantry Branch has been eliminated. All branches have... and we're going to management by grade instead. But on the other hand, with this one station train concept where, let's say Fort Benning now, will handle all AIT for Infantrymen, all NCO courses, and all the officers' courses at that one post, it would seem to me that, that post commander with all Infantry training consolidated at his post, might almost be able to assume that role as the Chief of Infantry training.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, it goes broader. It goes deeper than that.

INTERVIEWER: Because that would be transient...?

LTG YARBOROUGH: That's exactly right, and I feel that Infantry units anywhere ought to look to a Chief of Infantry for guidance, for guidelines, for standards. Of course, history shows that we have run out of infantry in every war that we've been in, where there's still no assurance that we're not going to do it in the future. We've retreaded other
arms and services and made infantry out of them. And by our actions, we
seem to play down the hard fact that the toughest job in war is infantry.

There isn't any question about it. The most decisive arm in war is the
infantry. The Vietnam War proved that again. The requirement for the
most highly motivated, highly skilled, highly trained, rugged individual
in infantry is outstanding. I've known Europeans who say that, who have
said that. An Englishman especially said, "You can judge a country by the
nature of its infantry." So to put this on the same wave length as the
training of Ordnance, the training of Signal, the training of Medical
Corpsman, and the training of Infantry; you can't say it that way. If
it's the sharp edge of your effort; if you have a long, long history of
deficiency along that line; if you're not satisfied right now with the
load the Infantrymen carries, with the reliance, for instance, on heavy
fire support; if there are unresolved problems, and there are many still,
then we should have some top echelon guy, it seems to me, that concerns
himself with that sharp edge of U.S. combat effort. And I think a gen-
eral, who does not understand infantry thoroughly, and you can't under-
stand infantry by being an engineer all your life, or an Ordnance man
all your life, or a tanker all your life; but put a man like this in com-
mand of an infantry division or infantry corps, which is predominately
infantry, or at least the combat elements of it, you're doing the country
a disservice. So I would think if the Army War College could concentrate
on command, commanders, that the fall-out would be tremendous and it would
result in more inspired and more professional command of large units, and
those for which there were not places which fulfilled with distinction
many, many staff positions, but not the administrative kind of structure. Now, here again for a lot of reasons, I should not rule out, nobody should rule out, having people who are getting familiar with the business assigned in order to understand what the combat arms are about, what their philosophy of functioning is. And here shortly, there could be members of other branches who are there for the purpose of understanding or getting to know the kinds of forces that they’re going to support. And you’d probably get wide objection to this view.

INTERVIEWER: But one compromise might be, you have a paper that I have brought and showed you, reference some of the thinking of the Army War College on what their curriculum should be and so forth. And I have another paper which I read which you didn’t see, which was a presentation given by the past commandant, General Davis, at a seminar on Army Officer Education, to a bunch of civilian educators at the Sheraton Park Hotel back last fall. In that, he was talking about the dilemma between the tailored curriculum and a common curriculum that everybody would take, and he was advocating the tailored curriculum. There’s some words in that paper that I was showing you, where it talks about the individual nature of the people that come there, and the diverse backgrounds from which they appear to come. And as a result from that, it would lead you to believe that they’re pushing for the tailored curriculum where you have electives, and space in the curriculum for you to pursue different goals, and maybe as an interrum measure. With a diverse student body, there’s going to be at least some emphasis put in the elective portions of the course, but certain people would be encouraged to get into that
command track, so to speak, in a whole body of electives that can be supportive of that track. And the other people that are there, from tech branches would go with everybody to the common core curriculum, so to speak, and then they would split out, and the other people that were there could go their special way.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, it's feasible, I guess, to have this sort of university approach to the educational structure there so that there is a college of command, and a college of administration, and a college of support, a college of logistics. But to expose everybody to the same requirements across the board for understanding and getting some facility in manipulation of the multiple things that the Army does and is responsible for, is placing command in a subordinate position and really the payoff of everything in command. It's going to be. And I don't know how the Army War College now identifies those individuals that are adequate for high command. If there isn't emphasis on demonstration of those qualifications and characteristics that lead in that direction, or if there isn't some system for increasing the capability through the study of history, through the study of strategy and grand strategy and tactics to improve the individuals capability. In other words, if everybody is exposed to the technological, social, psychological factors associated with broad aspects of national security and utility of military forces and other things that appear throughout this paper, one year isn't enough really to get on the same level as the high commanders in the Warsaw Pact countries who spend their, commonly spend most of their lives studying maneuver, fire movement, strategy on the battlefield. I notice
here emphasis here on land combat and I take some exception to the word, “land combat” because the military, the Army is incapable of three dimensional combat, four dimensional, if you call psychological and political combat part of it, and this seems to have kind of an atavistic connotation. Surely now, the Army’s air-arm, the business of air mobility. Land combat sounds too restrictive to me. It’s like wrap-leggings and we have wrap-legging. The military profession here, the War College objectives, to advance the body of knowledge concerning the land warfare, I would say all kinds, I would say warfare, warfare. People’s wars are in the hearts and minds of men. They’re very successful apparently. Underground warfare is a phenomenon of life which we weren’t able to cope with in Vietnam. The Phoenix Program attempted to try to rout out some of the things that were giving us such a hard time concerning land warfare. Now, it goes on to saying raising and maintaining and employing the U.S. Army, raising an Army, is something that I wouldn’t have asked General Patton to do or General Phil Sheradon. Somebody has to do it. Maintaining an Army is something else again. It involves battling with Congress, battling for your share of the pie with the Air Force and Navy. Getting local politicians to keep your posts, camps, and stations from being sold as public parks. Well, I think to win wars, especially in this era, people have got to specialize in winning wars, and the whole mechanism and the mechanics and the structure that provide you the lift-off portion of your missile has got to be put in it’s proper perspective. There are people who dedicate their lives to providing that base for the Army and should, but they shouldn’t be mixed in with the moonwalker, the pilot, the guy that’s actually going to be on hand at the pay-off.
Now, I mentioned I think yesterday that concepts of combat have got to be looked on with some suspicion. The employment of military forces projected into the future is full of all kinds of uncertainties. However, current history and recently passed history is full of indicators which would lead us to presume that the kind of conflict that our forces may be involved in in the future could be different. All soldiers, say every Army, prepares for the last war, and they all laugh about it. They then go back to the drawing board and continue to prepare for the last war. Invariably, this is not really an indictment, it's because a soldier likes to have one foot on solid ground before he gets out into the quagmire or something that is not understood. However, physical preparation for the last war is not as indictable as psychological preparation for the last war, and psychological preparation doesn't cost all that much. And I would think that the vast preoccupation with the mechanics and the hardware and the politics of getting a finite military machine together in something like the past format but which has more firepower and more mobility for the next one, could be indictable. We lost in Indo-China, and I use the word advisedly, because we didn't understand the power of the political factor both in our homeland and in the motivation of the enemy. We assumed that the physical instrument that we had developed was adequate for even intangible situations which it was not. And we saw the collapse of the outposts that we had established physically because it didn't have a psychological or moral buttress built into it. We see this rot continuing in the Asian area. It may extend eventually to Japan, our main ally because Japan if confronted by increasing socialist pressure on the mainland,
together with distress inside the United States with the free-enterprise system and apparent public disillusionment with the free-enterprise system, could result in the removal of an ally without military action, through psychological action. Other areas in the world that appear to be going into the socialist orbit without overt combat are Portugal, which I think we've talked about before. Spain is probably on the list. Now, where is the battlefield going to be for the use of the kinds of forces that the "managers," the project managers, people who are learning how to raise and maintain armies, where will they exercise this hardware that is on the developmental board now. If our arch enemy, the Soviet Union seeks our demise, and there's every reason to indicate that it does, (and Communist China as well,) because the systems aren't compatible in the long run, how is the best way to do it? Through meeting our forces on the field of conventional battle or through first making the socialist system work to the point where there is propaganda advantage. Then making the economic environment in the world inhospitable to continuation of our part of the multi-national corporation and enterprise, inhibiting the economic activity of the United States to the point where internal dissention which is now apparent, because of the depression and recession rises to a crescendo, helping this along in every way short of overt support, attacking American institutions, delaying or inhibiting of Congressional action because of public pressure. We may find that the American system, like these other systems, is under attack in a way that will result in a drastic change in our government and our society, and the military then will have no place to go, nobody to fight, to protect the country. In the beginning,
we took an oath to protect the country against all enemies, foreign and domestic. It's an American curiosity that we can't define what a domestic enemy is. There isn't one apparently. He's a dissenter and he has every right to do that. He can't even kick his butt for it any more. But somewhere along the line, and I have talked to a number of young officers, and officer groups about this, I feel that a return to some kind of national discipline is necessary if there's going to be a coherent society. A society without discipline is no society, and by a very definition of a society, somebody gets pinched in order to belong. If everybody did as he pleased, there would be no society. It would be the "Banderlog". But because there are boundaries and limits, your activities and your freedoms, if you will, are inhibited to some degree in the interest of the whole.

Our civilian echelon seems to appear to have rejected a lot of this, for a complex bunch of reasons that began with the enemy propaganda effort to keep us out of the Vietnam War and to make us disenchanted with it. That reflected itself into the Watergate affair which then reduced the faith in the Presidency and in all people in high office, the President, Vice-President, Secretary, of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and permissiveness has stemmed from a tremendous number of these things, all catalogable and all understandable. If this condition exists or persists, then as I said, society can come apart and all sorts of dire things can follow in it's wake, including totalitarianism, a militant form of socialism that will seek law and order above everything else, security in the streets, job security, and medical care without pay and things of that nature. But I have more faith in the resiliency of the country than to think this kind
is imminent. But I do think that the military is a repository at this time of a kind of discipline and a kind of belief in country and a belief in leadership which is an essence that has to be spread back again into the civilian population. Now, millions of young men go through the military services. The families that are affected are in the tens of millions because they have people that are in the services. I think, if the moral is as to the physical as ten to one, and we prove this every time we go into battle, every time we have a hard time of any kind, then the morale of the military can be an infusion into the civilian sector and the requirement for sticking bayonets into people and maneuvering on the field of battle of your tanks and your artillery becomes that much less. Just in summary, the exercise that is vital to this country, in my view, is not to see where in Europe we're going to send our expeditionary forces, but to see how we can bolster the strength of this country, the belief in itself. And I think to assume that the military doesn't have a logical or reasonable part in that because of past inhibitions is to misunderstand the nature of the battlefield of the future. The last thing that I would envision would be American guerrillas fighting against their government. But if the society becomes more and more fractionalized and the processes which give reason, preach reason are eroded, then there are certain elements of this country that could very well go into that kind of a format. And what then is the role of the military? Can it be discussed or is it one of those things that you're afraid to talk about because the Attorney General will say, "You're out of your tree."?

INTERVIEWER: So military policy today should be what in your regard?
LTG YARBOROUGH: Military policy. Well, let's talk about part of it.
First, I don't believe that it is possible to send an expeditionary force of American troops outside this country for any protracted period of time or any kind of tough combat unless they believe in the country and the country believes in the issue at stake. I wouldn't bank on the troops believing that much in any issue at this point. Maybe for a week's period, ten days' period, but not for a couple of years of combat. I think the issues inside the country and the discipline of the forces, the motivation of the forces have got to undergo a metamorphosis and a renaissance before we should contemplate any heavy military action anywhere. Now, in order to get that thing in shape, that echelon, that element in shape, internal problems of the country have got to be solved. So if I were to announce a military policy, I would state that until our forces are better disciplined, better motivated, better understood and reflect more of the combined belief of the country in itself, that the high command should avoid taking on any outside exercise. I'll put it that clearly. There was a time, I guess, in the history of the country, when a start of a foreign war could make the forces in the country congeal and all fight together. I think the mass communications media have wrecked that business for once and for all, and the fractionalism along ethnic lines, along religious lines, along political lines, along economic lines have meant that there is a strong possibility that in face of real overseas confrontation rather than getting the nation together, each element which is considered now the time for us to get what we want to act. If the opposite is true, there's got to be some force that is making it
true. In the light of recent political events in the country, I don't see that force. I see the President now beginning to reestablish the prestige of the office of Presidency, but there's the dichotomy between the President and the Congress which has got to be solved and which has a very strong implication for military strategy. How could you, as a high command, a member of the high command, knowing that Congress may disapprove your ammunition or if you're launched into an area, may say, "You've got to be out of there by two weeks from now or three weeks from now." What kind of a coherent military policy can you develop under circumstances like that? Well, I think the coherency under the military policy under those circumstances and all circumstances that we face now should lie in perfecting the instrument, the human instrument to the degree that it becomes really dedicated to the essence of the country, really imbued with the idea that the free enterprise system as we know it is sacred, that the backing and the filling of the society as it seeks development in a revolutionary world notwithstanding, that they are the crux of the law, order and security. So, I'm saying, I'd come back again and again, anyway that I approach it to the requirement for the psychological preparation. I don't want to use the word "indoctrination", but I mean education of the military as being on as high an order of importance as teaching the guy how to control the fire or fly a helicopter.

INTERVIEWER: No evidence that we do that at all.

LTG YARBOROUGH: No, there isn't. There's every reason to believe that if we started to do it, the forces would wish us ill, would through intermediaries, through liberal groups, would try to inhibit it. Try to stop
it. But feeling these things just as sure as we're sitting here, the socialism process will develop. Socialism itself isn't all that bad because we have some of it in our structure now that is good. But the part that is unacceptable to Americans is the philosophy which requires dismantling completely of the old structure in order to build a new one along these clean lines of Marxism, Leninism, you see. The military can't sit to one side and not think these thoughts it seems to me. It's heresy to talk about it because we have been born and raised and grown up in an environment that says the political decisions belong to somebody else. We carry out the wishes of our civilian leaders. And we do. We have the checks and balances. But we've got to understand all these dimensions that shape the nature of the instrument that we have in our hands and condition the probability or the possibility of victory or defeat on the battlefield. It's not new with me to talk about the many facets of the Vietnamese affair. I was talking about that a long time ago. I didn't learn it all on my own. I learned it from Ho Chi Minh, and I learned it from Mao Tse-tung, and I studied them assiduously. I can see what was developing in that theatre and the inability of our military and our conventional structure to see the conflict through the enemy's eyes gave rise to our loss and that process, as I said, is continuing around the world.

INTERVIEWER: Well, to look at the curriculum of the War College and it's hard to keep from doing that. You know, you have the realistic approach of what the probability of actually getting some change made as opposed to, if you could start all over with clean, new lines, where you'd like
to put it. But there's about three things in that paper that it looks to me like they're trying to do. One of them is the, and they're not necessarily listed in order, but those objectives. One of them is an orientation, however slight, toward immediate problems that the graduates will face. Let's say the next two or three assignments. There is the feeling that a lot of people are going to leave and go to positions of responsibility and to what extent should the War College focus on some of the real current vital issues of the Army and debate that in some type of form. That's one thing. The second thing then is what you've been talking about. The responsibility for some type of command they've got hidden away as you've mentioned. And the third thing is the inter-disciplinary thing they talk about which you really, where you've got all the emphasis. What degree should we spend time studying all of the other aspects of a political, economic, social system under the auspices supposedly of showing the military where they fit in and how are we going to do what we had to do in full recognition of all these other factors and in accomplishing the national goal. You look at those three things. What direction do you think we ought to be going?

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, you obviously had to go in all of those directions for this question of emphasis. I think I favor the university approach with the colleges of these different endeavors and the waiting being in the light of numbers of people going to each. I would make extensions from the Industrial College of curricula, and exchange of instructors, and so on for the colleges that have to do with things in that sphere that would be appropriate; but I continue to be concerned about the lack of emphasis
on production of commanders, and I think the history in the past shows that these are scarce as hen's teeth and even in peacetime you can see that with the way the commands are run. Another point I wanted to make but I forget what the hell it was.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, there's one other aspect of the curriculum of the War College that we can talk about: is the requirement, supposedly, for civilian graduate education. Initially, several years ago, in 1971, to give you a statistic, 60% of the people that came to the Army War College already had a Masters Degree from somewhere else. That is about reversed now, so that now only 40% have a Masters Degree and 60% do not. As a result, right today, 42% of the student body is working on their Master's Degree at the same time they are attending the Army War College, either at Shippensburg or Penn State. Most of these people are getting it in public administration; some in business administration, as I think I mentioned before. The question is, do you have any feel for the value of graduate level education, or in particular, getting the piece of paper that says you have a Master's Degree... at this stage in the officer's service, average eighteen years of service.

LTG YARBOROUGH: Well, I have extremely strong feelings on that. I guess I was in the Army for about 40 years, all told, and I never considered that I knew everything there was to know about the military profession. In World War II, I commanded units in combat over long periods of time and only at the end of long and extremely arduous activities, did I feel that I knew, was beginning to know the fundamentals of combat and command in combat. I don't think an Army officer really has all that time to broaden
his civilian type education if he wants to really be an outstanding professional military officer. Now, there are prestige reasons for some of the degrees. There are hundreds of reasons that are valid. But I could think of more that are not valid if an individual wants really to become outstanding in his profession. I think everything he does ought to be professionally related. Of course, we have built such a tremendous military structure a hierarchy with all the attributes in some cases of civilian big business and civilian industry. If we're going to perpetuate that scene which some think has been at cross purposes to the objectives of combat and military action, then we'll need the kinds of businessmen to run those business operations, and they'll have to follow "business" careers and study civilian business systems. But I don't think, again, that the Warsaw Pact gives a damn about our structure in that sense. They're going to confront our guys in a different way, in a different medium. I think all things that come out as blanket requirements have to be looked at very, very carefully. You and I have both been in the military during periods when things were considered absolutely essential for a man's future development, like ROTC duty and various things, and as new leadership came into the civilian echelons, particularly, those ideas changed. ... as new Chiefs of Staff came in. I think the test is whether or not the end product is going to give fighting capability to the military in the kind of environment that the best brains could project for the future. If that means a degree in business administration, if the battle is going to be among the computers, and the procurement areas, well all right. I wonder how many of these types that are getting their Master's and Doctorates could give
you a dissertation on Clausewitz or could write anything remotely resembling J.F.C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, or even Hanson Baldwin’s Treatise On War. If they can’t, and you don’t see much evidence of it in military publications, then maybe we’re looking in the wrong direction. It seems to me that we’ve been seeking prestige among civilian groups and by trying to compete with them in their own area when I believe they would have a hell of a lot more respect for the military if they knew we were outstanding in our own profession which is an esoteric one at best, and a thousand years old.

INTERVIEWER: Well, the argument presented by the War College faculty, which seems to be supporting graduate school, is that they don’t care so much about the degree or prestige, they just think that going to graduate school helps broaden your perspectives by mingling with civilian educators and civilian type students and studying the different disciplines, having to do methodical research in some area or write a paper for some course. It’s just a mind broadening thing.

LTC YARBOROUGH: Well, I can’t fault that at all. Of course it is. Of course it’s mind broadening and develops you as a human being. There’s no argument against continuing education, but if the end requirement is to run the mightiest military machine on earth, keep it viable and dynamic and forward moving and capable, then where do you get the time to go off on those tangents? If everyone of the degrees was related in some way directly to a military requirement. Of course this is hard to say too because the military is more than a way of life. We want our officers to be educated because the men respect them more if they are educated,
no question about that. They also respect knowledge of the military art
and leadership, and victory in battle, even if the guy doesn't know the
proper English term for it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, thank you very much, sir, for this side.

THIS CONCLUDES THE TAPING SESSION